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Abstract
Agricultural commodity futures markets experienced dramatic price swings 
between 2007 and 2012.  This high level of market volatility had not been seen since the 
early 1970’s and the Great Depression.  Applied economic research has not reached a 
consensus as to whether market economics, increased speculative participation, or 
regulatory policy shifts have been the primary cause of the increased volatility.  Policy 
research has concentrated on the legislative intent of the law and how financial and 
commodity market regulation should revert back to the successful, though not always 
enforced, policies prior to the Commodity Futures Act of 2000.  The Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 has been an attempt to re-tighten 
legislation, but challenges to the Dodd-Frank Act, and its implementation, have prevented 
a complete return to more constrained market regulatory policies.  Policy scholars credit 
financial and commodity market turmoil to changes in regulatory policy, but no specific 
research has been identified that associates changes in market volatility with changes in 
regulatory policy.  This dissertation addresses the following research question: why has 
agricultural commodity futures price volatility changed over time?  Applying quantitative 
analysis methods of descriptive statistics and econometric modeling, alongside qualitative 
policy research and applied theory, this research examines the price volatility of four 
agricultural commodity futures markets and how their price volatility relates to economic 
fundamentals, speculative participation, and regulatory policy shifts over the past forty-
three years.  The findings indicate that market economics and speculative participation 
variables, in conjunction with changes in commodity futures market regulation, are all 
factors that led to a significant increase in agricultural commodity futures market 
volatility that took place during the period from 2007 to 2012. 
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Introduction 
“We need to start re-evaluating this big push that occurred in the 1990’s to remove 
government oversight.  Congress really doesn’t get it.  It is incredible to me that they are 
still trying to call the Enron case an isolated problem.” 
Tom Schlesinger, executive director of the Financial Markets Center, a non-profit 
research group, (Perine, April 6, 2002) 
Increased price volatility, between 2007 and 2012, across physical and 
agricultural futures markets has drawn the attention of both applied economic and public 
policy scholars because turbulent commodity prices have significant economic and 
political implications, (Janzen, Smith, and Carter, 2013).  The larger commodity markets 
by volume and value, such as energy and metals, have attracted the most interest.  The 
smaller agricultural crops, such as corn, wheat, soybeans, and cotton, have received less 
attention.  Regardless of size, commodity futures regulatory policy blankets all actively 
traded futures markets.  Regulatory policy change may be one of many significant causes 
of these booms and busts. 
This dissertation research question is: why has agricultural commodity futures 
price volatility changed over time?  This question is important to policy studies because it 
is important to understand if a particular type of regulatory policy has an effect on market 
volatility.  If regulatory policy can influence market volatility, policy makers may be able 
to enact a policy that is gauged for a particular level of volatility in the market.  
Economic research has centered on the causes of price volatility.  Policy research has 
observed market behavior before and after regulatory change but without quantitative 
analysis, especially for agricultural commodity markets.  Comparing market volatility 
both prior and subsequent to a major regulatory policy change is one way to determine 
the correlation between regulatory policy and volatility; but to understand the relative 
significance of the relationship, other variables must be corrected for in the model.  
This research focuses on recent historically high volatility in major agricultural 
commodity markets.  High volatility can be a sign of market failure if there is information 
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asymmetry1 (markets are perceived not to reflect true economic fundamentals), severe 
financial hardship, and / or manipulative activity by participants (hoarding or 
stockpiling).  If regulatory policy does not address the problem of market failure, via the 
rules established by Congress or regulations enforced by the designated government 
agency, then regulatory policy must shift in order to abate or minimize the problem.  A 
quantitative assessment of volatility surrounding major shifts in commodity regulatory 
policy is examined, adjusting for economic fundamentals and non-commercial market 
participation variables.  Applying policy theory, qualitative assessment examines the 
causes of regulatory policy change and the difficulties of implementation.  Finally, the 
specific tool to prevent or minimize market failure is presented.  
0.1.0 The Problem 
0.1.1 Price Volatility 
In a meeting in Rome in October of 2014, the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) stressed that price volatility was a major issue affecting all 
agricultural commodities.  International food and agricultural raw materials have become 
vulnerable to excessive price volatility, causing some food and fiber producing countries 
to lose their trust in world markets as a reliable source of supply.  National governments 
have turned to policies that enhance their food and fiber self-sufficiency (FAO, 2014). 
For instance, between 2007 and 2012, cotton futures prices experienced a level of 
volatility not seen in many years.  From May 2007 to March 2008, in less than a year, 
prices virtually doubled.  Within six months, by November 2008, cotton futures dropped 
60% in value.  Between November 2008 and March 2011, in just over two years, nearby 
cotton futures increased more than five-fold (519 percent) to a historic high of $2.27 per 
1 Asymmetric information refers to a situation where, in a particular market, some market participant 
knows more about market characteristics than do other market participants; it appears to have played a role 
in the recent financial crisis (Williamson, 2011, pp. 313 and 318).  Ulbrich (2011, p. 345) defines 
information asymmetry as the disparity between the seller and the buyer in information quality, reliability, 
and other aspects of product or service.  The author is of the opinion that information asymmetry exists in 
agricultural commodity markets where a participant may have knowledge of stock that is eligible for 
contract certification and / or product quality information (at respective locations) that all participants may 
not have access (and can be reflected in basis divergence). 
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lb.  By June 2012 (fifteen months) prices declined 71 percent.  In comparison, from 
March 1995 to October 2001, nearby cotton futures declined from a high near $1.20 per 
lb. to a low of $0.33 per lb.  This six year and three month price swing was the largest 
since the mid-1980’s, but was only a decline of 14 percent per annum compared to the 
231 percent annualized price increase between November 2008 to March 2011 and the 57 
percent annualized price decrease between March 2011 to June 2012. 
The result of these dramatic price swings in the cotton case was bankruptcy and 
financial hardship for commercial cotton futures market participants, also referred to as 
hedgers.  Commodity hedgers include producers (farmers), merchants / shippers 
(distributors), processors (flour and textile mills), and ancillary services to those 
industries (Carter, 2003).  Firms that have been in business for generations were forced to 
dismiss employees, liquidate assets, and / or declare bankruptcy in order to meet the 
financial obligations required of futures market positions (Carter and Janzen, 2009; 
Janzen, 2010).  Individual participants suffered, as did national economies that rely on 
cotton and cotton-related income (McFerron, Javier, and Perez, 2013).  Consumers and 
producers in both developing and developed countries faced distress, leading to market 
distorting responses and stockpiling by foreign governments to protect domestic 
economies dependent on cotton production and / or manufacturing (Plastina, 2011). 
The story is very similar for other agricultural commodities.  For many years 
speculation has been blamed as a cause of abnormal volatility in commodity futures 
markets (Medlock and Jaffe, 2009).  Since the introduction of financial futures markets in 
the early 1970’s, non-commercial participation has increased in agricultural futures 
markets; and since a change in regulation in 2000, speculative driven participation has 
increased dramatically (Robles, Torero, and von Braun, 2009).  Non-commercial 
participants are those not directly involved in the production, distribution, processing, or 
consumption of an agricultural commodity.   Bankers, money managers, index funds, and 
hedge funds are considered to be non-commercial participants, often referred to as large 
speculators.  These Wall Street firms trade in futures markets principally for profit and 
use futures markets to offset (hedge) their risk in underwriting commodity-based over-
the-counter (OTC) derivative products (swaps) for their customers.   
 	 4	
Exchange-traded (ET) futures and options have traded on organized exchanges 
since their inception in the mid-19th century, and have been federally regulated since the 
1920’s (GFA, 1922).  OTC derivatives are traded between firms, not on a futures 
exchange, and were not regulated by a government agency until the passage of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank, 2010).  
Many of the clients of financial institutions use commodity-based derivatives and 
investment products to speculate on the price direction of that commodity or a basket of 
commodities.  It is ironic that today’s large financial institutions may have a banking 
division that provides a loan to a commercial hedger to finance business activity; but at 
the same time may be taking the opposite side of a futures transaction, inadvertently 
profiting from the client’s loss (O’Brien, 2012). 
 
0.1.2 Market Regulation 
 
Modern agricultural futures exchanges with standardized contracts and clearing 
systems began in the mid-19th century in Chicago and New York.  In 1936, Congress 
enacted the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA, 1936) that replaced the Grain Futures Act 
of 1922.  The CEA (1936) provides federal regulation of all commodities and futures 
trading activities and requires all commodity futures to be traded on organized 
exchanges.  Specifically, CEA (1936) authorized the use of “position limits” to limit the 
size a futures position a trader can have in the market.  This regulatory legislation was 
enacted in response to the high degree of speculation that occurred in the 1920’s and 
1930’s. 
After the United States abandoned the gold standard in 1971, bringing the Breton 
Woods system to an end, and with the introduction of financial futures markets in the 
early 1970’s, Congress established the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
in 1974 in the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act (CFTCA, 1974) as an 
independent agency to regulate commodity futures and options markets in the United 
States.  From the middle 1970’s until the late 1990’s, growing domestic and international 
economies created more capital that encouraged financial service institutions to seek a 
wider range of investment opportunities and products for their clients.  The technology of 
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the information age, allowing instant global communication and electronic transactions, 
has revolutionized financial markets.  The increasing pace of marketing innovation has 
instituted round-the-clock trading by active market users and market intermediaries 
(Born, 2001). 
Government regulatory agencies are in charge of overseeing markets to protect 
market participants and the public from fraud, abusive practices, and systemic risk.  
While the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates stock, bond, and 
currency markets in the United States, the CFTC is empowered by Congress to regulate 
organized futures, options, and swap markets.  The CFTC’s mission is to foster 
transparent, open, competitive, and financially sound markets (CFTC, 2016).  
Complicated investigations and extended litigation by the CFTC have been necessary to 
prove manipulation.  
In 2000, responding to the demand for flexibility by the financial industry, 
Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA, 2000) that 
deregulated certain financial products.  Over-the-counter derivatives went unregulated, 
much to the chagrin of the CFTC (Brush and Schmidt, 2013).  This de-regulation lead to 
an explosion in a myriad of financial products, many based on commodities, where the 
underlying price exposure was hedged in commodity futures markets. Since then, 
institutional hedge funds, pensions funds, and investment banks have substantially 
increased participation in agricultural commodity futures markets.  Based on the findings 
of the International Food Policy Research Institute (Robles, Torero, and von Braun, 
2009), noncommercial firms are more than half of market participation, compared to one-
third twenty years ago.  No longer are the majority of participants commercial hedging 
organizations who use futures to manage price risk; instead they are large non-
commercial institutions trading purely for profit for their clients and themselves.  This 
phenomenon has become known as “the financialization of commodity markets,” 
according to a World Bank policy research working paper (Baffes and Haniotis, 2010). 
In response to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank, 2010), which 
changed the financial regulatory environment affecting all federal financial regulatory 
agencies.  As part of the overhaul, Dodd-Frank (2010) requires the CFTC to limit the 
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amount of futures contracts that a single trader or firm can hold (position limit) on a 
commodity; however, the law failed to offer much guidance on the scope of the limits 
(Protess, 2011).  Under the guidelines of the CFTC, commodity exchanges each establish 
position limits for each commodity traded on its own exchange.  From 1936 until 2000, 
the dominant policy instrument utilized to curb excessive speculation was position limits, 
the constraint on participants to prevent manipulation in the market.  However, after 
1991, the CFTC used its discretion to grant exemptions from position limits to certain 
futures market participants.  As of October 2013, twenty-eight physical commodity 
futures markets (including cotton, soybeans, corn, and wheat) had not seen the Dodd-
Frank (2010) requirement implemented, despite a proposal by the CFTC for a new 
system of position limits.  The CFTC ruling was rejected in a District of Columbia court 
on appeal by a consortium of financial industry representatives (Peterson, 2012).  In 
November 2103, the CFTC proposed a new rule setting position limits and modifications 
were still being proposed (Federal Register, September 29, 2015). 
 
0.1.3 Policy Implementation 
 
Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank (2010), the CFTC was a regulatory 
agency struggling to find its level of authority and enforcement in a rapidly expanding 
derivatives market.  The high costs of enforcement and prosecution were a deterring 
factor to regulators (Markham, 1991).  There have also been contentions between the 
CFTC and the SEC over jurisdiction.  That contention has been due to the complexity of 
the derivatives market as to what is defined as a commodity and what is defined as 
security.  After the enactment of Dodd-Frank (2010), the CFTC found itself with clear 
responsibilities and defined jurisdiction on equal basis with other financial market 
regulatory agencies (Greenberger, 2011).  Contentions with the SEC have eased as the 
classification of derivatives has improved under the law.  Unfortunately, the CFTC has 
been struggling with inadequate resources to fully implement regulation in a timely and 
encompassing fashion (Massad, 2015). 
In 1998, United States ET futures and options volume was 630 million contracts.  
By 2008, trading volume had increased to 3.4 billion contracts, a rise of 440 percent in 
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ten years.  In 2014, trading volume increased to 8.2 billion contracts, twelve times the 
amount sixteen years earlier.  From 1988 to 2008, the number of large (reportable) 
traders2 on U.S. exchanges monitored by the CFTC grew by 26 percent, the number of 
reportable traders in the Chicago Board of Trade corn and wheat contracts increased 43 
percent and 116 percent respectively, and those in the New York Mercantile Exchange 
West Texas Intermediate crude oil contract grew 74 percent.  During the period from 
2006 to 2007, just before the recent financial crisis, financial futures and energy futures 
volume grew by 27 percent, agricultural futures by 23 percent, and metal futures by 38 
percent (Bennett, 2010).  In notional value terms, in 2009, the U.S. market for ET futures 
and OTC swaps markets combined was $290 trillion and for the world market $600 
trillion.  By 2011, those figures had increased to $358 trillion and $633 trillion 
respectively.  In 2013, the market for U.S. ET futures and OTC swaps had steadied to 
$356 trillion, but the world market had increased to $710 trillion (FIA, 2015), as Dodd-
Frank (2010) regulations encouraged United States firms to move transactions offshore. 
 
0.1.4 Agricultural Commodities 
 
This research focuses on the agricultural commodities of cotton, soybeans, corn, 
and wheat.  All four are major fiber, food, or fuel crops (or some combination thereof) 
that are internationally traded, produced, and processed in the United States and around 
the world.  Each has one or more associated active futures markets based in the United 
States as well as domestic and overseas OTC derivative markets.  The importance upon 
global food and fiber commerce and local economies of these four commodities has been 
revealed in such classic works as Morgan’s (1979, 2000) The Merchants of Grain, 
Broehl’s (1992) Cargill: Trading the World’s Grain, Beckert’s (2014) Empire of Cotton: 
A Global History, and Garside’s (1935) Cotton Goes to Market: A Graphic Description 
of a Great Industry.  Rather than review each commodity’s significance to the question of 																																																								
2 CFTC market surveillance staff assesses individual trader’s activities and potential market power and 
enforces speculative position limits by using a large trader reporting system (LTRS).  Under the 
Commission’s LTRS, clearing members, futures commission merchants, and foreign brokers (collectively 
called reporting firms) file daily reports with the Commission under Part 17 of the CFTC’s regulations, 17 
CFR Part 17.  The reports show futures and option positions of traders with positions at or above specific 
reporting levels as set by the Commission.  Current reporting levels are found in CFTC Regulation 
15.03(b), 17 CFR 15.03(b) (CFTC Website, 2015). 
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change in agricultural commodity futures market price volatility, an overview of the 
cotton market is presented.  Each commodity has its own but similar story. 
 Despite its relatively small size by traded volume and market capitalization 
compared to the energy, metal, and grain markets, cotton is one of the most important and 
widely produced agricultural and industrial crops in the world.  Cotton is an actively 
traded global commodity; it is an important cash crop in the United States and many 
developing economies, providing some 250 million jobs worldwide (Roche 1994).  In 
some countries it contributes as much as 40 percent of merchandise exports and more 
than 5 percent of GDP (Baffes, 2005).  Producers in Africa and South America heavily 
depend on cotton income for their livelihood.  Processors in middle and east Asia depend 
on affordable raw cotton for their manufacturing businesses. 
The cotton and cotton textile industries are central to the economic growth of both 
developed and developing countries. (Gruere, Guitchounts, Plastina, and Townsend, 
2010).  It is the world’s most important textile fiber, representing 40 percent of fiber 
production; 30-40 percent of cotton fiber crosses international borders before processing 
(Meyer, MacDonald, and Foreman, 2007).  Cotton is grown in more than one hundred 
countries on about two percent of the world’s arable land, making it one of the most 
significant crops in terms of land use after grains and oilseeds (Gruere, Guitchounts, 
Plastina, and Townsend, 2010).  More than one hundred million family units are engaged 
directly in production. 
As in many other commodity industries, the United States is at the center of the 
global cotton trade; the United States is a major producer, international exporter, and 
major consumer of cotton products.  In international commerce, the price of cotton is 
denominated in United States dollars.  Since the mid-19th century, through its legal and 
financial system, the world has depended on the United States to provide a secure and 
transparent price discovery mechanism for the global cotton market. 
Cotton futures price volatility dramatically increased in the late 2000’s and cotton 
was one of the most volatile of fifty-three actively traded commodities by 2010 (Plastina 
and Ding, 2011).  Since 2008, with the help of the financial market press, the informed 
public has perceived increased speculation by United States and European financial 
institutions as a cause of extreme volatility in commodity markets.  For cotton, according 
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to a former president of the American Cotton Shippers Association and current president 
of Eastern Trading Co., the extreme volatility led to unemployment in cotton fiber and 
textile producing countries, further fueling anti-United States sentiment and terrorism 
(Lea, 2013).  According to the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC, 2014), 
U.S. and foreign government policy continue to distort the world cotton market, leading 
to the increasing temptation for countries to intervene in defense of their growers.  
Despite the public and commercial perception, a CFTC Staff Report did not find any sign 
of manipulation of cotton futures price activity during the abnormally high volatility 
week of March 3, 2008 (CFTC Staff Report, 2010).  With over 150 countries involved in 
exporting and importing cotton, combined with its dramatic increase in price volatility, 
cotton warrants inclusion in research into the effect of commodity regulatory policy 
change on agricultural futures market activity. 
If the problem of abnormal volatility is not addressed, traditional participants may 
be forced to exit commodity futures markets.  This situation threatened the Australian 
cotton industry during the 1990-1991 marketing season (Apperson, Parton, and 
Macpherson, 1992).  Cotton is a capital-intensive commodity to produce, distribute, and 
process.  If futures market price swings continue to be extreme over extended periods of 
time, hedgers will not be able to finance commercial activities and futures hedging at the 
same time.  For farmers with limited access to capital, this means that financing the 
production of a crop, and funding a short futures position to hedge that crop, may not be 
possible.  Without the ability to hedge price risk, forward contracting will diminish.  This 
would mean that producers will not be able to sell crops prior to harvest in order to secure 
profitable margins; instead they will be subject to the prevailing price at harvest.  Textile 
mills will not be able to buy inventory forward; they will only be able to buy for 
immediate shipment or hold inventory at their own cost as merchants / shippers will not 
hold inventory in storage.  Stockpiling by cotton economies and institutions, as has been 






0.2.0 Scholarly Significance 
 
For economic scholars, commodity price volatility affects producer and 
agribusiness current and projected income.  Output price volatility is an indispensable 
input for farmers’ and agribusiness’ decision-making (Yang, Haigh, and Leatham, 2001).  
Economic research has focused on whether increased speculation or unusual economic 
supply and demand fundamentals have led to more dramatic price swings and the 
resulting financial hardship for commodity hedgers (Janzen, 2010; Power and Robinson, 
2009).  While economists have not reached a consensus as to the causes of recent volatile 
commodity futures prices (Irwin and Sanders, 2011), they have acknowledged that 
extreme volatility can be detrimental to commercial market participants (Janzen, 2010; 
Carter and Janzen, 2009).  Some applied economists caution that a change in market 
regulatory policy to induce a change in market volatility could be made for the wrong 
reasons (Irwin and Sanders, 2011; Wright, 2011). 
Applied economic research has addressed the increased participation by 
speculators, but most research has only focused on one sector of the speculative element, 
index funds.  There are many other elements of speculation besides index funds.  As in 
energy market research (Medlock and Jaffe, 2009), contract volume and open interest (at 
any given time) do not coincide with world production and consumption numbers (within 
historical ranges).  For the agricultural commodity futures markets, the growth in non-
regulated financial products is also likely to coincide with increased volumes, 
participation, and volatility.  Stockpiling by governments has many industry participants 
concerned about the ramifications of unregulated manipulative practices on the market 
(McFerron, 2013, Plastina and Ding, 2011).   Most of the recent work has focused just on 
the 2007-2008 time period, therefore a more longitudinal period of study should reveal 
more insight.  Given the recent market volatility of 2010-2011, previous research that has 
addressed the issue of causation, economic fundamentals of supply and demand versus 
increased speculative participation should be revisited.  
For policy analysts, commodity market volatility may affect United States 
agricultural policy in the form of farm income policy and financial market regulation.  
Congress is concerned with financial loss and risk borne by farmers whether the threats 
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are from natural causes, government policy, or free market trading.  Public policy 
research has focused on the change in financial and commodity market regulation.  The 
findings stress that regulatory policy needs to revert to the tighter controls utilized to curb 
speculative participation in financial and commodity markets prior to 2000 (Randall, 
2008).  Policy scholars stress that the degree of market volatility in financial and 
commodity markets is not just the concern of professional market participants, 
commercial or non-commercial, but also the general public at large.  Regulatory policies 
that encourage market volatility can do great harm, and can lead to devastation of the 
American (Anderson, 2011, pp. 328-329) and global economy. 
Topham (2010) identified the influential stakeholders and authorities that made 
policy changes, and the periods of complacency and disruption that preceded policy 
change, but policy research has not measured market volatility to gauge regulatory policy 
effectiveness.  According to Topham, since the early 1970’s two theories have dominated 
economic policy: (1) the “efficient market” hypothesis holds that asset prices reflect all 
information available in the market and (2) the “capital asset pricing model” assumes 
every investor rationally balances risk against reward.  These popular economic theories, 
combined with financial industry lobbying efforts and subsequent legislation, pushed 
commodity futures market regulatory policy towards financial deregulation that 
culminated in the creation of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA 
2000).  Randall (2008, p. 5) warned about serious disruptions in the market place in the 
absence of public policy reform of CFMA (2000).  In the shadow of the financial crisis of 
2008, these “free market” theories have proven gravely erroneous (Krugman, 2009) and 
the warnings by policy scholars were proven correct. 
Public reaction to the financial crisis that led to the call for expanded regulation of 
the financial industry gained prominence as Dodd-Frank (2010) surfaced on the policy 
agenda.  Anderson (2011) made further warnings that reform legislation would be 
moderate in tone as the economy improved. Anderson (2011) and Greenberger (2011) 
also predicted that resistance would be strong from free market economists and their Wall 
Street colleagues, causing delayed implementation. 
To explain why commodity futures market regulatory policy has had three major 
and two minor shifts over the past five decades, two policy theories are incorporated into 
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the research, Baumgartner and Jones’ (2009) theory of punctuated equilibrium and 
Sabatier’s (1993) advocacy coalition framework.  These two concepts complement each 
other; the former emphasizes the temporal aspect, and the latter stresses the stakeholder 
influence on policy change.  To explain why commodity regulatory policy has not been 
enforced and the implementation of Dodd-Frank (2010) has been slow, the organizational 
challenges of the CFTC are studied. These challenges include insufficient resources, 
jurisdictional coordination with the SEC, agency leadership, and the agency dilemma 
(principal-agent problem). 
 
0.3.0 Literature Review 
 
Market behavior, as reflected by price volatility, is naturally drawn into the vortex 
of narrow economic rather than broader public policy research.  This tendency has been 
especially noticeable following a financial crisis.  Once the fallout of a crisis is evident, 
policy scholars and researchers follow their economic counterparts and begin to reflect 
and reassess what policy changes should be made to prevent perceived market failure of 
information asymmetry and widespread financial stress.  Given the magnitude and daily 
impact on peoples’ lives, energy market price volatility has drawn the greatest attention 
of all physical commodity markets from researchers.  To a lesser degree, base and 
precious metal market volatility has been studied.   Further down the chain of popularity 
are agricultural commodity markets, the grain and oilseed markets of corn, wheat and 
soybeans commanding the most attention.  The cotton market has received some 




Due to the sheer size and influence of the energy markets on people worldwide, 
scholarly research covers both the economic and political effects of oil price volatility.  In 
their research on how the energy futures market has changed since the implementation of 
CFMA (2000), Medlock and Jaffe (2009, p. 5) found that noncommercial participants 
constituted about 50 percent of the United States oil futures market at any given time, 
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compared to an average of 20 percent prior to 2002.  The authors cite a 2007 United 
States Government Accountability Office report that the CFMA made it easier for 
financial participants to remove speculative limits and made it more difficult for the 
CFTC to regulate oil futures markets.  In 1990, there were 10 active oil futures contracts 
trading worldwide, with a combined daily volume equivalent to 150 million barrels a day, 
or 130 percent of the daily volume of oil demand at the time.  In 2009, total New York 
Mercantile Exchange oil futures daily trading activity represented the equivalent of 600 
million barrels, which was about 700 percent the daily volume of oil demand.  According 
to Medlock and Jaffe (2009), previous rules for speculative position limits were 
historically much stricter than they were in 2009.  Despite financial industry rhetoric that 
imposing stricter limits would harm market liquidity, there has been no evidence to 
support such claims in the oil market (Dugan, 2008). 
The oil futures market was functioning very well prior to 2000 when speculative 
position limits were tighter.  Medlock and Jaffe (2009) question the time-series 
econometric techniques of Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and 
Generalized Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) to forecast and 
analyze the volatility of time-series data.  They argue that ARCH and GARCH models, 
employed by the CFTC and academics, have found that increased speculative 
participation has not been the cause of increased volatility, are inadequate to answer the 
type of questions being asked.  ARCH and GARCH models are designed to deal with 
time-series data that exhibit unstable variance over time, sometimes called “volatility 
clustering.”  Medlock and Jaffe (2009, pp. 13-14) state that the volatility of time-series 
data need not exhibit any clustering or significant changes for the market to be influenced 
by a large group of participants.   The authors conclude that the surge in oil prices from 
2007-2008 set the stage for renewed analysis of the application of position limits in the 
regulation of commodity futures markets as well as the role of government in preventing 






0.3.2 Multiple Commodities 
 
As the focus narrows to less visible commodity markets, the research concentrates 
on the economic causes of increased volatility rather than the regulatory policies that 
allowed market volatility to change.  In his institutional study of crude oil, non-ferrous 
metal, and grain futures prices between 2006 and 2008, Gilbert (2010, p.18) found that 
index-based investments pushed prices away from their fundamentally-based values, 
suggesting additional controls on futures market activity may be required to prevent 
repetition of the 2008 bubble.  Gilbert (2010, p.8) also found that index-based investment 
(commodity index fund, ET or OTC, used for investment by non-commercial / 
speculative participants) is driven by views about the likely future evolution of the 
macroeconomic fundamentals, which drive commodity prices (in particular, perceptions 
of likely demand growth in China and other parts of developing Asia).  The latter finding 
suggests that there was not a commodity price bubble and the price collapse of the 
summer of 2008 was temporary and a result of the financial crisis.   Gilbert (2010) tested 
whether lagged changes in a constructed quantum index of twelve agricultural markets 
helped to forecast price changes in each of the seven markets included in his analysis.  
The results indicated that index-based investment in commodity futures may have been 
responsible for a significant and “bubble-like” price increase in three of the seven 
markets: crude oil, aluminum, and copper.  Gilbert estimates that the maximum impact of 
index funds in these markets to be a price increase of 15 percent (Irwin and Sanders, 
2011, p. 12). 
 
0.3.3 Grains and Oilseeds 
 
Other scholars credit increased trading volumes and outstanding contracts (open 
interest) to participation by large speculators during the first decade of the twenty-first 
century (Irwin and Sanders, 2012, 2011; Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin, 2010, 2009).  
However, they have seen little evidence that passive index investment was the cause of 
increased volatility in grain futures markets between 2007 and 2011.  The authors’ 
research focused on the index-fund component of large speculative traders.  Data for that 
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component of non-commercial participation has only been available since 2006.  Irwin 
and Sanders (2011, 2012) question the findings that there is evidence of a relationship 
between commodity index investment and movements in commodity futures prices.  
They state that the data and methods used in these studies are subject to a number of 
important criticisms that limit the degree of confidence one can place in their results. The 
authors point out that, historically, when financial and commodity markets experience 
periods of extreme volatility, the initial public reaction is to attack speculation.  Wright 
(2011, pp. 55-56) also found inconsistency in the argument that index fund investors 
influenced futures prices.  He concluded that price volatility was based on market 
economic supply and demand conditions, especially given the increased multiple 
utilization of corn (ethanol mandate) and soybeans (biofuels). 
Independent research groups from the International Food Policy Research 
Institute and The World Bank take a contrary view.  Robles, Torero, and von Braun 
(2009) analysis of the corn, soybean, rice, and wheat futures markets assessed whether 
speculative activity in the futures market could be a source of the high agricultural 
commodity prices in 2007-2008.  Their results showed that speculative activities might 
have been influential in causing the price surges of 2007-2008.  The authors’ conclusion 
called for reducing the incentives for speculation in food commodities by: (1) changing 
regulatory frameworks to limit the volume of speculation versus hedging, (2) making 
delivery on contracts or portions of contracts compulsory, and (3) imposing capital 
deposit requirements when each futures transaction is made.  Baffes, and Haniotis (2010) 
argue that the use of commodities by financial investors may have been partly 
responsible for the 2007-2008 price spike.  They observe that collective measures by 
central governments (buffer stocks and regulatory controls) historically have not been 




Prior to 2009, the only published economic study specifically on cotton futures 
price volatility was that of the 1930’s (Howell, 1934), a time of similar market turmoil 
and regulatory policy uncertainty.  Following the United States Farm Bill of 1985, cotton 
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policy research has been generated mostly by institutions and has concentrated on the 
global agricultural policy subject of subsidized cotton production in developed countries 
compared to unsubsidized production in developing countries (Baffes, 2005).  After the 
dramatic price swings of 2007-2008 and the documented hardships faced by cotton 
industry participants during that period (Carter and Janzen, 2009; McFerron, Javier, and 
Perez, 2013; Plastina, 2008), two studies investigated causes of cotton price volatility.  
Power and Robinson (2009) found that well-established economic relationships for cotton 
futures markets were disrupted during the period 2006-2009.  The authors found no direct 
evidence to support the claim that index traders were responsible for changes in prices or 
volatility.  Janzen, Smith, and Carter (2013) found that supply and demand shocks unique 
to the cotton market were the major source of cotton price variation.  The 2008 price 
spike, specifically, came from an increase in precautionary demand that was based on 
projections of lower future production.  The study also found no evidence of co-
movement (correlated movement among commodity prices, caused by the inclusion of 
commodities into major indexes) type effect related to financial speculation.  Janzen, 
Smith, and Carter (2013) concluded that legislative and regulatory efforts to restrict 
trading activities of index traders and other financial speculators would not prevent future 
price spikes. 
 
0.3.5 Regulatory Policy 
 
With respect to commodity futures market regulation, CFMA (2000) clarified that 
certain OTC derivative transactions were outside the jurisdiction of the CFTC and that 
CEA (1936) did not apply to certain swap agreements, hybrid instruments, and other 
products commonly offered by banks (Kloner, 2001).  Prior to the passage of CFMA 
(2000), the dangers of unlimited borrowing practiced by OTC derivative market 
participants were evident in the Long Term Capital Management crisis of 1998.  While 
traders on futures exchanges must post margin and have their positions marked to market 
on a daily basis, no such requirements existed in the OTC derivatives market.  In 
explaining the role of the CFTC in international regulatory responses to derivative crises, 
the former chairman of the CFTC warned that high leverage in the OTC derivatives 
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market posed potentially serious dangers to the economy (Born, 2001).  Ensuing 
bankruptcies of large trading companies and Wall Street investment banks a few years 
later proved her correct.  
Randall (2008) called for the CFTC to broaden its mission so that it could 
accomplish the overarching objective of the original CEA (1936), which was to limit the 
effects of speculation on commodity prices.  Randall (2008) also called for more of the 
market to be regulated (OTCs, swaps, and hybrids), the reestablishment and enforcement 
of position limits, greater transparency of large speculative positions, and requiring 
managed index funds to operate within constraints established by Congress to promote 
public interest.  But Randall (2008) criticized the CFTC for inconsistency; on one hand, 
the Commission was actively promoting the notion that commodity futures were an asset 
class while on the other hand ignoring the price effects from speculative inflows of 
managed money (along with its Congressional mandate to ensure that commodities 
reflect the laws of supply and demand). 
Topham (2010) went so far as to argue that future effective financial regulation 
must include a repeal of CFMA (2000) coupled with new derivative regulations (such as 
centralized clearing and exchange trading vs. OTC) to achieve total transparency for 
derivative markets.  In his thorough analysis of the proposed repeal of the CFMA, 
Topham (2010) particularly called for the changes necessary to eradicate the loopholes in 
CFMA (2000) for swap agreements and hybrid instruments.  He notes that to understand 
CFMA’s (2000) context, one must delve into the political and economic climate at the 
millennium, when thirty years of deregulatory zeal culminated by seducing policy makers 
and market participants with the notion that modern financial instruments had eliminated 
the risks of the past.  Topham (2010) concludes that political posturing and vast amounts 
of lobbying dollars continue to abate any real transformation of futures and derivative 
market regulatory policy (failure to implement Dodd-Frank) while banker bonuses reach 
record levels and the United States economy remains on questionable footing.  Topham’s 
(2010) comments acknowledging the existence of subsystem politics implies a 
framework for policy change as outlined in Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework 
(Sabatier, 1993) which is one model used for understanding why commodity futures 
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market policy formulation, adoption, and implementation has frequently changed in 
recent times. 
 
Economic research has addressed the causes of market volatility without coming 
to a general consensus for two reasons: (1) when focusing on speculation as a cause, 
academics have concentrated on the passive speculation of index funds where 
institutional research has focused on more broad measures of speculative participation, 
i.e. swap dealers, hedge funds, and index funds; and (2) possibly because quantitative 
methods applying statistical analysis and econometric modeling have yielded different 
findings.  Pirrong (2012) concluded that seasonal commodity prices demonstrate the 
limitations of partial equilibrium structural models because they do not fully capture 
intertemporal choices available to market participants.  He suggests it is likely that 
general equilibrium models, with multiple storable commodities, are required to provide 
a more accurate characterization of commodity prices (Pirrong, 2102, p. 12). 
Policy research has identified how policy authorities have reacted to prevailing 
economic theory, influential stakeholders, and public opinion.  Where economists advise 
caution in implementing policy instruments that seek to reduce market volatility (for fear 
of adverse market effects), policy scholars call for regulatory change that reverts back to 
tighter controls in order to prevent market failure (in fear of economic and political 
instability).  Economists theorize that policy drives market behavior; policy scholars 
theorize that market behavior, or a transition in power, ultimately lead to a change in 
policy.  Regardless of why volatility levels change, research has yet to identify whether 
or not commodity regulatory policy has any significant influence on agricultural 
commodity price volatility. 
 
0.4.0 Dependent Variables 
 
The dependent variables utilized in this research to measure commodity price 
volatility in agricultural markets are the nearby (front month) daily commodity futures 
price for the cotton, soybean, corn, and wheat markets.  Spot or cash markets are the 
distributive markets for commodities, whereas futures markets are primarily financial 
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markets that may culminate in the actual delivery of a commodity.  It is a commodity’s 
cash market that directly affects the price of goods that consumers pay.  If the price of 
bread increases, it is likely that the price that General Mills paid for a bushel of wheat has 
risen and has been passed on to the consumer.  However, commodity futures markets 
indirectly affect the price of goods that a consumer pays as they facilitate the 
management of commodity price risk.  Futures markets rely on credit and the ability of 
participants to meet financial obligations.  Commercial participants use futures to hedge, 
or reduce price risk.  Since futures markets are open to the public, where transactions are 
offset through a clearing-house and a margining (good faith deposit) system ensures 
contract sanctity, speculators also participate.  Speculators seek price risk in order to reap 
financial rewards.  If futures market movement affects cash market movement, then past 
values of futures markets should contain information that helps predict cash market 
values above and beyond the information contained in past values of cash markets alone.  
The following analysis justifies the use of futures price data as the dependent value in this 
research over cash price data. 
 
0.4.1 Granger Causality 
 
Granger Causality is a statistical and econometric method applied to measure 
whether agricultural commodity futures markets are a leading indicator of cash markets 
or vice versa.  According to Wooldridge (2009, p. 839), Granger Causality (GC) is a 
limited notion of causality where past values of one series (xt) are useful for predicting 
future values of another series (yt) after past values of yt have been controlled for.  
Simply, GC measures whether current or past values of one variable help to forecast 
future values of another (Enders, 2010, p. 318).  GC has nothing to say about 
contemporaneous causality between yt and xt, so it does not determine whether xt is an 
exogenous or endogenous variable in an equation relating yt to xt (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 
650).  The application of GC can support the argument that due to their transparency, 
liquidity, and reliability, many agricultural futures markets are benchmarks for United 
States domestic and international commodity prices (hence the high correlation between 




Two sets of nearby futures price were utilized: (1) First of Month (FOM) roll and 
(2) Last Trading Day (LTD) roll.  In order to establish a continuous nearby futures price 
from one contract delivery month to the next, given multiple deliveries for futures 
contracts, either a FOM or LTD roll applies.  A nearby futures price applying FOM rolls 
from the settlement price on the last trading day of the preceding calendar month for a 
contract delivery to the settlement price on the first day of trading in the subsequent 
calendar month for the next contract delivery (from one calendar month to the next is the 
point of roll).  A nearby futures price applying LTD rolls from the settlement price on the 
last trading day of the delivery contract and begins on the next day’s settlement of the 
subsequent futures delivery contract (calendar month is insignificant, contract expiration 
is the point of roll).  The following are the data sets utilized for futures and cash prices in 
the GC and subsequent analyses: 
 
Cotton Futures: the daily settlement price of the InterContinental Exchange (ICE, 2015) 
Cotton No. 2 Futures Contract supplied by Quandl Data Platform (2015).  The nearby 
(continuous) includes both a First of Month (FOM) and Last Trading Day (LTD) roll.  
Data extended from January 2, 1973 to September 20, 2015. 
Cotton Cash: the daily Cotlook ‘A’ Index (2015).  The current spot quotation is for 
middling grade, 1-3/32 inch staple length, is continuous, and extends from January 2, 
1973 to September 30, 2015.  Prior to July 1, 2004, the A Index quote was for CIF NE 
Europe delivery; from July 1, 2004 to September 30, 2015 the quote is for CFR Far East. 
Soybean Futures: the daily settlement price of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME, 
2015) Soybean Futures Contract supplied by Quandl Data Platform (2015).  The nearby 
continuous includes both a First of Month (FOM) and Last Trading Day (LTD) roll.  Data 
extended from January 2, 1973 to September 20, 2015. 
Soybean Cash: the daily No. 1 Yellow Soybean Central, IL quote supplied by the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA, 2015).  The current spot quotation is 
continuous and extends from January 2, 1992 to September 30, 2015. 
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Corn Futures: the daily settlement price of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME, 
2015) Corn Futures Contract supplied by Quandl Data Platform (2015).  The nearby 
continuous includes both a First of Month (FOM) and Last Trading Day (LTD) roll.  Data 
extended from January 2, 1973 to September 20, 2015. 
Corn Cash: the daily No. 2 Yellow Corn Decatur, IL quote supplied by the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA, 2015).  The current spot quotation is continuous and 
extends from September 2, 1992 to September 30, 2015. 
Wheat Futures: the daily settlement price of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME, 
2015) Wheat Futures Contract supplied by Quandl Data Platform (2015).  The nearby 
continuous includes both a First of Month (FOM) and Last Trading Day (LTD) roll.  Data 
extended from January 2, 1973 to September 20, 2015. 
Wheat Cash: the daily No. 2 Soft Red Wheat Toledo, OH quote supplied by the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA, 2015).  The current spot quotation is 
continuous and extends from January 2, 1992 to September 30, 2015. 
 
0.4.3 Granger Models 
 
Futst = λ0 + λ1Futst-1 + … + λpFutst-p + ρ1Casht-1 + … + ρpCasht-p +  εFuts,t 
 
Casht = α0 + α1Casht-1 + … + αpCasht-p + b1Futst-1 + … + bpFutst-p +  εCash,t 
 
The test is for a strong relationship between Futst-1 and Casht, with Futst-1 having more 
Granger causality over Casht than Casht-1 over Futst. 
 
0.4.4 Granger Methodology 
 
The autoregressive (AR) parameters in the above models were estimated and 
tested.  First, an autoregressive model for Cash was established and a test was made to 
determine the number of lags for Futures.  The choice of lags for Futures is less 
important because, when Futures do not cause Granger Cash, no set of lagged Futures 
should be significant (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 650).  A vector autoregression (VAR) 
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analysis was conducted to test the null hypothesis that Futures do not cause Granger Cash 
(Greene, 2003, pp. 592-593) in the model.3  Under the null hypothesis (Ho) that Futures 
do not cause Granger Cash, any lags of Futures are added to the equation should have 
zero population coefficients.  For example, if using one lag of futures, then test Futurest-1.  
If two lags of Futures, F test the joint significance of Futurest-1 and Futurest-2.  There 
cannot be serial correlation under Ho because the model is dynamically complete 
(Wooldridge, 2009, p. 650), i.e. the lags have captured the autocorrelation.  Using JMP 
(2015) software, a separate linear regression was conducted on each variable x and y to 




There is no real distinction as to the statistical significance or economic effect 
between the First of Month (FOM) price roll and Last Trading Day (LTD) price roll for 
each commodity in the analysis.  Either can be useful as a dependent variable. 
For cotton and soybeans, futures (prices) Futurest-1, Granger cause cash (prices), 
Casht-1, is significant (α = 0.01), but not for corn and wheat.  In half the commodities 
studied for daily data ranging from 1992 to 2015, futures (prices) Granger cause cash 
(prices), where past values of futures contain information that helps predict cash prices 
above and beyond the information contained in past values of cash alone.  For cotton, 
futures also Granger cause cash for daily data from 1973 to 2015.  The expectation is for 
futures prices to Granger cause cash prices; but since the selected corn and wheat do not 
reject the null hypothesis, a comparison is made between futures and cash volatility.  
Measures of volatility, based on descriptive statistical analysis, are utilized to understand 





3 VAR is a model for two or more time series where each variable is modeled as a linear function of past 
values of all variables, plus disturbances that have zero means given all past values of the observed 
variables (Wooldgridge, 2009, p. 848). 
 	 23	
0.5.0 Measuring Volatility 
 
Four measures of volatility were considered to find the best method for this 
research: (1) Absolute Value Percentage Change (AVPC), (2) number of days the AVPC 
is greater than or equal to 3% (≥3%), (3) relative spread (RS), and (4) coefficient of 
variation (CV).  The AVPC indicates the dispersion of prices relative to a previous price 
as the absolute value percentage change.  The percentage change is over a period of time 
counting both increases and decreases as if they were both increases (Gruere and Plastina, 
2011).  
 
AVPC = !!!!!!!  x 100% 
 
≥3% indicates the number of days over a given period that the AVPC is greater 
than or equal to 3%, as more than a 3% change in daily price is considered (by the 
author) a high level of volatility. 
AVPC ≥ 3% 
 
The RS compares a range of prices relative to its mean, and is calculated as the 
ratio of the difference between the maximum price and minimum price to the average 
price observed over a period of time (Plastina, 2011). 
 
RS = !"#$%!"#$  
 
The CV measures the dispersion of prices relative to an average price over a 
period of time.  The CV compares the variation of prices to its mean, and is calculated as 
the ratio of the standard deviation of prices to the average price observed over a period of 
time (Plastina, 2011). 
CV = !"!"#$ 
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The AVPC and ≥3% are measures of relative percentage change or short-term 
(from one period to the next) and the RS and CV are measures of the relative percentage 
change to an average price over a period of time or long-term (more than two periods).  
Table 1 compares the mean volatility measure of daily nearby futures and cash price for 
each of the four commodities from 1992 to 2015.  For daily data from 1992 to 2015, price 
volatility, as measured by AVPC, ≥3%, RS, and CV, indicates similar levels in cash and 
futures markets for soybeans, corn, and wheat but not the AVPC and ≥3% in cotton. 
 
Table 1: Cash and Futures Prices Mean Volatility Comparison (1992-2015) 
  
 
A problem with nominal prices over a long period of time is the inflation effect.  
By applying a rolling average to the measurement, the inflationary effect is minimized.  
The rolling component is a method of smoothing of data and accounts more for a trend, 
seasonality, or lagging effect.  In this case, given daily data, the rolling average (n) was 
for every 5 periods, representing a 5-day rolling average.  The data interval, or number of 
observations, determines the rolling average (n).  Subsequent studies where data is 
weekly, a RCV(4) will be applied, and for monthly data, a RCV(3), representing 
quarterly.  The formulas for the rolling RS and CV are as follows: 
The level of significance for testing the null hypothesis that there is no difference 
in the mean volatility level between cash and futures is presented in Table 2, applying the 
Price 














Cotton Cash 72.77 0.66 150 2.87 35.5 5,852 
Cotton Futures 68.30 1.31 542 2.72 33.7 5,852 
Soybean Cash 823.50 1.08 326 1.72 40.4 5,946 
Soybean Futures 815.50 1.08 343 1.67 39.7 5,946 
Corn Cash 343.75 1.25 468 2.08 47.0 5,771 
Corn Futures 342.00 1.23 443 1.92 45.2 5,771 
Wheat Cash 429.00 1.52 673 2.52 41.3 5,850 
Wheat Futures 456.75 1.41 568 2.30 39.4 5,850 
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Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis test.  The Wilcoxon rank sum test is a procedure for 
comparing the mean of two sets of data; the test does not require a normal distribution 
(Ott and Longnecker, 2010). 
 
Table 2: Significant Differences Applying Wilcoxon /Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 
Note:  ES (Effect Size) = mean difference divided by pooled standard deviation 
 
Mean wheat cash volatility was higher than mean futures volatility in both the 
short-term (AVPC and ≥3%) and long-term (RS and CV) measurements.  For cotton 
futures, volatility was higher in the short-term measurements and cash volatility in the 
long-term measurements.  Cash volatility was certainly higher for wheat and corn, the 
reverse for cotton, and there was no significant difference for soybeans (α = 5%).  As 
indicated by the Chi Square value and the Effect Size (ES), the magnitude of cotton 
futures volatility over cash volatility was much larger than wheat.  This may be the result 
of (1) the effect of the Marketing Loan Program in Food Security Act of 1985 (1985 
Farm Bill) on the transition from old crop to new crop futures,4 (2) the change in the 
composition of the cash price (A Index) in 2004, or (3) both. 
The higher corn and wheat cash market volatility over the corresponding futures 
market volatility between 1992 and 2015 (for the quality and cash delivery points 
sampled), can explain the Granger Causality findings.  A more volatile cash market is 
likely to be the leading indicator of a less volatile futures market, or vice versa.  If 
another sample of cash prices were taken for each market, a different result may be 																																																								
4 Prior to August 1, 1986, the cotton loan price set by the cotton program of the United States Farm Bill 
was above world cotton prices.  The 1985 Farm Bill introduced the “marketing loan program” where the 
United States government subsidized the difference in the “cotton loan value” and the world price of cotton 
(as reflected by a formula based on Cotlook’s A Index of world prices).  The New York Cotton No. 2 
futures market, and today’s ICE cotton futures market, call for delivery of United States cotton only, no 
foreign cotton can be delivered on the No. 2 futures contract (Cotton No. Futures Contract, 2015). 
Cash & Futures 
(1992 to 2015) 
          AVPC 
ChiSq  p-Val  ES 
         RS(5)  
ChiSq  p-Val  ES 
         CV(5) 
ChiSq  p-Val  ES 
Cotton F > C (5852) 2655    0.00    0.86 6235    0.00    1.46 6108    0.00    1.34 
Wheat C > F (5850) 1284    0.00    0.33 1739    0.00    0.46 1832    0.00    0.57 
Corn C > F (5771)     93    0.00    0.06   122    0.00    0.06   121    0.00    0.05 
Soybean NS (5946)       0    0.45    0.02       2    0.12    0.02       2    0.14    0.03 
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found.  Given the findings of Granger Causality for cotton and soybeans, and the 
explanation for corn and wheat cash volatility over futures (reliability of data5), futures 
data is chosen to represent commodity price volatility. 
For daily futures data from 1973 to 2015, all four commodity futures markets 
have significant differences in mean volatility as measured by AVPC, a RRS(5), and a 
RCV(5) under the Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis tests (α = 5%).  See Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Table 3: Futures Prices Volatility Comparison (1973-2015) 
 
 
Table 4: Futures Significant Differences Applying Wilcoxon /Kruskal-Wallis Test 
 
 
The non-parametric mean test was applied only for AVPC, RRS(5), and RCV(5) 
in Table 4.  In all three volatility measurements, mean futures price volatility was 
significantly higher for wheat, followed by cotton, soybeans, and corn.  Each volatility 																																																								
5 Futures price data tends to be more accurate than cash or spot price data due to consistency and 
transparency of futures price collection; cash prices at various locations can vary due to local production, 
reporting reliability, and USDA resources for data collection. 
Mean Price 













Cotton Cash  72.53 0.55 156 2.88 29.31 10,805 
Cotton Futures  67.43 1.22 774 2.75 28.24 10,722 
Soybean Futures 740.25 1.16 795 1.84 36.10 10,768 
Corn Futures 305.50 1.13 730 2.25 40.95 10,766 
Wheat Futures 410.75 1.31 964 2.60 36.72 10,769 
Futures (10,702) 
(1973 to 2015) 
          AVPC 
ChiSq  p-Val  ES 
          RS(5)  
ChiSq  p-Val  ES 
         CV(5) 
ChiSq  p-Val  ES 
Wheat > Corn   553    0.00    0.29 1176    0.00    0.39   879    0.00    0.35 
Wheat > Soybean   246    0.00    0.22   701    0.00    0.30   576    0.00    0.28 
Wheat > Cotton   158    0.00    0.14   245    0.00    0.16   206    0.00    0.13 
Cotton > Corn     42    0.00    0.09   139    0.00    0.13   109    0.00    0.13 
Cotton > Soybean       4    0.04    0.05     76    0.00    0.10     58    0.00    0.10 
Soybean > Corn     44    0.00    0.05     14    0.00    0.03       7    0.01    0.03    
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measure leads to different ES when analyzing relative futures market price volatility 
among crops, but the ranking of ES are very similar.  These differences and similarities 
are easily seen when viewing mean volatilities by decade.  As per Figure 1, AVPC 
reveals that for all four commodities, for the dataset under study, mean volatility was 
high in the 1970’s, much lower in the 1980’s and 1990’s before rising in the 2000’s and 
remaining high to easing in the 2010’s.  (Take note that the 1970’s data is 80 percent and 
the 2010’s is 50 percent of the other three decades.)  Figure 2, ≥3% illustrates that the 
consistency of high volatility was greatest in the 2000’s than any other decade, with the 
wheat and cotton markets experiencing the most volatility.  Figure 3, RRS(5), bears a 
close resemblance to Figure 1, AVPC, but does not show the consistency of high 
volatility as illustrated in Figure 2, ≥3%, in the 2000’s.  Figure 4, RCV(5), illustrates 
very similar movement in volatility to Figure 1, AVPC and Figure 3, RRS(5), but also 




















Figure 1: AVPC Daily Futures Mean per Decade (1973 to 2015, Obs 10,702)  
 
 




























Figure 3: RRS(5) Daily Futures Mean per Decade (1973 to 2015, Obs 10,702)  
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0.6.0 Composite Measurement 
 
Figure 5 presents the annual mean futures RCV(5) for each commodity between 
1973 and 2015.  As with the decadal trends, the early 1970’s was a period of high 
volatility followed by declining volatility until the mid-1980’s.  The implementation of 
the Food Security Act of 1985 in mid-1986 (1985 U.S. Farm Bill) incurred a high level of 
volatility on cotton futures due to the transition of market support programs from old crop 
to new crop.  Otherwise, volatility was relatively stable from the late 1970’s until the 
mid-2000’s.  All four commodities experienced an extended period of historically high 
volatility between 2006 and 2012 (with the exception of soybeans, for which volatility 
declined as early as 2010). 
 
Figure 5: RCV(5) Annual Mean of Daily Futures (1973 to 2015)  
 
 
Aggregating, by means of a simple average the four RCV(5)’s for each 
commodity, yields a composite RCV(5) annual mean as presented in Figure 6.  For the 
composite annual mean RCV(5), 1973 volatility was double the 1973 to 2015 average of 
1.4% per annum.  From 1978 until 1998 annual volatility was relatively stable; but from 








1980 1990 2000 2010
Mean (Wheat CV (5)) Mean (Soybean CV (5)) Mean (Corn CV (5)) Mean (Cotton CV (5))
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Though declining since 2008, the composite annual mean RCV(5) remained above the 
historical average through September 2015.  The general trend in rising volatility 
between 1973 and 2015 is apparent for an aggregate of all four commodities both in 
Figure 7 and by decade in Figure 8.  Figure 7 is a simple linear regression that 
quantifies and illustrates the rising volatility for the composite despite the high level of 
volatility in the 1970’s. 
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Mean: 1.4%  
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Figure 7:  RCV(5) Composite Annual Mean of Daily Futures Regression 
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In Figure 9, all four non-econometric measures of volatility for the composite  are 
presented.  The ≥3% measurement illustrates the consistency of high daily volatility that 
was occurring in all four commodities between 2007 and 2012. 
 
Figure 9: Composite Daily Futures Mean Measurement per Decade (1973 to 2015) 
 
 
To test for statistical significance differences in composite mean volatility 
between decades, the nonparametric Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis test on JMP (2015) 
software was conducted.  The results are presented in Table 5.  Each method of volatility 
measurement yields a different result for the composite, but the general trend is still 
evident.  All four measurements indicate that volatility in the 1980’s was significantly 
different from that of the 1970’s (α < 0.01), i.e. 1970’s > 1980’s.  Volatility in the 1990’s 
was significantly different from the 1980’s (RCV(5) α < 0.05 and ≥3% α < 0.10), i.e. 
1990’s ~ 1980’s.  All four measurements indicate that volatility in the 2000’s was 
significantly different from the 1990’s (α < 0.01), i.e. 2000’s > 1990’s.  All four 
measurements indicate that volatility in the 2010’s was significantly different from the 
2000’s (RCV(5) α < 0.01, RRS(5) α < 0.01, AVPC α < 0.05, and ≥3% α < 0.10), i.e. 
2010’s < 2000’s.  The score mean difference (SMD: a measure of magnitude) is 































Left Scale: Mean (Mean AVPC) Mean (Mean RS (5)) Mean (Mean CV (5))
Right Scale: Sum (Mean >3%)
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Table 5:  Composite Daily Futures Mean Measurement per Decade (1973 to 2015) 
      Nonparametric Pair-wise Wilcoxon Method p-Values (α = 0.05) 
 
*SMD: Score Mean Difference 
 
Within each year, volatility does follow some seasonal trends, for both cash and 
futures prices.  In Appendix 3 the high and low mean monthly CV for both cash and 
futures prices from 1992 to 2015 are presented.  The data indicate that corn has the 
highest mean monthly volatility level for both cash and futures, followed by wheat, 
soybeans, and cotton.  Corn and soybean futures price volatility peak in August, wheat in 
February, and cotton in March.  Volatility is lowest for corn in December, soybean in 
November, wheat in May and November, and cotton in July. 
 
For this research, two arguments have been established.  (1) The Granger 
Causality findings, and the further volatility analysis and explanation for the corn and 
wheat markets not rejecting the null hypothesis for Granger Causality, support that 
nearby futures prices be used as the dependent (response) variable in this research.  (2) 
The cumulative RCV(5) results mirror both those of the RRS(5) and AVPC volatility 
measurements. Therefore the RCV(n) is used in subsequent studies, where n is relative to 












AVPC SMD* -634 55 774 -115 
AVPC p-value <0.0001 0.1766 <0.0001 0.0022 
Days≥3% SMD* -376 -44 431 -50 
Days≥3% p-value <0.0001 0.0589 <0.0001 0.0881 
RS(5) SMD* -813 54 1115 -161 
RS(5) p-value <0.0001 0.1828 <0.0001 <0.0001 
CV(5) SMD* -790 93 1046 -159 
CV(5) p-value <0.0001 0.0203 <0.0001 <0.0001 
1970’s 1980’s 1990’s 2000’s 2010’s 
Observations 1748 2514 2507 2493 1440 
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Chapter 1: Causes of Market Volatility 
 
 
“Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise.  But the 
position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation.  
When the capital development of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a 
casino, the job is likely to be ill-done” 
John Maynard Keynes, 1936 
 
1.1.0 Financial Economic Theory 
 
Economics has been distinguished from other social sciences by the belief that 
behavior can be explained under the assumption that people have stable, defined 
preferences, and that they make rational choices consistent with those preferences 
through trading in markets (Thaler, 2015, p.172).  As presented in the Introduction, 
Topham, (2010) emphasized that two economic theories dominated market regulatory 
policy from the early 1970’s through the mid-2000’s, the efficient market hypothesis 
(EMH) and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  The former holds that asset prices 
reflect all information available in the market and the latter assumes every investor 
rationally balances risk against reward.  The specific modern meaning of the EMH has 
been attributed to Eugene Fama, a University of Chicago economist (Shiller, 2012, p. 
169).  Fama basically believed that market prices were too perfect to be predictable.   
Katherine Dusak was the first to apply the standard Sharpe-Litner CAPM to commodity 
futures markets (Leuthold et al, 1989, p.111).  Relying on the assumptions of the EMH, 
the CAPM attaches a risk premium of an asset to an overall market of assets in order to 
assess predicted performance.  The recent turmoil in financial markets has not only 
questioned the EMH and the associated CAPM, but it has also turned these theories 
upside down.  Even prior to the financial crisis, some economists began questioning the 
EMH and CAPM because financial market participants seemed to be devoting strategies 
to anticipating perceived market value versus perceived market value, i.e. guessing 
participant behavior in markets in higher degrees; a practice Keynes identified in the 
1930’s (Thaler, 2015, pp. 210-211). 
Most research suggests commodity futures markets are considered efficient if all 
publicly available information on supply and demand is being incorporated and registered 
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in the discovered price (Purcell and Koontz, 1999).  Statistical hypothesis testing 
indicates that the efficient market will generate price movement where price changes are 
independent of each other.  Like security markets, much of the direction in futures 
markets comes from the large trading firms that possess skilled analyst support.  Until the 
mid-2000’s, most of the available research concluded that the presence of futures markets 
decreases variability in the related cash (spot) market across a number of commodities by 
increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of supply response to price changes (Purcell 
and Koontz, 1999, p. 371).  As former floor brokers that used to crowd the trading pits of 
New York and Chicago would say, the “market is the market.” 
EMH supporters, such as Milton Friedman and George Stigler (former University 
of Chicago economists) have made strong arguments against regulating markets, the 
latter believing that the principal goal of regulation is to prevent the entry of competitors 
to markets (Shiller, 2012, p. 95).  They turn to the works of Ronald Coase (a former 
faculty member of the University of Chicago Law School) whose Coase theorem states 
that in the absence of transaction costs, meaning that people can easily trade with each 
other, resources will flow to their highest value (Thaler, 2015, p. 261).  As will be 
revealed in Chapter 3, central bankers such as Alan Greenspan advocated the EMH.  But 
those who believe that financial bubbles or abnormal market volatility are theoretically 
impossible may end up like Alan Greenspan, having to admit that he made some serious 
mistakes in his assumptions about the markets (Thaler, 2015, p. 9). 
According to Richard Thaler  (2015), the debate between behavioral finance 
researchers and defenders of the EMH began in October 1985 at a conference at the 
University of Chicago.  Emerging behavioral economists, those who combine economics 
and psychology, wanted to show economic purists that there were many facts that did not 
line up with traditional models based on consumers, investors, and traders acting 
rationally, i.e. the market is not necessarily the market.  They agree that the EMH 
explains 90 percent of market movement, but not the remaining 10 percent; the 10 
percent that can cause bubbles and extreme price spikes.   Thaler (2015) calls the 10 
percent, the behavioral phenomena, supposedly irrelevant factors (SIFs) in financial 
markets, i.e. when professional traders exploit the mistakes made by amateurs. Thaler and 
Werner De Bondt’s published research in 1985 showed the inefficiency of the stock 
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market by confirming that markets overreact.  Using the value investing techniques of 
Benjamin Graham, David Dodd, and their protégée Warren Buffet, in a longitudinal 
study they tracked cheap and expensive stocks over a period of three to five years.  The 
result was that stocks classified as “losers” (low-priced stocks) beat those classified as 
“winners” (high-priced stocks) by a substantial margin (Thaler, 2015, p. 223), disproving 
the EMH that says it is impossible to beat the market.  Challengers, who feared that the 
findings defy the EMH, attributed Thaler and De Bondt’s finding to the level of risk 
undertaken in the portfolio.  To model the risk component, in 1992 Fama and other 
challengers documented that the CAPM predicted both value stocks and the stocks of 
small companies earned higher returns (Thaler, 2015, p. 228).  The debate has continued 
with more factors being added onto the model to keep the EMH alive and well. 
About the same time as Thaler and De Bondt’s research, Robert Shiller published 
a paper that embraced the idea that social phenomena might influence stock prices just as 
much as they do fashion trends (Thaler, 2015, p. 233).  Shiller (2012, p. 103) claims that 
the EMH has been oversold to students by educators as the “magnificent equilibrium” 
and this helped contribute to the formation of speculative bubbles and the severe financial 
crises that began in 2007.  He also claims that the conservation laws of finance, of which 
EMH is one, are only valid as their underlying assumptions, and their applicability to the 
real world phenomena has been overrated (Shiller, 2012, p. 133).  Shiller (2012, p. 172) 
labels the 10 percent “animal spirits;” the spontaneous urge to action rather than careful 
and deliberate calculation.  He claims that human judgments are driven by emotions, and 
their origin is largely subconscious.  Thus, there is no escaping the role of animal spirits 
in driving prices and financial activity (Shiller, 2012, p.p. 172-173). 
Thaler (2015, p. 249) presents the desperate example of Long-Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) as to when prices start to move against a money manager (in this 
case an unregulated hedge fund) and investors then ask for some money back, prices will 
be driven further against them, causing a vicious spiral.  In 1997, a year before these 
events occurred, Sheleifer and Vishny published a paper describing a hypothetical 
situation similar to that of LTCM; they called it “limits of arbitrage.”  In 2008, the cotton 
futures market experienced a similar event (Carter and Janzen, 2009).  Merchants with 
short futures positions covering cotton purchases experienced a dramatic spike in cotton 
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prices and had to meet margin calls on those positions.  Given the contraction of credit at 
the time, banks were unwilling to extend hedging lines of credit.  The result was a vicious 
spiral of merchants having to exit positions, thus driving prices higher.  Within a year, 
three major global cotton shippers ceased to participate in the global trade.  As Thaler 
(2012, p. 249) points out, “the key lesson is that prices can get out of whack, and smart 
money cannot always get things right.” 
Applying to both security and commodity markets, scholars now recognize 
behavioral finance as part of financial economics.  Thaler (2012, p. 9) says that policy 
makers have to stop assuming that abstract models are accurate descriptions of behavior, 
and stop basing decisions on the resulting flawed analysis of those models; it is the SIFs 
(the variables the models cannot account for) that need to be addressed.  When prices 
diverge from fundamental value by wide margins, the result can be a misallocation of 
resources.  Thaler (2012, pp. 252-253) goes on to say that sometimes the market 
overreacts and sometimes it underreacts; but regulatory policy makers cannot accept that 
the market is always right, otherwise they will never see any need to take preventive 
action.  He points out the irrationality of the same people who complain most about the 
recovery measures in response to the recent financial crisis are also those who object to 
the minor steps to reduce the likelihood of another catastrophe. 
 
1.2.0 Market Failure 
 
In December 1999, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) was trading at 
11,500, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil was $26 per barrel, and ICE cotton 
futures were $0.50 per pound (using cotton again as the agricultural volatility example).  
At the time that the CFMA (2000) was enacted in late December 2000, the DJIA had 
dropped to 10,427, oil had rallied to $33 per barrel, and cotton was up to $0.65 per 
pound.  Between 2001 and 2007 Enron collapsed and the “Great Recession” began.  
From October 2001 to October 2007, the DJIA increased 60 percent (8,848 to 14,164), 
from October 2001 to July 2007 oil increased 218 percent, and cotton increased 39 
percent between October 2001 and May 2007.  2008 was a disaster in terms of corporate 
failures in these markets; Bear Sterns was bailed out by the Federal Reserve, Lehman 
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Brothers declared bankruptcy, AIG failed, the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
was implemented, the Swiss cotton firm of Paul Reinhart Inc. filed for bankruptcy 
protection, and Weil Brothers Cotton Ltd. ceased cotton operations.  The DJIA was at the 
12,266 level in March; but by October it had fallen to 8,579, a drop of 30 percent in 
seven months.  Oil had rallied to a high of $147 in July but by December it had fallen 80 
percent to $30 per barrel.  Cotton reached a high of $0.91 in March to fall 59 percent by 
November to $0.37. 
The “Great Recession” did not officially end until June of 2009, corporate failures 
had subsided but the volatility continued.  By March 2009, the DJIA had fallen further to 
6,547, oil steadied at $33 in January, and cotton had risen to $0.54; due to financial 
stress, Dunavant Enterprises merged with Allenberg Cotton Co.  By the third quarter of 
2009, the DJIA was up to 9,172, oil was up to $72, and cotton was steady at $0.53.  The 
reaction by Congress to the fallout in the financial system and the excessive volatility in 
commodity markets was Dodd-Frank (2010).  Despite signs of greater stability in security 
markets, commodity prices continued to see high volatility.  From July 2010 until June 
2012, the DJIA climbed from 10,154 to 12,824, oil rallied from $76 to $82 (though a high 
of $115 occurred in May 2011), and cotton rose from $.82 to $2.27 in March 2011 before 
falling to $0.66 (a rise of 177 percent and a decline of 71 percent within 24 months). 
 
1.2.1 The Unprosecutable Crime (Markham, 1991) 
 
Manipulation of commodity and financial markets is not new.  There are 
numerous cases of attempts by entities to corner markets.  Suspect manipulation and price 
distortion occurred in the infamous Hunt Brothers silver crisis in 1980 and the Ferruzzi 
soybean scandal in 1989.  Historically, the effect of regulation has not been successful 
(Markham, 1991).  The high costs of enforcement and prosecution have been a deterring 
factor to regulators.  There have also been contentions between the CFTC and the SEC 
over jurisdiction due to the complexity of the derivatives.  That contention was intense 
until the passage of Dodd-Frank (2010). 
Markham (1991) called for the CEA (1936) to be amended and for the 
government to take a more affirmative role in regulating futures markets.  He cited a 
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC) study that stated, “…effective remedies for cornering 
the market are not found in the present law; at least it is not actually enforced.”  With the 
introduction of CFMA (2000), regulation and enforcement had not heeded Markham and 
the FTC’s call.  During the 1990’s the CFTC granted a series of exemptions regarding 
position limits for futures trading entities and the push for unregulated OTC derivative 
markets was successful with the enactment of CFMA (2000).  It finally took a financial 
crisis and a global food crisis between 2007 and 2009 to enact Dodd-Frank (2010) that 
fully regulated all derivative markets and gave the CFTC and the SEC more salient 
enforcement tools to deter market manipulation and price distortions. 
 
1.2.2 Regulatory Black Hole (Greenberger, 2011) 
 
What Markham (1991) and the FTC were referring to in 1991 was what 
Greenberger (2011) later referred to as the “regulatory black hole.”  The economic 
meltdown between 2007 and 2009 was a result of the failure of OTC derivatives 
regulation, or complete lack thereof.  Greenberger (2011) argues that the OTC market in 
credit default swaps (CDSs) and synthetic collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) 
provided the trigger that launched the mortgage crisis, credit crisis, and systemic financial 
crisis.  The dominos were in place when financial institutions wrote “naked” CDSs to 
investors.  These issuers / underwriters did not set aside sufficient capital to honor 
potential commitments, for they never foresaw their bets losing money.  The dominos 
began to tumble when housing prices began to plummet and homeowners defaulted.  As 
these OTC derivatives were not regulated, the financial community did not realize that 
the size of the market was much larger than anyone expected.  Credit began to tighten 
immediately and the downward spiral led to a meltdown.  It was not only the subprime 
mortgage market that suffered; CDOs and CDSs existed in most credit markets. 
The systemic risk was derived from all types of swaps. This interconnectedness 
(Greenberger 2011) of unregulated market transactions is analogous to bookies at the 
track laying off bets with each other in order to spread risk and still profit from a client 
transaction.  Swaps, other than CDSs, have caused serious financial dislocations.  Swaps 
were part of the energy and food bubble.  There was also the Orange County crisis in 
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1994 and the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund crisis of 1998 where leveraged 
financial swap positions ended in severe financial loss.  The European sovereign debt 
crisis involved swap transactions based on debt obligations.  Given that most swaps are 
underwritten by the large Wall Street banks, and that their underwriting risk is offset with 
each other, this leads to the notion of “too big to fail,” for if one institution sinks, others 
will be dragged under as well.  This was certainly the fear in the Bear Sterns bailout, the 
Lehman bankruptcy, and the AIG bailout.  According to Warren Buffet, the Federal 
Reserve stepped in to avoid a financial chain reaction of unpredictable magnitude 
(Greenberger 2011).  The Federal Reserve and United States Treasury’s actions revealed 
to the world the correlation between the “interconnectedness” of unregulated OTC swap 
transactions and the too big to fail phenomenon.  As with the bookies, swaps are a credit 
transaction where no deposit is required or cash is paid up front.  The transaction is based 
on good faith and assumes any financial obligation will be paid.  Swaps are also masked 
by opaque accounting principles, for they are off the balance sheet, so that full exposure 
is not reported, only net exposure. 
 
1.2.3 Filling the Black Hole (Greenberger, 2011) 
 
Dodd-Frank (2010) transformed the regulation of OTC derivatives by generally 
requiring that swaps be subject to clearing and exchange-like trading, including capital 
and margin requirements (Greenberger, 2011).  The Act requires that all swap dealers and 
major swap participants register with the appropriate banking regulators, the CFTC and / 
or the SEC.  The Act requires swap dealers and participants to disclose any risks of swaps 
and incentives or conflicts of interest, meet capital and margin requirements, conform to 
business conduct rules set by regulators, conform to position limits on their trading 
volume in commodity swaps, and report all swap transactions. 
In brief, Dodd-Frank (2010) imposes clearing and exchange-like trading 
requirements on standardized swap transactions.  The Act contains a narrow “end-user” 
exception designed to ease the burden on businesses using swaps to mitigate risk 
associated with their commercial activities (bonafide hedging).  The Act also imposes its 
reporting requirements for all swaps, whether or not they are cleared transactions through 
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a designated clearing organization (DCO).  The Lincoln, or “Push-Out” Rule, prohibits 
federal assistance to any bank operating as a swap dealer.  The Volcker Rule generally 
prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading or acquiring or retaining an interest 
in a hedge fund or private equity fund. 
 
1.2.4 Benchmarking Dodd-Frank 
 
But how will we know if Dodd-Frank is working?   Greenberger (2011) presented 
six benchmarks to gauge Dodd-Frank’s success in filling the black hole of derivatives 
regulation.  (1) 90 percent of standardized OTC derivatives must be cleared and traded 
with 10 percent exempt, based on end-user exclusion.  (2) Swap dealers or swap 
participants will have no more than 20 percent ownership or any DCO, board of trade 
(BOT), or swap execution facility (SEF).  (3) All financial institutions that deal or buy 
swaps would be subject to strict capital requirements and rigorous business conduct rules.  
(4) Proprietary and commodity trading, hedge and equity funds, and uncleared credit 
default swaps will be moved from large banks to smaller structures with few adverse 
impacts on the financial system.  (5) Energy and food prices will be explained by market 
fundamentals rather than factors that may be attributable to excessive speculation.  (6) 
Swaps that do not clear or exchange-trade will be subject to real-time reporting 
requirements. 
 
1.2.5 Energy Market Revisited 
 
Crude oil market economics cannot fully explain the radical oil price oscillations 
of recent years presented previously.  Energy analysts question why prices spiked when 
demand actually fell between 2004 and 2008.  According to Greenberger (2012) and 
Clapp and Heillner (2010) the financialization of hard (metals and energy) and soft 
(agricultural) commodity markets through increased speculation of commodity 
derivatives has exacerbated price swings.  Speculation provides liquidity (to commercial 
hedgers) in markets but when it becomes excessive, the market becomes unmoored from 
the competing tensions between consumers and producers.  Information asymmetry 
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occurs when Wall Street banks and larger financial institutions send false demand signals 
to the markets as they bet on upward (or downward) price direction, causing commodity 
prices to rise (or fall) despite equilibrium between supply and demand. 
Next to the financial OTC derivatives of CDOs and CDSs, the energy markets 
have received the most attention regarding increased speculation.  The participation rate 
of non-commercial participants relative to the underlying commodity produced and 
consumed has dramatically increased since 2002 (Greenberger (2012).  The typical ratio 
of hedgers to speculators in the energy markets prior to 2002 was 80:20 (Medlock and 
Jaffe, 2009, p. 5).  In 2012, the ratio of hedger to speculators was estimated between 
30:70 and 20:80.  The result is that about one billion barrels of oil are traded in the 
synthetic oil futures markets every day while only 85 million barrels are produced.  Less 
than 10 percent of what is traded is actually produced. 
According to Greenberger (2012), though the debate and denial continues, the 
great weight of independent authority finds that outsized increased speculation in the 
physical derivatives markets has caused unnecessary price volatility in crude oil prices 
since 2008.  This volatility has led to unnecessary and substantial increase in prices that 
consumers pay for energy and food products.  This accusation has been noted by an array 
of industry participants and observers.  They include market participants such as Exxon 
and Delta Airlines, bankers and investors Goldman Sachs and George Soros, financial 
analysts Tim Evans of Citi Futures and economist Mike Norman, international and 
domestic leaders Ali Naimi, the minister of petroleum and mineral resource in Saudi 
Arabia, and President Barack Obama of the United States, and academics that include 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman and Kenneth Singleton of Stanford 
University. 
 
1.2.6 Agricultural Markets 
 
Clapp and Helleiner (2011) argue that the global food crisis of 2007-2008 was 
also partly due to loose regulation of financial markets.  The global food crisis triggered a 
response from United States in initiatives to tighten regulation over agricultural 
derivative markets.  United States domestic agricultural groups boosted their influence by 
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(1) allying with energy groups concerned about volatile energy prices and (2) linking 
their cause to the politics of financial reform in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.  
Like Greenberger’s (2012) oil case, Clapp and Helleiner (2011) attribute the recent 
growth in trading agricultural futures to the loosening of position limits.  Deregulatory 
and market pressures increased the scale of financial investment in agricultural 
derivatives, intensifying the linkages between the financial and agricultural sectors of the 
economy.  Clapp and Helleiner (2011) emphasize that financial markets and regulation 
do not just concern securities and energy, but that financial market regulation influences 
food security of people around the world. 
 
1.2.7 Complementing Enforcement 
 
Greenberger (2012) promulgated the view that strong enforcement of rigorous 
position limits and anti-manipulation rules by the CFTC (and other agencies), as directed 
by Dodd-Frank (2010), would curb excessive speculation in commodity markets.  
Enforcement, or threatened enforcement, against excessive speculation has forced down 
prices.  By the time of Dodd-Frank (2010) in July of 2010, oil stabilized between $75 and 
$85 per barrel.  After the President’s comments in April 2011, oil had a brief rally to 
$115 per barrel; by May 2011, it was lower.  Prices remained in the $80 to $115 range 
until 2014 when oil dropped to $50 per barrel.  Greenberger (2012) proposed three legal 
weapons against excessive speculation: (1) enforcement of position limits (there is a 
constant battle by CFTC to enact and enforce), (2) a legislative ban on commodity 
investment vehicles (index swaps and exchange-traded funds), and (3) stricter anti-
manipulation rules (lowering the standard of proof for the CFTC). 
 
1.3.0 Basis Risk 
 
In the Introduction, defining the Problem, the agricultural commodity scenario 
for cotton alluded to the problem commercial participants face when cash and futures 
markets dramatically diverge or converge in their price relationship.  This risk is known 
as basis risk; and simply, it is the risk one takes when hedging with futures to offset price 
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risk of an underlying commodity or asset.  The Granger Causality and the first volatility 
analysis in the Introduction illustrated how cash and futures markets do not move in 
perfect tandem but futures do Granger cause (lead) cash.  Futures and cash market 
divergence and convergence is reflected in basis volatility.  The following two sections 
are based on information from Apperson, 2013; Carter, 2003; and Leuthold, Junkus, and 
Cordier, 1989. 
 
1.3.1 Futures Markets 
 
Futures markets originated to facilitate the management of financial price risk of 
commodities.  Through the inherent transparency traded on public exchanges, they aid 
firms in discovering forward prices for commodities.  By knowing the value of a given 
commodity in the future, firms are provided with a means to request finance for the 
production or consumption of that commodity from lenders.  Thus, futures markets have 
become key sources of information for basic commercial commodity transactions. 
Organized exchanges (marketplaces) have been in existence since the beginning 
of trade and commerce, i.e. bazaars of the Middle East, bourses in Europe, the Royal 
Exchange in London, and the rice exchanges in the Far East.  Modern futures exchanges 
originated in the American mid-west in the mid-19th century in order to standardize the 
trading of agricultural products to ensure contract sanctity and simplification.  Forward 
contracting was (is) the basis for futures contracts.  What originated as organized cash 
exchanges developed into organized futures exchanges that facilitated the trading of 
standardized contracts guaranteed by a clearinghouse and system of margining. 
The first organized exchange began in 1848, the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT).  Initially hosting cash forward contracts, trading evolved into futures maturity 
trading in 1865 and then offset trading before maturity in 1882.  New York soon followed 
with the New York Cotton Exchange in 1870 and the Coffee Exchange of the City of 
New York in 1882 (sugar futures were added in 1914).  Back in the Midwest, the 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange emerged in 1891.  It was there that the first clearinghouse 
was established; completing the evolution from forward contracts to futures trading and 
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complete standardization.  In 1898, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) was 
formed. 
Organized futures exchanges are unique because they consist of standardized 
contracts that call for specific delivery, quantity, quality, price quotation, time and 
location of, trading, and are regulated by a central government authority to ensure 
contract sanctity.  They provide a trading platform that has evolved form pit-trading 
(open-outcry) to screen trading (computer).  These exchanges disseminate price 
information to the public through telecommunications and guarantee contract 
performance through a clearinghouse mechanism that matches all sales and purchases.  
Prior to the 21st century, exchanges were predominantly member-owned and overseen by 
a board of governors.  Today, most organized futures exchanges are publicly held 
corporations with a board of directors.  Examples of mergers into mega-exchanges 
include the CME and CBOT, now known as the CME Group, and NYBOT now under 
the InterContinental Exchange (ICE).  The futures industry has seen a huge 
transformation from the mid-1990’s to the mid-2000’s, as financial futures (and other 




Given familiarity with some of the key terms associated with derivative markets 
(See Appendix 1), some distinctions among those terms are appropriate.  As stated 
previously, physical markets are distributive markets where the production, shipping, 
processing, and consumption of commodities take place.  Physical markets can involve 
spot (cash, immediate) or forward (deferred, future) delivery.  Futures, or derivative 
markets, are financial markets that may or may not end in physical delivery (most often 
not).  They are not intended to be distributive markets where the physical product 
changes hands.  Though ultimately delivery may occur, it is usually cost prohibitive to do 
so. 
Futures markets are financial markets that rely on credit and the ability of 
participants to meet financial obligations.  Commercial participants use futures markets to 
hedge, or to reduce price risk.  Since futures markets are public, where transactions clear 
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as cheques through a bank, and a margining (good faith deposit) system ensures contract 
sanctity, speculators also participate.  Speculators seek price risk in order to reap 
financial rewards. 
For commercial hedgers (often referred to as bona fide hedgers), basis is the risk 
in hedging.  Mathematically, basis is cash (spot) minus futures (deferred).  Generally, 
hedgers trade basis and speculators trade price.  Hedgers seek profits from marginal 
differences in markets where speculators seek to profit from the rise and fall of 
commodity prices.  Most agricultural markets call for physical delivery of the 
commodity, but some call for cash settlement (index-based price where physical delivery 
is not possible).  The most successful agricultural futures contracts possess the ultimate 
expectation of physical delivery of the product. 
 
1.3.3 Basis Volatility 
 
 Theoretically, basis is less volatile than cash or futures prices, it is seasonal in 
nature, and is responsive to local economic factors.  Basis reflects the local cash price of 
a commodity’s relationship (correlation) to the corresponding futures market.  Figure 10 
and 11 show weekly prices for two cash markets for cotton, the A Index Quote and the 
Australian cash price, relative to the ICE nearby futures contract.  Both pairings exhibit a 
high correlation between the A Index, and Australian cash markets, and the ICE futures 
market.  The difference in the two basis measurements is revealed in Figure 12 via the 
marketing season6 basis mean.  In Appendix 4, the mean and standard deviation of daily 
cash less nearby futures for all four commodities between the marketing seasons 1992/93 
and 2014/15 is presented.  The marketing season mean of daily cash less nearby futures 




6 The USDA defines the marketing season for each commodity based on the United States harvested crop 
year.  The dates are as follows: cotton, August 1st to July 31st; soybeans, September 1st to August 31st; corn, 
September 1st to August 31st,; and wheat, June 1st to May 31st.  Due to insufficient data, this research does 
not incorporate the 1991/92 and 2015/16 marketing season. 
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Figure 10: Cotton - Weekly Cash (A Index) and Nearby FOM Futures Prices 
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Figure 12: Marketing Season Basis Mean (A Index and Australian Cash) 
 
 
The difference in volatility of the two basis markets, as measured by marketing 
season basis CV mean, is presented in Figure 13.  In the 1990’s world cash prices, as 
reflected by the A Index were more volatile than Australian cash prices.  During the 
2007-2009 financial crisis, the Australian basis volatility was a bit higher than the A 
Index; but during the 2010/2011 marketing season, the Australian basis volatility far 
surpassed that of the A Index.  Hedging Australian cotton on the ICE futures contract 
became non-existent and Australian producers were not being offered forward contracts 
during the price spike.  The risk in hedging Australian cotton purchases by merchants 
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Figure 13: Cotton Marketing Season Basis CV Mean (A Index and Australian Cash) 
 
 
Figures 14 and 15 compare the marketing season mean CV of the respective 
basis, cash quote, and the nearby futures for the A Index quote and Australian cash.  It is 
evident from this sample that basis is less volatile than the cash and futures markets from 
which it is derived.  However, in the case of Australian cotton during the 2010/2011 
marketing season, basis became more volatile than both cash and futures (a rare but 
possible occurrence).  The economics for Australian cotton were different to that of world 
cotton in general.  This could be explained by many factors, such as the effect of local 
weather on the Australian crop relative to the rest of the world or government 
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Figure 14: Cotton Marketing Season CV Mean Comparison (A Index Basis) 
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Figure 16 compares the composite marketing season rolling CV(4) mean of basis 
cash and futures volatility.  Not only have cash and futures volatility risen since the 
2002/203 marketing season, but also that of the basis.  As stated in Section 0.6.0, since 
basis data is a weekly data set, RCV n is equal to 4. 
 
Figure 16: Composite Marketing Season RCV(4) Mean Comparison 
 
 
Figure 17 presents the composite’s positive correlation between marketing season 
mean basis volatility and marketing season cash volatility.   Figure 18 presents the 
composite’s positive correlation between marketing season mean basis volatility and 
marketing season mean futures volatility as measured by a RCV(4).  The residuals in 
Figures 17 and 18 are the difference between the actual value and the fitted (or 
predicted) value; there is a residual for each observation used to obtain an Ordinary Least 
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Figure 17: Composite Marketing Season RCV(4) Mean – Basis vs. Cash 
 
 













Linear regression of each variable’s RCV(4), Table 6, shows the positive 
correlation between basis volatility and cash and futures market volatility for all four 
commodities.  For each commodity regression, see Appendix 5. 
 
Table 6: Weekly Basis Correlation to Cash and Futures (1992/93 to 2014/15) 
 
 
The basis study reveals that the composite (average across four commodities) 
basis volatility, as measured by a RCV(4), had a positive correlation to cash and futures 
market volatility for weekly price data between 1992 and 2015.  The RCV(4) volatility 
measurement indicates that cash, futures, and basis volatility increased from the early 
1990’s to the 2010/11 marketing season.  From the early 2000’s, marketing season 
composite mean RCV(4) dramatically increased before decreasing after the 2010/11 
marketing season.  Since 2011/12, the composite volatility for basis has remained at a 
premium to futures through the 2014/15 marketing season. 
Understanding basis explains the financial risk commercial hedgers of commodity 
futures markets undertake.  Theoretically, commercial hedgers transfer price risk to basis 
risk.  Thus basis is the interaction of futures and cash markets; when abnormal 
convergence or divergence occurs, the risk in hedging potentially becomes greater than 
outright price risk.  For example, the financial losses suffered by the Australian cotton 
industry in in 1991 (Apperson, Parton, Macpherson, 1991) and international cotton 
Basis Basis CV(4) to Cash CV(4) Basis CV(4) to Futures CV(4) 
R2 Coefficient R2 Coefficient 
Cotton A Index 
Quote 
0.61 +0.81 0.53 +0.65 
Cotton Aussie 
Cash 
0.18 +1.18 0.50 +1.22 
Soybean  
Cash 
0.43 +2.07 0.42 +2.12 
Corn 
Cash 
0.34 +0.87 0.35 +0.87 
Wheat 
Cash 
0.65 +0.93 0.50 +1.10 
Average 
Cash 
0.62 +1.08 0.52 +1.05 
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merchants in 2008 (MecFerron, Javier, and Perez, 2013; Carter and Janzen, 2009; and 
Plastina, 2008) were results in abnormal basis divergence.  Of particular interest to 
agricultural basis traders would be future research that entails a commodity’s basis as the 
dependent variable versus futures or cash price. 
 
1.4.0 Drivers of Commodity Price Volatility 
 
Commodity price volatility is the degree of expansion (dispersion) or contraction 
(concentration) of a commodity price over a period of time.  High volatility means a high 
dispersion of prices where low volatility means a low dispersion of prices (Plastina, 
2012).  Volatility does not measure the direction of price changes, but the magnitude of 
the fluctuation itself (Plastina, 2010).  Historically there has not been a strong correlation 
between the level of commodity prices and their volatility (Plastina, 2011). 
Changes and expected changes (forecasts) in short and long-term supply and 
demand factors are economic variables that drive commodity prices.  Available supply is 
based on existing stock, or inventory, at a given point in time and expected production 
over a period of time.  Demand consists of consumption, or usage, over a period of time 
plus or minus any imports or exports during that period.  The stocks to use (S/U) ratio is a 
common indicator of the level of stocks on hand relative to consumption at any given 
point in time.  High ratios reflect high levels of stock relative to demand, theoretically 
driving down prices; and low ratios reflect low stock relative to demand, theoretically 
pushing prices higher.  Both supply and demand for most basic commodities are 
relatively price inelastic (Penson, Capps, and Rosson, 2002, Chapter 5).  Supply cannot 
change quickly due to lead time for the planting of crops or the mining of minerals.  
Demand is relatively inelastic as consumption patterns for food, clothing, and fuel take 
time to respond to major price changes.  The following is considered some of the major 
factors of commodity supply and demand that drive price volatility. 
 
Economic Outlook (global growth): GDP revisions by domestic and international 
economists for various countries and the world have an impact on price volatility, though 
more long-term than short-term.  China and other developing nations have added to 
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volatility in recent times because of strong demand for food and raw materials.  Slower 
growth in Europe and the United States has tended to reduce price volatility in many 
commodities. 
 
Weather: Drought, floods, and natural disasters are factors that can dramatically reduce 
short-term supply, creating shortages and increasing price volatility.  There are also long-
term effects that can alter both supply and demand.  Climate change not only extends 
droughts and increases flooding that affect supply, but it also has an effect on 
consumption habits for various types of food and clothing. 
 
Seasonality of prices: For agricultural crops such as cotton, soybeans, corn, and wheat, 
the anticipation of plantings and harvest pressure in the larger crop area of the northern 
hemisphere, tends to increase volatility, especially perceived expectations of such. 
 
Government intervention: Though intended to reduce volatility for domestic prices, 
government price support programs (United States marketing loan program), initiatives 
(ethanol subsidy and export enhancement), and stockpiling (Chinese cotton reserve 
program) can increase volatility in many markets.  Short-term volatility can increase at 
implementation; but longer-term, high inventory levels can reduce volatility as well as 
pressuring prices. 
 
Transparency: Due to the transparency and openness of commodity futures markets, 
prices can change quickly in response to the factors mentioned above.  Thus volatility is 
usually higher in commodity markets than consumer staple markets. 
 
Other markets: The co-movement of other commodity prices can increase or decrease the 
volatility of a commodity, depending on whether the other commodities are complement 
or substitute goods.  Increasing volatility in the corn market has been attributed to corn 
being used in ethanol production in addition to its traditional use for human and animal 
consumption.  During times of financial stress or panic, both soft and hard commodity 
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prices can move in tandem as investors treat commodities as a short-term asset.  If the 
financial markets are in turmoil, commodities are likely to follow. 
 
Currencies: With the floating of major currencies in the 1970’s, large moves in exchange 
rates can increase or decrease volatility in the commodities that are globally traded in 
U.S. dollars.  Changes in prices in crude oil markets tend to have high correlations with 
changes in the value of the U.S. dollar.  Interest rate movements in China, Japan, and 
Europe can affect the flow of investment in and out of U.S. dollars, and thus indirectly 
affect commodity prices such as crude oil or soybeans. 
 
Credit Risk: Contract defaults on behalf of commodity processors and large consumers 
can have an impact on agricultural products.  When grain or cotton exports from the 
United States to China or the Middle East are cancelled or defaulted due to domestic 
financial stress or social unrest, short-term volatility in those markets can increase. 
 
Speculative investment: In recent years, commodity markets have seen increased 
participation from the financial community in the form of OTC swaps, index funds, 
hedge funds, and money managers.  This financialization of commodity markets is the 
result of investors seeking asset diversification.  Viewing commodities as another asset 
class for long-term investment (inflation hedge), regulators relaxed restrictive measures 
to limit participation by this sector until the passage of Dodd-Frank (2010).  This 
infiltration by predominantly “long-only” traders has been suspected as being a cause of 
the historically high volatility levels across commodities in recent times. 
 
Algorithm (High-Frequency) Trading: High Frequency Trading (HFT) refers to 
computerized trading based on algorithms in which transactions are completed in very 
small fractions of a second via supercomputers.  Executing massive amounts of trades, 
HFT comprised over 60 percent of all futures volume in 2012 on U.S. futures exchanges.  
Proponents argue that HFT increases liquidity, but opponents raise concerns over market 
access and stability.  The CFTC continues to investigate whether HFT at times flood the 
markets with “wash” trades and “flash crashes.” 
 	 58	
1.5.0 Challenges in Measuring Volatility 
 
Commodity price time series data can be very inconsistent in its measurement, 
temporal characteristics, and availability.  These factors present challenges to researchers 
and market analysts.  Statisticians and econometricians have developed mathematical 
techniques to overcome the challenges. 
 
Scale effect: Commodities are measured and priced differently (lbs., tons, bales, bushels, 
dollars, cents).  To compare levels of volatility, most data needs to be transformed to a 
common form of measurement (Ott and Longnecker, 2010).  The most common form of 
transformation is the logarithmic transformation (Log).  Logs do not convert units of 
measure or price.  Instead, they allow unlike variables to be compared and reduce the 
impact of large values (much like value percentage change). A log transformation takes 
each value of a variable to a fractional power; as the power approaches zero, the 
transformed value of the variable approaches the natural logarithm (ln y) (Bowerman, 
O’Connell, and Koehler, 2005). 
 
Seasonality: Many commodities exhibit seasonal variations that are caused by such 
factors as weather and consumption patterns.  In order to segregate the seasonal effect, 
several methods can be applied.  Deseasonalizing the monthly, quarterly, or annual data 
can include seasonal dummy (indicator) variables in a regression (Wooldridge, 2009).  
Differencing often makes nonstationary times series data appear to be stationary; it can 
also remove the seasonal component. A lagged difference series of data will have no 
periodic mean component and what remains is the mean component.  The number of lags 
differenced depends on the type of seasonality (Bowerman, O’Connell, and Koehler, 
2005). Decomposition methods can also be applied to modeling.  The basic idea is to 
decompose the time series of data into several factors: trend, seasonal, cyclical, and 
irregular (error) (Bowerman, O’Connell, and Koehler, 2005).  The multiplicative 
decomposition model is useful when time series display an increasing or decreasing 
seasonal variation.  The additive decomposition model is useful when modeling time 
series that exhibit constant seasonal variation. 
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Trends: Commodity prices usually exhibit upward or downward trends that can be caused 
by changing market fundamentals.  In order to segregate the trend effect, 1st, 2nd,or kth 
differencing can remove the trend.  Differencing k times will remove a polynomial trend 
of order k, leaving a mean stationary process (Bowerman, O’Connell, and Koehler, 
2005).  Another method, detrending, is used when commodity price movement satisfies a 
linear, quadratic, or any other polynomial trends.  A computed goodness-of-fit measure 
removes the effect of time trend on price.  The method computes the usual R-squared 
(proportion of the total variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the 
independent variable) in a regression where the price has already been detrended 
(Wooldridge, 2009). 
 
Frequency of data: Commodity price time series data are collected at different intervals, 
i.e. yearly, quarterly, monthly, daily, and hourly.  Hourly and daily data do not display 
seasonal patterns where weekly, monthly, quarterly do.  In comparing crop weekly price 
data between the northern and southern hemisphere, there is likely to be a counter-
seasonal trend.  Though monthly and annual price data over a period of time may yield 
the same average price, the distribution of those prices can be very different (Plastina, 
2012).  If supply and demand data are available on an annual basis and price data are 
available on a daily basis, the variance in price data are not consistent with that of the 
supply and demand data.  Their variance over time is not consistently measured.  The 
challenge with extended periods of historical data are gaps or missing entries due to input 








“In 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which slipped into a huge omnibus 
appropriations act and enacted with no debate, prohibited regulations of credit default 
swaps and other financial derivatives.  Collectively, these statutes, and decisions by 
regulatory officials not to use authority they possessed, contributed to the financial 
devastation of the American economy.” 
James Anderson, 2011, pp. 328-329; citing Frank Parnoy, F.I.A.S.C.O.  2009 
 
 
2.1.0 The Indicator Variable 
 
In order to determine whether market volatility has changed after a shift in policy, 
a simple econometric model was developed.  The purpose of this model was to observe 
the levels of futures price volatility before and after changes in regulatory policy.  The 
daily futures data for each commodity is dissected into 10 segments to test for a 
difference in mean volatility before and after a major policy change or authorization.  
This is sometimes referred to as a “quasi-treatment effect” due to the fact that the study is 
not a true experiment, but rather one where the treatment is imposed in hindsight.  This 
methodology is based on the Campbell and Ross (1968) study. 
The 10 periods consist of 500 days each of daily futures nearby futures settlement 
before and after the key date: A) pre-October 23, 1974, B) post-October 23, 1974, C) pre-
October 16, 1981, D) post-October 16, 1981, E) pre-October 15, 1991, F) post-October 
15, 1991, G) pre-December 1, 2000, F) post-December 1, 2000, H) pre-July 21, 2010, 
and G) post-July 21, 2010.  The five key dates for major commodity futures legislation or 
authorization, the indicator variable, in this research are as follows: 
 
October 23, 1974: Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 was enacted to 
replace the Department of Agriculture’s Commodity Exchange Authority, as an 
independent federal agency responsible for regulating the futures industry (CFTCA, 
1974). 
 
October 16, 1981: CFTC required position limits on all commodity futures contracts as 
CFTCA (1974) authorized the CFTC to establish position limits on non-commercial 
traders who are not bona-fide hedgers (CFTC Website, 2015). 
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October 15, 1991: First exemptions of futures position limits granted by the CFTC to 
major bank and market participants (US Senate, 2009). 
 
December 1, 2000: Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 enacted to officially 
ensure the deregulation of financial products known as OTC derivatives are not subject to 
regulation under CEA as futures contracts, i.e. explicitly prevented CFTC from regulating 
OTC derivatives (CFMA, 2000). 
 
July 21, 2010: Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
required the CFTC to limit the amount of futures contracts (via position limits) that a 
single trader or firm can hold on a commodity (Dodd-Frank, 2010). 
 
The Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) measures the dispersion of prices 
relative to a smooth trend in prices (Plastina, 2011).  The trend is calculated from a 
polynomial function to the 6th degree. 
 
ρt = α0 + α1xt +α2xt2 + α3xt3 + α4xt4 + α5xt5 + α6xt6 + εt 
 
The MAPE is calculated as the average daily absolute difference between the observed 
(𝜌) and a projected value of a price (𝜌), divided by the observed value of that price (𝜌).  T 
equals the number of observations per period, i.e. 500 days. 
 | 𝜌! − 𝜌! |𝜌!𝑇  
 
The projected value is the forecast of the price obtained by using a polynomial regression 
with a constant and a polynomial(6) fit over a number of observations. 
 
The advantage of this measure is that volatility is calculated with respect to a 
trend rather than an average, so when prices are increasing or decreasing at a constant 
rate, this measure takes into account relevant price direction (Plastina, 2011).  The degree 
of relevance can be gauged by the average R2 of the regression over a period of time.  If 
the R2 is high, then the MAPE is a reasonable measure of volatility with respect to a 
trend.  If the average R2 is low, then the MAPE is not a reasonable measure of volatility 
with respect to the trend, because the trend is not significant.  Plastina (2011) considers 
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an average R2 of 0.60 as the minimum cut-off point for this measure of volatility to be 
relevant.  Figures 19 and 20 present the composite (average) MAPE for each period 
before and after key commodity futures regulatory policy shift.  Each individual 
commodity analysis can be found in Appendix 6. 
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Figure 20: Composite MAPE Polynomial(6) Fit Period Mean and R2 
 
 
Table 7 presents the results of a pair-wise test using the Wilcoxon Method for 
each commodity and the composite’s volatility before and after a shift in regulatory 
policy.  The results are interpreted in Table 8. 
 
Table 7: MAPE Period Mean Comparison Nonparametric Pair-wise Wilcoxon 
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Left Scale: Composite Poly(6) MAPE







     2010 
Mean R2: 0.78  
Pre Date Post Cotton Soybean Corn Wheat Composite 
A 10/23/1974 B <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
C 10/16/1981 D <0.0001 0.0492 0.0034 0.0001 <0.0001 
E 10/15/1991 F 0.7357 0.6690 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0142 
G 12/01/2000 H <0.0001 <0.1932 0.0012 <0.0001 0.7135 
I 07/21/2010 J <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0001 0.0140 
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Table 8: MAPE Observed Significance (α = 0.05) 
 
 
In four out of five cases, the composite results followed expectations; the 
exception was no significant volatility increase after (CFMA, 2000).  For cotton this was 
the case (See Appendix 6), but not for corn and wheat; the difference was not significant 
for soybeans.  In each case, economic factors could have had a more significant impact 
on volatility rather than a change in regulatory policy.  This was certainly the case for 
cotton before and after Dodd-Frank (2010).  As of result of high volatility in 2007-2008, 
it is likely that both economic factors of lower supply and the Chinese government’s 
stockpiling of cotton dominated any effect of a shift in commodity regulatory policy. 
 
2.2.0 Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium 
 
In order to explain distinct changes in commodity price volatility over time, the 
theory of punctuated equilibrium (PE) is applied to this research.  Punctuated equilibrium 
is a theoretical model applied to agenda setting in the policy process.  Baumgartner and 
Jones’ (2009) theory of PE states that the course of public policy in the United States is 
one not of gradual and incremental change, but rather disjointed and episodic.  Long 
periods of stability are interrupted by bursts of frenetic policy activity (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 2009, p. xvii) before returning to incremental change.  The concept of PE is 
founded on human behavior operating within formal and informal social and political 
environments.  Human behavior is influenced by perceptions and mechanisms of change, 
Period 
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such as a dramatic event or expanded knowledge.  It is major events or expanded 
knowledge that lead to a change in public behavior and call for a change in public policy 
(Baumgartner and Jones, 2009).  PE focuses more on the temporal aspect of policy 
change than other policy theories; shifts are cyclical, responding to internal or external 
events that drive political subsystems. 
PE (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009) encompasses ideas of bounded rationality, 
institutionalism, incrementalism, impact of image and venue, and the study of agenda 
setting.  Bounded rationality decision-making is responsible for both policy stability and 
change.  According to Herbert Simon, individuals do not seek to maximize their benefit 
from a particular course of action because they cannot access all information required and 
their minds would not be able to properly process it; the human mind restricts itself 
(Hindle, 2009).  Institutionalism is social theory that studies the way formal and informal 
rules in society affect social change.  Institutions operate within the limits of bounded 
rationality.  Periods of incremental change (marginal decision-making) are the result of 
institutionalism and the bounded rationality of individual decision makers that keep 
policy stable. 
PE (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009) introduces the policy concepts of policy image 
and policy venue.  Policy image is how the public perceives a particular policy, the way 
in which the policy is understood and discussed.  One day a policy image could be 
positive, the next day, very negative.  A case in point is the nuclear energy policy of the 
United States.  In the 1950’s and 1960’s nuclear was considered the energy of the future, 
but by the 1970’s and 1980’s, after the disasters at Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl, the 
perception changed.  Policy venue is the structure under which policy is made, the 
institutions or groups that have the authority to make decisions concerning an issue.  
Policy venue determines where the debate will take place to strategically initiate policy 
change, whether it is vertically at the local, regional, or national level, or horizontally at 
the executive, judicial, or congressional level.  Policy change will be stimulated by a 
change in policy image, the bounded rationality of individual decision makers having 
urgency to respond to new change, and / or a change in venue.  The interaction between 
changing images and venues can produce a system of punctuated equilibrium 
(compromise or balance), a shift from one point of stability to another. 
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Within each policy venue are policy actors (networks or subsystems) that share 
beliefs related to a particular problem or issue.  The actors consist of those in authority 
who make decisions and those who have a vested interest in the problem or issue, the 
latter influencing the decisions of those in authority.  When a group of policy actors come 
together under structural arrangements supported by common beliefs and dominate the 
agenda, a policy monopoly emerges.  Policy monopolies do not last forever because new 
beliefs and ideas make them unstable.  Instability leads to a burst of activity of change in 
policy image and venue that interrupts the state of incrementalism (Baumgartner and 
Jones, 2009, pp. 84-86).  It is in the agenda-setting stage of the policy process (Anderson, 
2011, p. 93) that dominant policy monopolies, usually with the support of public opinion 
following an image-changing event or expanded knowledge, introduce a proposal for 
change. 
 
2.3.0 Applying Punctuated Equilibrium 
 
When applied to regulatory policy for agricultural commodity futures markets in 
the United States, PE says that commodity futures regulatory policy does not change 
incrementally.  Instead, it experiences periods of relative stability interrupted by major 
policy shifts.  For example, if futures markets have a negative public image as a result of 
price volatility, perceived to be caused by speculation, policy makers should respond by 
implementing regulations that restrict speculation in commodity markets.  In hopes of 
reducing volatility, the regulation might entail tighter position limits on traders so they 
are unable to manipulate market activity.  A policy change could also occur if, as a result 
of a catastrophic event, there was a shift in the majority of elected officials that favored 
increased regulation in financial markets.  Thus, PE theory would predict that market 
failure (due to information asymmetry, severe financial hardship, or manipulative 
activity) or shift in authority would lead to a change in commodity regulatory policy.  
Once a policy solution is formulated, adopted, and implemented, the evaluation stage 
would assess whether the policy had been effective (Anderson, 2011).  In the case of 
commodity regulatory policy, does the desired change in market behavior (volatility) 
follow the change in policy? 
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The policy actors in commodity futures regulatory policy consist of three factions: 
government authorities overseeing regulatory policy, and two policy subsystems looking 
after their vested interests.  Government authorities consist of the CFTC, Congress, the 
president, and the courts.  The CFTC is the independent agency authorized by Congress 
that oversees the regulation of exchange-based futures markets.  Congress is the 
government authority that makes laws concerning futures market regulatory policies.  
The president (advised by the President’s Financial Working Group, PFWG) makes 
recommendations to Congress on financial market regulatory policy, appoints the chair 
and commissioners of the CFTC, and has the power to veto congressional legislation.  
The courts make rulings, usually on appeal, as to the constitutionality of proposals (under 
the guidance of Congress) set forth by the CFTC. 
All government authorities have a political party connection and tend to side with 
one subsystem or the other.  Since the early 1990’s, evidence suggests that Republicans 
favor less regulation and Democrats favor more regulation in financial markets (Topham, 
2010, p. 157).  However, presidents are not necessarily consistent along party lines.  Bill 
Clinton signed CFMA (2000) (de-regulatory policy), but it was the PFWG, consisting of 
ex-Wall Street and Chicago-school free-market economists, that set White House policy 
on financial market regulation.  Clinton appointed a regulation advocate to chair the 
CFTC but Brooksley Born was outnumbered on the PFWG and in confronting a 
Republican controlled Congress.  Under appeal, President Obama’s nominee to the 
District Court for the District of Columbia in September 2012 ruled that the CFTC 
overstepped its authority with its new system of position limits on twenty-eight physical 
commodities (Peterson, 2012, p. 1) 
 
2.3.1 Policy Subsystems 
 
One policy subsystem consists of commercial participants (CP) in commodity 
futures markets and associated entities who share the common belief that commodity 
futures markets should be regulated and provide a safe and secure price discovery 
mechanism, allowing participants to manage financial risks in order to engage in forward 
commerce.  These participants have utilized futures markets since their inception for 
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hedging purposes, encouraging speculative participation but favoring regulation that 
prevents market manipulation.  The common bond is that they are all part of the 
commodity supply chain involving production, warehousing, processing, distribution, and 
manufacturing.  The subsystem consists of organizations such as the National Grains 
Council, the National Cotton Council, the American Cotton Shippers Association, 
Commodity Markets Council, the American Farm Bureau, farmer cooperatives, and other 
agricultural groups in the grains, oilseeds, and cotton industries.  Members of the 
Democratic party tend to support the views of this commercial network (Topham, 2010; 
Wetjen, 2013). 
The other policy subsystem consists of non-commercial participants (NCP) in 
commodity futures markets and associated entities that share the common belief that 
financial markets should have minimum regulation, allowing them flexibility to innovate 
products and compete with overseas markets.  The subsystem consists of the International 
Swaps and Derivative Association, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association, Goldman Sachs, J P Morgan, Morgan Stanley, money mangers, index funds, 
hedge funds, and their major customers.  Members of the Republican party tend to 
support the views of this “non-commercial” network (Topham, 2010; Wetjen, 2013). 
It is not easy to place the commodity futures exchanges (such as CME and ICE) 
in a policy subsystem, commercial or non-commercial.  Formerly structured as private 
membership exchanges, the transition to “for-profit” occurred early in the twenty-first 
century simultaneously with de-regulatory legislation.  During this time, trading volumes 
markedly increased (Irwin and Sanders, 2012), boosting revenue for shareholders.  Many 
commodity exchanges merged and are now publicly listed on stock exchanges.  Thus the 
futures exchanges appeared to shift their alliance from CP to NCP as revenue from 




In their presentation of PE, Baumgartner and Jones (1993), offer the dual 
mobilization thesis.  Based on the works of Downs (1972) and Schattschneider (1960), 
the mobilization of new voices and previously excluded interests can come either during 
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a wave of enthusiasm for a particular policy or out of opponents’ criticism of, and attack 
against, the policy status quo.  A Downsian mobilization is marked by a positive policy 
image and by the creation of institutions likely to support system interests.  An example 
of Downsian mobilization is the period preceding the enactment of CFMA (2000).  
During this period, change in commodity futures regulatory policy was incremental.  The 
futures industry grew exponentially on the back of financial futures in the 1970’s and 
1980’s (Irwin and Sanders, 2012).  A growing and healthy economy in the United States 
in the 1990’s provided an environment of financial stability and the perception that the 
efficient market theory was working to everyone’s economic benefit.  The non-
commercial subsystem became the policy monopoly when Republicans gained control of 
both the House and Senate in early 1995.  However, the real push occurred when 
President Clinton’s PFWG pushed Congress to keep OTC derivative markets free of 
CFTC regulation (Topham, 2010, pp. 141-143) in November 1999 and when George W. 
Bush was elected to the White House.  The passage and implementation CFMA (2000) 
ensured the deregulation of financial products and prosperity would continue. 
A Schattschneider mobilization, by contrast involves negative policy images.  
Here the greater policy role is played by institutions less likely to offer complete support 
for the status quo (Bosso, 1994).  An example of Schattschneider mobilization is the 
period preceding the enactment of Dodd-Frank (2010).  Commodity futures regulatory 
policy had again been incremental since the passage of CFMA (2000).  However, bank 
failures on Wall Street, followed by a change in venue in Washington, led to the 
commercial subsystem becoming the policy monopoly.  The Economic Crisis of 2007-
2009 was the jolt to the system that changed public opinion against Wall Street and 
changed Congress’s attitude towards financial market regulation.  In 2009, Democrats 
controlled the House, Senate, and the office of the President.  The passage of Dodd-Frank 
(2010) in July 2010 promised to control speculation and tighten financial market 
regulations (Protess, 2011), returning to a more stable and sustainable economic 
environment.  Because of President Obama’s focus on healthcare and foreign affairs, the 
huge financial resources of Wall Street committed to lobby government authorities, the 
loss of a House majority in 2011, and the Senate in 2015, many of the Dodd-Frank (2010) 
requirements have not been implemented (Brush and Schmidt, 2013). 
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2.4.0 Commodity Futures Regulation 
 
As presented in Section 2.1.0, three major commodity regulatory policy shifts 
have taken place since the early 1970’s: CFTCA (1974), CFMA (2000), and Dodd-Frank 
(2010).  Prior to 1974, Congress passed the Grain Futures Act (GFA, 1922), where 
regulated transactions on grain futures exchanges.  After massive speculation in the 
1920’s and the resulting Depression in the 1930’s, the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA, 
1936) was enacted.  CEA (1936) was an amendment to the Grain Futures Act with the 
sole purpose of regulating transactions on commodity futures exchanges, limiting or 
abolishing short selling, and curbing manipulation.  The Act established the Commodity 
Exchange Authority (CEA) as the federal government agency overseeing regulation.  In 
1944, the Breton Woods Agreement opened the door for the creation of the IMF and later 
futures contracts for exchange rates in the early 1970’s. 
 
2.4.1 CFTCA 1974 
 
A combination of high volatility in all existing commodity futures contracts and 
new financial futures contracts was the jolt that led to the CFTCA (1974).  On the 
Chicago exchanges in the 1970’s, trading began in foreign currency and financial futures.  
This expansion in futures activity beyond agriculture led to the creation of the CFTC.  
The CFTC succeeded the CEA as the federal government regulatory agency for all 
organized exchanges on October 23, 1974. 
 
2.4.2 Position Limits: Implementation and Exemption 
 
Two minor, but still very important, authorized actions by the CFTC took place in 
the early 1980’s and early 1990’s.  The 1980’s saw the re-birth of options on futures 
contracts, along with precious metals and energy futures in New York.  As of October 16, 
1981, the CFTC required position limits on all commodity futures contracts as CFTCA 
(1974) authorized the CFTC to establish position limits on non-commercial traders who 
are not bona-fide hedgers (CFTC Website, 2015).  The National Futures Association 
 	 71	
(NFA, 2015) was established in 1982 as the self-regulating agency for the industry.  Its 
primary function was the licensing of brokers and advisers.  Following the recession of 
1990/91, a growing domestic and global economy, in combination with technological 
advances in communication, pressured the CFTC to loosen position limit restrictions.  On 
October 15, 1991, the first exemptions of futures position limits were granted by the 
CFTC to major bank and market participants (US Senate, 2009). 
 
2.4.3 CFMA 2000 
 
Responding to the demands for flexibility by the financial industry, Congress 
passed CFMA (2000).  There had not been an external jolt, but rather an internal change 
within the Congressional venue that enabled the de-regulatory policy subsystem to 
influence policy.  On December 1, 2000, the CFMA (2000) was enacted to officially 
ensure the deregulation of OTC derivatives that were not subject to regulation under the 
CEA as futures contracts.  This Act prevented the CFTC, or any other regulatory agency, 
from regulating OTC derivatives, thus leading to the exponential growth in unregulated 
financial products.  (An overview of CFMA 2000 is presented in Appendix 28.) 
  
2.4.4 Dodd-Frank 2010 
 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 was the jolt that led to the passage of Dodd-
Frank (2010).  After years of corporate, investment bank, and commercial company 
failures, a Democratically controlled Congress passed Dodd-Frank (2010) on July 21, 
2010.  With regard to commodity futures market regulation, Dodd-Frank (2010) required 
the CFTC to limit the amount of futures contracts (via position limits) that a single trader 







2.5.0 Independent Variables 
 
This research incorporates two types of independent variables that may be related 
to commodity price volatility; “economic” variables, and “non-commercial participation” 
variables.  The economic variables are the stocks to use (S/U) ratios for the World and 
United States.  The S/U ratio is defined as estimated ending stocks (inventory) of a 
commodity at the end of the marketing season divided by the estimated consumption 
(usage) for that marketing season, expressed in a ratio or percentage terms.  The non-
commercial participation variables are taken from the CFTC’s Commitment of Traders 
(COT) report, divided into three categories, Legacy, Disaggregated, and Commodity 




Economic variables consist of the current monthly USDA supply-demand S/U 
ratio for the United States (USA) and the world (World) for each commodity.  Estimates 
for forward or new crop are not included due to limited availability.  USA numbers date 
from 1973 to 2015 and World from 1980 to 2015, covering each marketing season from 
1980/81 to 2014/15.  Monthly USDA numbers are publicly released about the middle of 
month.   When utilizing the monthly USA and World S/U ratio in statistical analysis, or 
an econometric model, alongside commodity prices, the end of month daily nearby 
futures settlement is applied.  As with previous analysis, futures prices date from 1973 
and cash from 1992.  Soybean, corn, and wheat are USA delivery; cotton cash are the A 
Index quote and Australian cash quote (as specified in the Introduction). 
Two sets of regressions were run to test the significance of the relationship 
between futures volatility and the S/U ratio: (1) futures volatility as represented by a 
RCV(4) and the actual S/U ratio (volatility vs. level measure) and (2) futures volatility as 
represented by a RCV(4) and S/U ratio volatility, as measured by a RCV(4) (volatility vs. 
volatility measure).  At this stage of the research, a RCV(4) was applied despite the 
frequency of data being monthly.  Subsequent economic modeling based on monthly data 
applies a RCV(3).  
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Table 9 summarizes the relationship between composite futures price volatility 
and the S/U ratio volatility for both the USA and World.  The only significant finding is 
that, as the composite USA S/U ratio volatility increases, composite futures volatility also 
increases (α = 0.05).   For each individual commodity economic analysis, see Appendix 
6. 
 




Figure 21 compares the volatility RCV(4) of the composite futures of all four 
commodities to the level RCV(4) of the composite USA and world S/U ratios.  Figure 22 
compares the volatility CV(4) of the composite of all four commodities to the volatility 
CV(4) of the composite USA and World S/U ratios.  The relationship is significantly 
greater between composite futures RCV(4) and composite USA S/U ratio RCV(4), the 
volatility vs. volatility measure.  The composite futures price volatility has a positive 
slope from the 1973/74 to the 2014/15 marketing seasons relative to the negative slopes 
of the USA S/U and World S/U volatility (See Appendix 7, for individual commodities, 
see Appendix 8).  Specifically, for the composite volatility measure since 2008/09, World 







Marketing USA S/U CV(4) World S/U CV(4) 
Year Mean Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
Futs CV(4) 42 0.13 +0.23 0.02 35 0.01 -0.11 0.62 
Marketing USA S/U Ratio World S/U Ratio 
Year Mean Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
Futs CV(4) 42 0.06 -0.04 0.13 35 0.02 +0.04 0.39 
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Figure 21: Composite Marketing Season Mean Futures RCV(4) and S/U Ratio 
 
 






































































































































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Month End Nearby Compositie Futures Settle Price CV(4))



























































































































































































































































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Month End Nearby Compositie Futures Settle Price CV(4))
Right Scale: Mean - Mean (USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(4)) Mean - Mean (USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(4))
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Figures 23 and 24 illustrate that USA S/U volatility is positively correlated to 
futures volatility (P < 0.05) but World S/U volatility is not correlated.  This relationship 
likely exists because a) USA futures markets are of USA origin only and b) accuracy for 
USDA supply and demand estimates for the USA are likely to be more accurate than 
those in other parts of the world. 
 
Figure 23: Composite Marketing Season Mean Futures CV(4) vs. USA S/U CV(4) 
 
 
World and USA composite S/U volatility has diverged since the 2001/02 
marketing year, the widest point being 2008/09.  World stocks began to build relative to 
USA stocks as sovereign nations responded to the threat of high and insufficient supply 























The Commitment of Traders (COT) is a weekly report published by the CFTC 
(2015) that provides the breakdown of each Tuesday’s open interest (aggregate net open 
positions, long and short) for markets in which 20 or more traders hold positions equal to 
or above the reporting levels established by the CFTC.  The report is released each 
Friday.  For each commodity, the CFTC first breaks open interest into “reportable” and 
“nonreportable” positions.  For traders with a large position (above a CFTC specified 
reporting level), the report is further broken down between commercials (hedgers) and 
non-commercials (speculators).  Historical records of the reporting began in January 1986 
and have developed over the years into three categories; Legacy, Disaggregated, and 
Commodity Index Trader Supplement (CIT).  For this participation study, net long and 
short positions are expressed in percentages of OI versus the actual number of contracts. 
The Legacy COT segregates traders into commercial and non-commercial. 
Commercial participants (CP) include bona-fide hedgers and swap dealers.  Non-
commercial participants (NCP) include professional money managers, i.e. hedge funds 










September 30, 1992, the report was mid-month and month end instead of weekly.  
Options on futures contracts have been included since March 21, 1995. 
The Disaggregate COT further separates traders into producer / merchant / 
processor / user (commercial) form swap dealer, managed money, and other reportables 
(non-commercial).  This further separation of commercial and non-commercial 
participants for futures and options did not begin until June 13, 2006. 
The Commodity Index Trader (CIT) Supplement segregates CITs from 
commercial and non-commercial positions in the COT.  This weekly report on futures 
and options positions began January 3, 2006.  The CIT Supplement reports show 
aggregate futures and option positions of noncommercial, commercial, and index traders 
in 12 selected agricultural commodities. 
Most active futures markets have associated option markets where the asset on 
which the option is based is the underlying futures market, i.e. a March 2015 cotton 
option’s value is based on the March 2015 futures price.  Options are like insurance 
(owners and underwriters).  Since their re-introduction in the early 1980’s, producers and 
processors of agricultural commodities have utilized options.  When large amounts of 
capital are tied up in production or processing, there is little capital to finance an opposite 
position in a financial market (for hedging purposes), especially when the physical and 
the futures markets diverge (or converge). 
In today’s derivative trading environment, there are three institutionally managed 
funds that participate in commodity markets for speculative purposes (for a more detailed 
overview of the composition of managed funds, see Appendix 27).  (1) Commodity 
Funds (pools) are managed speculative futures funds similar to mutual funds in the 
security markets.  (2) Index Funds are funds whose assets are invested in financial 
instruments based on or linked to a (commodity) price index.  (3) Hedge Funds are 
private investment pools that employ sophisticated investment techniques in both asset 
and derivative markets (a misleading term because hedge funds do not necessarily 
hedge).  The latter are managed funds that pool investors’ money and make extensive use 
of leverage (purchases assets or derivatives with borrowed money on margin).  Hedge 
funds were not required to register under federal securities law until Dodd-Frank (2010). 
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This freedom from regulation gave hedge funds extensive latitude in their investment 
strategies. 
OTC products are off-exchange futures (a form of derivative).  The most common 
OTC is a swap, but swaps can be traded either OTC or on an exchange.  Swaps are 
traditionally an OTC product, which include not just financial products (currency, interest 
rate) but also commodity products that are offered by financial institutions to both 
commercial and speculative interests who in turn may hedge their risk in exchange-traded 
futures and option contracts.  The swaps market originated in the OTC market because of 
a lack of transparency, liquidity amongst traders, and not being regulated.  They have 
become exchange-based in recent times.  OTC markets are simply customized forward 
markets that did not have standardized delivery, quantity, quality, price, time, location, 
and regulation, until Dodd-Frank (2010).  The OTC market is also referred to as the 
interbank market.  It has been traditionally controlled by the large international banks, so 
it is difficult for the small investor to directly access the market.  That situation has 
changed in recent years, especially in the foreign exchange market. 
The following analysis compares the composite futures price RCV(2) then 
RCV(4) with the various composite COT reports level (CV vs. level) and the various 
composite COT reports RCV(2) then RCV(4) (CV vs. CV), focusing on the participation 
of non-commercial traders (NCP).  The reason for the shift from RCV(2) to RCV(4) is 













Tables 10 and 11 summarize the data of both observation and annual mean.  
Given the annual means’ representation of the individual data, for charting purposes, the 
annual mean is presented.  As with the Economic data, a more significant relationship 
was found with the volatility vs. volatility measure than the volatility vs. level. 
 
Table 10: Composite COT Summary for Data 
 
 
Mean Legacy COT NCP represented about 48 percent of futures open interest 
(OI) and total open interest (TOI), for both futures and options.  The range, standard 
deviation, and CV for Legacy NCP futures only OI is higher than for TOI indicating that 
NCP is more active in the futures market than the options market.  Mean Disaggregate 
COT NCP represented about 59 percent of futures OI and TOI.  The range, standard 
deviation, and CV for Disaggregate NCP futures only is also higher than for TOI 
indicating that the more segregated report also conveys that NCP is more active in futures 
than in the options market.  Mean CIT (commercial and non-commercial) represent about 
26 percent of TOI.  The NCP portion of the CIT at 57 percent is in line with the 
Disaggregated NCP percentage of OI and TOI.  It is interesting to note that although 
CITs are considered passive investors in commodities, the mean CV is about three times 
higher that the Disaggregated classification for about the same number of observations.  
This indicates that the volatility of the net position is more volatile than the participation. 
Obs Mean SD Min Max Range CV(%) 
Futures Rolling CV 1361 3.26 1.34 0.67 16.27 15.61 40.99 
Futures Only OI Rolling CV 1361 3.46 1.33 0.73 10.78 10.05 38.52 
Futures and Options Rolling CV 1068 3.40 1.38 0.95 9.40 8.45 40.69 
Legacy NCP % of Futures OI  1361 48.12 5.00 37.65 62.66 25.01 10.40 
Legacy NCP % Total OI 1068 47.58 3.26 41.63 57.22 15.60 6.85 
Disaggregated NCP % of Futures 
OI 
485 59.34 2.82 53.25 66.88 13.63 4.75 
Disaggregated NCP % of Total OI 485 59.87 2.61 54.70 66.33 11.63 4.37 
CIT Sup NCP % of Total OI 508 56.99 2.40 52.14 63.88 11.74 4.21 
Net CIT % of Total OI 508 26.06 4.16 18.18 36.05 17.87 15.96 
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Obs Mean SD Min Max Range CV(%) 
Futures Rolling CV 30 2.95 0.69 1.74 5.10 3.36 23.42 
Futures OI Rolling CV 30 3.52 0.56 2.70 5.16 2.46 15.85 
Futures and Options Rolling 
CV 
21 4.31 0.49 3.53 5.38 1.85 11.45 
Legacy NCP % of Futures 
OI  
30 48.91 4.83 40.99 57.73 16.74 9.88 
Legacy NCP % Total OI 21 47.68 2.92 43.15 53.24 10.10 6.13 
Disaggregated NCP % of 
Futures OI 
10 59.38 1.88 56.42 61.93 5.51 3.16 
Disaggregated NCP % of 
Total OI 
10 59.81 2.01 55.97 63.12 6.16 3.36 
CIT Sup NCP % of Total OI 10 57.01 1.73 53.64 59.64 6.00 3.04 
Net CIT % of Total OI 10 25.93 3.62 20.74 31.68 11.21 13.96 
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Figure 25 presents the composite annual mean nearby futures price RCV and the 
OI RCV (1986 to 2015) and TOI RCV (1992 to 2015).  Though the annual means 
indicate an increasing futures RCV (1989 to 2008) and a declining OI and TOI RCV 
(1986 to 2015), the daily nearby futures OI CV regression indicates that the actual data 
present a positive relationship (β1 = 0.31), but the R2 of the regression is not strong at 
(0.11).  The daily nearby futures CV and TOI CV regression indicates a positive 
relationship (β1 = 0.27) but the R2 is 0.09.  It is difficult to make the claim that as futures 
volatility increases so does futures open interest volatility, i.e. volatility vs. volatility. 
 































































































































































Left Scale: Composite Mean Nearby Futures Rolling CV(2) then (4)
Right Scale: Composite Mean Futures Open Interest Rolling CV(2) then CV(4) Composite Mean Futures and Options Total Open Interest Rolling CV(2) then CV(4)
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Figure 26 illustrates that from 1986 to 2008, as composite nearby futures 
volatility increased, Legacy NCP decreased (β1 = -0.14).  However, given a regression 
with an R2 of 0.38 for the annual mean of composite nearby futures RCV and TOI 
(volatility vs. level), this finding is not very convincing.  For the annual mean of 
composite nearby futures RCV and futures OI Legacy NCP regression, β1 = -0.09 and R2 
of 0.41.  The high volatility year of 2008 was a year of low Legacy NCP; it was not until 
post 2010 that NCP rapidly increased. 
 





















































































Left Scale: Composite Mean Nearby Futures Rolling CV(2) then (4)
Right Scale: Compostie Mean Legacy Futures Only NCP Composite Mean Legacy Futures and Options NCP
change of classification 
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Figure 27 presents a similar finding for the relationship between composite 
nearby futures volatility and Legacy NCP volatility (volatility vs. volatility), as futures 
volatility increased, Legacy NCP volatility decreased.  For the TOI regression, β1 = -0.6 
and the R2 is very low at 0.09.  For futures only regression OI, β1 = -0.32 and a R2 of 
0.03.  The high composite nearby futures volatility year of 2008 corresponded with low 
Legacy NCP volatility that remained low through 2015. 
 























































































































































Left Scale: Composite Mean Nearby Futures Rolling CV(2) then (4)
Right Scale: Composite Mean Legacy Futures Only NCP Rolling CV Composite Mean Legacy Futures and Options NCP Rolling CV
change of classification 
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Figure 28 shows that from 2006 to 2015, as composite nearby futures volatility 
rose and then decreased, Disaggregate NCP edged higher (volatility vs. level).  The 
nearby futures RCV and Legacy OI regression yield β1 = -0.16 and a R2 of 0.15.  The 
nearby futures composite RCV and Legacy TOI regression yield β1 = -0.04 and a R2 of 
0.01.  Statistically, there is no significance between price RCV and Disaggregate NCP 
except in 2008.  The Disaggregate report was introduced in 2006 and if extrapolated onto 
the Legacy report, Figure 24 may be more significant. 
 













































Left Scale: Composite Mean Nearby Futures Rolling CV(2) then (4)
Right Scale: Compostie Mean Disaggregate Futures Only NCP Composite Mean Disaggregate Futures and Options NCP
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Figure 29 shows that from 2006 to 2015, as composite nearby futures volatility 
rose and then decreased, Disaggregate NCP volatility was steady (volatility vs. volatility).  
Statistically there is no significance between price RCV and Disaggregate NCP RCV.   
The nearby futures RCV and Disaggregate NCP volatility OI regression yield β1 = -1.67 
and a R2 of 0.17.  The nearby futures composite RCV and Disaggregate NCP volatility 
TOI regression yield β1 = -1.93 and a R2 of 0.20.  2008 was the exception; without 2008, 
the regression line would be virtually flat. 
 





































































Left Scale: Composite Mean Nearby Futures Rolling CV(2) then (4)
Right Scale: Composite Mean Disaggregate Futures Only NCP Rolling CV Composite Mean Disaggregate Futures and Options NCP Rolling CV
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With respect to the CIT, Figure 30 illustrates that there is no significant 
relationship between composite nearby futures price RCV and CIT NCP (volatility vs. 
level).  There is a more significant relationship between composite nearby futures price 
RCV and net CIT as a percent of TOI.  The nearby futures RCV and CIT NCP regression 
yield β1 = -0.07 and a R2 of 0.02.  The nearby futures composite RCV and net CIT 
position as a percent of TOI regression yield β1 = +0.07 and a R2 of 0.11.  2008 was the 
exception; as composite nearby futures volatility rose, CIT NCP increased and the net 
CIT position as a percentage of TOI declined. 
 
Figure 30: Composite Annual Mean Futures Price RCV and CIT NCP and % of OI 
 
 
These composite findings indicate that NCP has ranged from 53 percent to 67 
percent of OI from 2006 to 2015; and by extrapolating Disaggregate data to Legacy data, 
NCP apparently increased from about 50 percent of OI in the mid-1990’s to the 60 
percent level that began in the mid-2000’s.  Thus NCP for the four agricultural 
commodities increased about 10 percent between 1996 and 2006.  2008 was a year that 
saw a rise in composite futures volatility and a rise in NCP and NCP volatility.  However, 
in 2008, CIT participation actually declined.  This implies that CITs, the large passive 



























































Left Scale: Composite Mean Nearby Futures Rolling CV(2) then (4)
Right Scale: Compostie Mean CIT SUP Non-Commercial Participation Composite Mean Net CIT Position as a % of Total OI
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(Irwin and Sanders, 2012, 2011; Irwin, Sanders, and Merrin, 2010, 2009; Power and 
Robinson, 2009).  The low correlations from the regressions conducted with Legacy and 
Disaggregate data also do not convey a strong relationship between composite futures 
price volatility and either NCP (level) or NCP volatility.  Individual commodity COT 
analyses are presented in Appendix 9 to 12. 
 
2.5.3 Interaction of Economic and Participation 
 
Medlock and Jaffe (2009) and Greenberger (2013) revealed that NCP in energy 
futures markets dramatically increased relative to available supply for the energy markets 
between the 1990’s and 2000’s.  The following research analyzes this relationship for the 
four agricultural commodities and their composite.  The findings for cotton, soybeans, 
corn, and wheat can be found in Appendices 13 to 16.  The composite findings follow. 
 
Table 12: Summary of Data OI, Legacy NCP, and Disaggregate NCP  
as Percentage (%) of USA and World Supply 
 
 
Table 12 indicates that composite nearby futures OI has averaged 41 percent of 
USA and 9 percent of World composite supplies (1986-2015) where composite nearby 
Obs Mean SD Min Max Range 
Futures OI % of USA Supply 1361 41.03 2.42 8.55 90.08 81.53 
Total OI % of USA Supply 1071 65.47 3.25 26.78 133.52 106.74 
Futures OI % of World Supply 1361 9.49 3.93 3.06 18.77 15.71 
Total OI % of World Supply 1071 14.55 5.47 7.58 28.29 20.70 
Legacy NCP Futures % of USA Supply 1361 19.05 10.59 4.74 44.97 40.23 
Legacy NCP Total % of USA Supply 1071 30.82 15.02 13.06 65.59 52.54 
Legacy NCP Futures % of World Supply 1361 4.44 1.60 1.70 8.11 6.41 
Legacy NCP Total % of World Supply 1071 4.98 1.66 2.71 8.39 5.68 
Disaggregate NCP Futures % of USA Supply 485 42.28 5.96 25.33 55.33 30.01 
Disaggregate NCP Total % of USA Supply 485 58.99 9.19 37.49 81.30 43.81 
Disaggregate NCP Futures % of World Supply 485 8.41 1.00 5.30 10.92 5.63 
Disaggregate NCP Total % of World Supply 485 11.85 1.79 7.90 16.59 8.69 
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futures TOI has averaged 65 percent of USA and 15 percent of World composite supplies 
(1995-2015).  From 1986 to 2015 composite Legacy NCP OI averaged 19 percent of 
USA and 4 percent of world composite supplies; from 1995 to 2015, composite Legacy 
NCP TOI averaged 31 percent of USA and 5 percent of world composite supplies. Under 
the more specific classification, between 2006 and 2015, composite Disaggregate NCP 
OI averaged 42 percent of USA and 8 percent of world composite supplies and composite 
Disaggregate NCP TOI averaged 59 percent of USA and 12 percent of world composite 
supplies.  As the following graphs illustrate, those percentages dramatically increased 
between 2006 and 2012. 
Figures 31 and 32 compare the annual mean of composite supply volatility to the 
annual composite mean of both nearby futures OI and TOI as a percentage of USA and 
world supply.  There is no significant statistical relationship between supply RCV and OI 
as a percentage of supply for both the USA and the world.  The correlation is positive for 
the USA and the world, but all R2‘s are less than 0.10.  USA supply RCV and futures OI 
percent of USA supply regression yield β1 = +0.06 and a R2 of 0.01.  USA supply RCV 
and TOI percent of USA supply regression yield β1 = +0.02 and a R2 of 0.01. 
 

















































































































































Left Scale: Composite Mean (USDA Current USA Supply Rolling CV (2) then (4))
Right Scale: Composite Mean (Futures Only Open Interest as % of USA Supply) Composite Mean (Futures & Options Open Interest  as % of USA Supply)
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World supply RCV and futures OI percent of world supply regression yield β1 = 
+0.08 and a R2 of 0.00.  World supply RCV and TOI percent of world supply regression 
yield β1 = +0.05 and a R2 of 0.01. 
 




Figures 33 and 34 compare the annual mean of composite supply volatility to the 
annual composite mean of both Legacy NCP futures OI and TOI.  There is no significant 
statistical relationship between supply RCV and Legacy NCP OI and TOI as a percentage 
of supply for both the USA and the world.  The correlation is positive for the USA and 
for the world, but all R2‘s are less than 0.14.  USA supply RCV and Legacy NCP OI 
percent of USA supply regression yield β1 = +0.11 and a R2 of 0.01.  USA supply RCV 
and Legacy NCP TOI percent of USA supply regression yield β1 = +0.04 and a R2 of 
0.01.  World supply RCV and Legacy NCP OI percent of world supply regression yield 
β1 = +0.13 and a R2 of 0.01.  World supply RCV and Legacy NCP TOI percent of world 











































































































































Left Scale: Composite Mean (USDA Current World Supply Rolling CV (2) then (4))
Right Scale: Composite Mean (Futures Only Open Interest as % of World Supply) Composite Mean (Futures & Options Open Interest  as % of World Supply)
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Left Scale: Composite Mean (USDA Current USA Supply Rolling CV (2) then (4))














1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Left Scale: Composite Mean (USDA Current World Supply Rolling CV (2) then (4))
Right Scale: Composite Legacy Futs NCP % of  World Supply Composite Legacy Total NCP % of World Supply
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Figures 35 and 36 compare the annual mean of composite supply volatility to the 
annual composite mean of both Disaggregate NCP futures OI and TOI.  There is no 
significant statistical relationship between composite supply CV and Disaggregate NCP 
OI and TOI as a percentage of supply for both the USA and the world.  The correlation is 
positive for the USA and for the world, but all R2‘s are less than 0.10.  USA supply RCV 
and Disaggregate NCP OI percent of USA supply regression yield β1 = +0.06 and a R2 of 
0.01.  USA supply RCV and Disaggregate NCP TOI percent of USA supply regression 
yield β1 = +0.03 and a R2 of 0.01.  World supply RCV and Disaggregate NCP OI percent 
of world supply regression yield β1 = +0.09 and a R2 of 0.01.  World supply RCV and 
Disaggregate NCP TOI percent of world supply regression yield β1 = +0.07 and a R2 of 
0.02. 
 
Figure 35: Composite Annual Mean USA Supply RCV and Disaggregate NCP as % 





















2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Left Scale: Composite Mean (USDA Current USA Supply Rolling CV (2) then (4))
Right Scale: Composite Diaggregate Futs NCP % of USA Supply Composite Disaggregate Total NCP % of USA Supply
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Figure 36: Composite Annual Mean World Supply RCV and Disaggregate NCP as 
% of World Supply 
 
 
Table 13: Composite OI, Legacy NCP, and Disaggregate NCP as Percentage (%) of 
























2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Left Scale: Composite Mean (USDA Current World Supply Rolling CV (2) then (4))
Right Scale: Composite Disaggregate Futs NCP % of World Supply Composite Disaggregate Total NCP % of World Supply
Exchange-Traded Futures and Options OI as % of Supply 
1995 2012 Ratio 
USA 34% 113% +3.3x 
World 10% 22% +2.2x 
Legacy NCP Futures and Options OI as % of Supply  
1995 2012 Ratio 
USA 17% 53% +3.1x 
World 6% 10% +1.6x 
Disaggregate NCP Futures and Options OI as % of Supply 
2006 2012 Ratio 
USA 44% 70% +1.6x 
World 10% 13% +1.3x 
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This interaction analysis has found that there is no strong correlation between the 
volatility of composite USA and World supply numbers, as reported by the USDA for 
current crop, and futures OI and TOI or NCP as a percentage of composite USA and 
World supply, based on data from 1986 to 2015 and COT categories.  As with previous 
research in energy markets (Medlock and Jaffe, 2009; Greenberger, 2012) the analysis 
has found that between 1995 and 2012, NCP has more than tripled as a percentage of 
USA composite supply and by 50 percent of World composite supply (Table 11). 
Between 2006 and 2012, composite NCP had increased 1.6x for USA composite supply 
and 1.3x of World composite supply. 
 
2.6.0 Effect of Policy Change on Market Volatility 
 
In this chapter, a relationship was established between each independent variable 
(economic, participation, and interaction of economic and participation) and the 
dependent variable (futures price volatility). 
In Section 2.1.0 of this Chapter, the mean levels of futures price volatility before 
and after the five regulatory shifts were observed (500 daily observations in each period 
of 10).  The composite (aggregate) Mean Absolute Percentage Error Polynomial(6) 
measurement revealed that futures price volatility was significantly different prior and 
subsequent to four out of five policy shifts.  Of the three major regulatory changes, 
volatility was significantly different prior and subsequent to CFTCA (1974) and Dodd-
Frank (2000), but not for CFMA (2000).  For the two minor authorizations by the CFTC 
(enforcement and exemptions for position limits), composite futures price volatility was 
significantly different prior and subsequent to those actions.  The findings for each 
individual commodity were presented in Tables 7 and 8. 
Section 2.5.1 compared the relationship between the marketing season mean 
futures price volatility RCV(4) to both the marketing season mean USA and world S/U 
RCV(4) over a period of 42 marketing seasons (1973/74 to 2014/15).  For the composite, 
the significant finding was that there was a positive relationship between futures volatility 
and the USA S/U volatility.  Though negative, the relationship between composite futures 
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volatility and world S/U volatility was not statistically significant.  The findings for each 
individual commodity are presented in Appendix 8. 
Section 2.5.2 compared the relationship between the annual mean futures 
volatility as measured by RCV(2)-RCV(4), based on the frequency of data, to the various 
categories of non-commercial participation (NCP) volatility as measured by RCV(2)-
RCV(4) between 1986 and 2015.  For the composite, the significant findings were 
between 2006 and 2015, NCP ranged between 53 percent and 67 percent of OI; but there 
was not a significant relationship between composite futures volatility and either NCP or 
NCP volatility, despite NCP increasing relative to CP by about 10 percent (from 50 
percent to 60 percent) from the mid-1990’s to 2015. 
Based on data from 1986 to 2015, Section 2.5.3 revealed that there was no 
significant correlation between the composite volatility of USA and world supply 
numbers (as reported by the USDA for current crop) and composite futures OI and TOI 
or NCP as a percentage of composite USA and world supply.  However, from 1995 to 
2012, composite TOI, as percent of supply, increased 330 percent for the USA and 220 
percent for the world.  As reflected in the CFTC Legacy categorization, composite NCP 
as a percent of supply increased 310 percent for the USA and 160 percent for the world 
over the same period.  But under the more specific Disaggregate categorization, in 2012, 
composite NCP TOI was 70 percent of USA supply and 13 percent of world supply.  
Thus from the mid-1990’s to 2012, composite NCP increased between 10 percent to 15 
percent relative to composite CP, as a percentage of composite USA and world supply. 
Sections 2.5.2 and Sections 2.5.3 showed that the composite NCP increased 
relative to composite CP between the mid-1990’s and 2015, but it did not show that the 
composite NCP caused composite nearby futures price volatility to increase.  Positive 
correlation between nearby futures price volatility and economic volatility or regulatory 
change does not also determine cause and effect.  Two econometric models were 
introduced to test the significant effect that each of these independent variables had on 





2.6.1 Null Hypothesis: Policy shifts have no effect on volatility 
 
NCP who favor de-regulated markets accept volatility and view any level of 
volatility as a function of an efficient market.  CP that favor regulated markets accept 
volatility but view sustained periods of high of volatility as potentially detrimental to 
commercial market participants.  The latter fear that sustained volatility is a sign of 
information asymmetry or manipulative activity that can lead to market failure.  
Commodity regulatory policy, less restrictive or more restrictive, should determine the 
magnitude of market volatility. 
The first hypothesis is: if commodity regulatory policy is not restrictive on market 
participants, then price volatility with respect to shocks, and the rate at which shocks are 
transmitted into futures prices, is likely to be higher than under a more restrictive policy.  
Sustained periods of historically high volatility may occur because less restrictive 
(deregulatory) policy may not limit participant activity, resulting in greater speculation in 
the market.  A less restrictive policy may be one where position limits are relaxed and 
margin requirements are low enough to encourage greater market participation.  
Following the less restrictive regulatory legislation of CFMA (2000), increased volatility 
was evident by 2007-2009.  This period of market turmoil led to the passage of Dodd-
Frank (2010), a more restrictive regulatory policy.  Thus, sustained levels of high 
volatility may lead policy actors to try to influence elected officials to change regulation 
in favor of lower volatility levels. 
The second hypothesis is:  if commodity market regulatory policy is restrictive on 
participants, then price volatility with respect to shocks, and the rate at which shocks are 
transmitted into futures prices, is likely to be lower than under a less restrictive policy.  
Normal volatility by historical standards may occur because a restrictive regulatory 
policy limits participant activity and decreases speculation in the market.  A more 
restrictive policy may be one where position limits are strictly enforced and margin 
requirements are high enough to discourage market participation.  Following the more-
restrictive regulatory legislation of Dodd-Frank (2010), composite market volatility 
subsided after a couple of years.  If volatility continues to be deemed low or moderate for 
a sustained period, policy actors in favor of deregulated markets may exert more 
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influence on elected officials to change regulation to being less restrictive in order to 
increase market participation.  Prior to 2000, markets were quite stable for a sustained 
period of time when regulatory policy was more restrictive than that which existed post-
2000. 
The third hypothesis is:  if commodity regulatory policy shifts from restrictive to 
less restrictive or vice versa, then a change in market behavior will not be immediate.  
There may be a time lag before the new policy has had an effect in changing market 
behavior.  Following CFMA (2000), composite nearby futures volatility did not change 
for a good while; the shock was the financial crisis of 2007-2009, largely attributed to the 
unregulated OTC derivatives market.  Following Dodd-Frank (2010), composite nearby 
futures volatility did not change immediately, in part because implementation has been 





The time period of study is forty-two years, from 1973 to 2015.  Given USDA 
economic supply and demand numbers are monthly, all variables are monthly.  The 
dependent variable is the end of month daily nearby futures settlement for each 
commodity as per the Introduction, Section 0.4.2. 
The independent economic variables are the USDA monthly USA and World S/U 
ratios for each commodity.  USA supply and demand numbers date from 1973 to 2015, 
with each commodity beginning with the 1973/1974 marketing season beginning month 
(cotton, August; soybeans, September; corn, September, and wheat, June) and ending 
with the 2014/2015 marketing season ending month (cotton, September; soybeans, 
August; corn August, and wheat, May).  World supply and demand numbers date from 
1980 to 2015, with each commodity beginning with the 1980/1981 marketing season 
(except corn which starts in July 1984, 1984/1985 marketing season) and ending with the 
2014/2015 marketing season.  See Section 2.5.1.  The Composite economic variables are 
presented in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37: Composite Economic Variables (USDA Monthly S/U Ratio) Period – 
USA (solid) and World (dotted) 
 
 
The independent participation variables are the non-commercial component 
(NCP) of the end of month (last weekly report of the month) CFTC COT Legacy, 
Disaggregated, and CIT Supplement reports.  As presented in Section 2.5.2, the Legacy 
COT begins January 15, 1986, the Disaggregated COT begins June 13, 2006, and the CIT 
Supplement begins January 3, 2006; all three end September 30, 2015.  Option data did 































































01/01/1973 01/01/1983 01/01/1993 01/01/2003 01/01/2013
USDA Report Date
USA data from 8/1973 
World data from 9/1984 
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Figure 38: Composite NCP Variable (CFTC COT) by Period – Futures Only (solid)    
and Futures and Options (dotted) 
 
 
The indicator (dummy) regulatory variables are the dates: October 23, 1974; 
October 16, 1981; October 15, 1991; December 1, 2000; and July 21, 2010.  The 
indicator regulatory variables represent the qualitative effect (Menddenhall and Sincich, 
2003) before and after a major United States Congress policy shift or a regulatory agency 
authorization, as presented in Section 2.1.0 and Section 2.4.0 of this chapter.  The five 
dates separate the data into six periods of study (A, B, C, D, E, and F) surrounding the 
shifts in commodity regulatory policy.  Similar to the MAPE results in Section 2.1.0, the 
RCV(3) results are presented in Table 14.  The RCV(3) model discussion follows, but 

































































































































































01/01/1985 01/01/1991 01/01/1997 01/01/2003 01/01/2009 01/01/2015
COT Report Date
Legacy data from 1/1986 
Options data from 3/1995 
Disaggregate data from 6/2006 
CIT Supplement data from 1/2006 
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Table 14: Dependent Variable (Mean Month End Nearby Futures Settle Price 





Two types of econometric modeling were applied in order to determine whether 
the dependent variable (nearby futures price volatility), has changed as a result of a 
change in an independent variable or combination of variables (regulatory shift, 
economic, and non-commercial participation).  The RCV(n) model consists of a rolling 
coefficient of variation for both dependent and independent variables.  The RCV for each 
commodity could then be compiled as a composite indicator for all four commodities.  A 
commonly used model to measure volatility in time series data is Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) that is designed to deal with the issue of 
“volatility clustering” (Engle, 2001).  ARCH models require sophisticated software but 
have been found not to handle multiple binary (dummy) variables as needed in this 
research.  Therefore the basic procedures of the ARCH model have been applied to a 
model termed, “squared residual analysis” (SRA) (Enders, 2010, pp. 126-127) that 
incorporates an autoregressive component AR(q) with normally distributed residuals 
Regulatory 
Period 




























































































































using autoregressive software (Enders, 2010, p. 8).  The means of the squares of the 
residuals are compared to determine differences in volatility across periods.  The reasons 
for applying two methodologies are threefold.  First, despite ARCH models having been 
applied to a wide range of time series analyses, some scholars have questioned their 
application in measuring commodity price volatility (Medlock and Jaffe, 2009).  Second, 
in order to aggregate all four commodities into a common indicator of volatility, only a 
relative measurement, such as the RCV, could be applied.  Finally, different models give 
different results that lead to different findings. 
The RCV(n) was presented in the Introduction, Section 0.5.0.  As the RCV 
measures volatility, it can be applied to both the dependent and independent variables in 
an econometric model.  Similar to a log – log model (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 46), the 
RCV(n) is a volatility - volatility model versus a volatility - level or level – volatility 
model.   Given that data was monthly over 42 years, quarterly (three month)  RCV’s were 
applied, i.e. RCV(3).  Recall that the frequency of the data is the major driver is 
determining the number of rolls (n) in the model.  By including the volatility of other 
factors that influence price volatility, such as previous nearby futures price volatility, 
economic supply and demand (S/U ratio) volatility, and non-commercial participation 
(NCP) volatility, alongside an indicator (dummy) variable for regulatory legislation, the 
significance and magnitude of the effect of regulatory policy on price volatility may be 
determined. 
Price data in which the variances of the error terms are not equal, where the error 
terms may reasonably be expected to be larger for some points or ranges of data than 
others, is said to suffer from heteroskedasticity.  The presence of heteroskedasticity 
means that the standard errors and confidence intervals estimated by conventional 
regression will be too narrow, giving a false sense of accuracy.  ARCH models treat 
heteroskedasticity as a variance to be modeled, correcting the deficiencies of the least 
squares regression.  A prediction is computed for each observation and the squared 
difference in the observation and the prediction is a measure of volatility (Engle, 2001).  
In temporal commodity prices there is a degree of autocorrelation, similarity between 
observations as a function of the time lag between observations.  ARCH models are 
designed to handle these issues of inconsistency in variance.  The purpose is to provide a 
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volatility measure, like a standard deviation, that can be used to gauge volatility 
accurately. 
The ARCH process simultaneously models the conditional mean and the 
conditional variance of time series data.  The ARCH model allows for autoregressive 
components in the variance where the GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroskedasticity) accounts for both autoregressive and moving average (ARMA: 
autoregressive moving average) components (weighted average of past squared residuals) 
in the heteroskedastic process (Enders, 2010).  The most widely used GARCH 
specification asserts that the best predictor of the variance in the next period is a weighted 
average of the long-run average variance, the variance predicted for this period, and the 
new information in this period that is captured by the most recent squared residual 
(Engel, 2001).  GARCH models can be interpreted as the standard deviation of the 
percentage change in prices.  Plastina (2012) describes the ARCH and GARCH process 
as a dual model that predicts both price (mean model) and the volatility of price 
(conditional variance of the error term of the mean model). 
As in the ARCH process, the SRA applies econometric modeling to test if the 
conditional variance, a measure of volatility, changed before and after a commodity 
regulatory policy shift.  By including other factors that influence price movement, such as 
previous price movement, economic supply and demand (S/U ratio), and non-commercial 
participation (NCP), alongside an indicator (dummy) variable for regulatory legislation, 
the significant effect of regulatory policy on price volatility may be determined. 
The difference in the two types of models lies in that the SRA conditional 
variance dependent variable is the error term of the conditional mean model and is a 
measure of volatility.  The independent variables of the conditional variance are actual 
monthly ratios, i.e. USA and world S/U ratios and NCP percentage levels.  The RCV(n) 
model dependent variable is a measure of volatility and the independent variables are a 
measure of USA and world S/U ratio volatility and NCP percentage level volatility (not 
the actual ratio or percentage, but the variance of the ratio or percentage).  Thus, the 
RCV(n) model tests the cause and effect of volatility of independent variables on the 
volatility of the dependent variable and the SRA model tests the cause and effect of 
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independent variables on the volatility of the dependent variable.  The two model types 
yield different results, but the findings are similar. 
 
2.6.4 Models of Volatility 
 
A1) RCV(n) AR(q) Conditional Mean Equation 
yt = β0 + β0t + εt 
where β0t = mean of y for n observations (𝑦!) 
 
A2) RCV(n) AR(q) Conditional Variance Equations 
CVnt = 
!!! (!!!)!!  
 
CVnt = β0 + β1CVnt-k + β2Dkt + εt 
 
CVnt = β0 + β1CVnt-k + β2Dkt + β3CVx1t + β4CVx2t + εt 
 
CVnt = β0 + β1CVnt-k + β2Dkt + β3CVx1t + β4CVx2t + β5CVx3kt + εt 
 
For each commodity RCV(3) econometric model, the dependent variable (yt) is 
the RCV(3) of the commodity month-end nearby futures price.  Independent variables 
include: an autoregressive lag(s) of the RCV(3) nearby futures month-ending price (yt-k), 
an indicator variable for separating the periods before or after regulatory policy shifts 
(Dkt); the RCV(3) of the current season’s cotton world stocks to use ratio (x1t), the 
RCV(3) of the current season’s USA stock to use ratio (x2t), and the RCV(3) of the NCP 
(Legacy, Disaggregate, and CIT Supplement).  For the composite, the dependent variable 
is the simple average of the RCV(3) of the four commodities (cotton, soybeans, corn and 




B1) SRA AR(q) Conditional Mean Equation 
 
yt = β0 + β1yt-k + εt 
 
B2) SRA AR(q) Conditional Variance Equations 
 
lnε2t = α0 + α1lnε2t-k + α2Dkt + vt 
 
lnε2t = α0 + α1lnε2t-k + α2Dkt + α3x1t + α4x2t + vt 
 
lnε2t = α0 + α1lnε2t-k + α2Dkt + α3x1t + α4x2t + α5x3kt + vt 
 
For the SRA econometric modeling conditional mean, the dependent variable (yt) 
is the month-end nearby commodity futures price settlement.  Independent variable(s) are 
simply the number of autoregressive lags of the dependent variable (yt-k).  For the 
conditional variance, the dependent variable (lnε2t) is the log of the squared error term 
from estimating Model (B1).  Independent variables include: an autoregressive lag(s) of 
the dependent variable (lnε2t-k), an indicator variable for separating the periods before or 
after regulatory policy shifts (Dkt), the current season’s world S/U (x1t), the current 
season’s USA S/U (x2t), and the NCP (Legacy, Disaggregate, and CIT Supplement) (x3kt). 
A test for serial correlation, Durbin’s alternative statistic (Wooldridge, 2009, pp. 
416-417), regressed the model residuals against the model inclusive of lagged residuals 





The cotton results are summarized in Table 15 and graphically presented in 
Figure 39 (detail reports See Appendices 17 and 18).  For models incorporating 
regulatory period and economic variables (1980 to 2015), both models indicate that 
cotton nearby futures volatility in period C was significantly lower to the overall mean of 
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cotton nearby futures price volatility.  Model A (R2 = 0.38) indicates period E volatility 
was higher than the overall mean where Model B (R2 = 0.05) indicates that period F 
volatility was higher than the overall mean and period B was lower.  For data covering 
1980 to 2015, USA economic data volatility has a significantly positive correlation with 
cotton nearby futures volatility in Model A.  For Model B, world economic data has a 
significant negative correlation with the dependent variable.  
Between 1986 and 2015, adding NCP data to the models, Model A NCP volatility 
was significantly positive along with USA economic data volatility; period C was 
significantly below and period E above the overall mean of cotton nearby futures price 
volatility.   For Model B, NCP data was not significant, world economic data has a 
significant negative correlation with the dependent variable, regulatory period C and D 
were significantly below the overall mean, and period F was significantly higher. 
Between the high volatility dates of 2006 to 2015, and fine tuning the NCP data, 
Model A did not show there was a significant difference in cotton nearby futures price 
volatility between regulatory period (E and F) but USA economic data volatility and NCP 
volatility were significant.  Model B revealed regulatory period was significant (E lower 
and F higher than mean volatility) and that world economic data was significant but NCP 
data was not. 
The RCV(3) model indicates that cotton nearby futures price volatility was 
positively affected by USA economic data volatility (not world) and NCP volatility.  
Longer duration data shows low volatility in periods C and D (relative to the mean) with 
high volatility in period E.  The SRA model indicates that cotton nearby futures price 
volatility was negatively affected by world economic data (not USA) and regulatory 
period was significant whether data was of short or long duration.  NCP data was not a 








Table 15: Cotton Price Volatility Econometric Model Comparison 
 
 
Figure 39: Cotton Price Volatility: Econometric Model Comparison 
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The soybean results are summarized in Table 16 and graphically presented in 
Figure 40 (detail reports See Appendices 19 and 20).  For models incorporating 
regulatory period and economic variables (1980 to 2015), the results of the models are 
very dissimilar in that soybean nearby futures price volatility in period E was 
significantly higher to the overall mean of soybean nearby futures price volatility for 
Model A (R2 = 0.38) versus Model B (R2 = 0.13) where no regulatory period was 
significant except period F that was significantly higher to the overall mean with no other 
independent variables included in the model.  For data covering 1980 to 2015, USA 
economic data volatility has a significantly positive correlation with soybean nearby 
futures price volatility in Model A but negative in model B.  For Model A, world 
economic data volatility has a significant negative correlation with the dependent 
variable, but in Model B, it is positive when both futures and options are included. 
Between 1986 and 2015, adding NCP data to the models, Model A NCP volatility 
and economic data volatility were not significant but USA economic data was 
significantly negative in Model B.  In Model A, period E was significantly above the 
overall mean soybean futures price volatility when economic and NCP data volatility 
were included.  For Model B, no period was significantly different to the overall mean of 
soybean futures price volatility.  World economic data was significantly positive in 
Model B with the Legacy NCP included futures and options data. 
Between the high volatility dates of 2006 to 2015, and fine tuning the NCP data, 
Model A showed significant difference in soybean nearby futures price volatility between 
regulatory period (E and F) but economic data volatility and NCP volatility were not 
significant.  Model B revealed that no regulatory period, economic data, or NCP data 
were significant. 
The RCV(3) model indicates that soybean nearby futures price volatility was 
positively affected by USA economic data volatility and negatively affected by world 
economic data volatility when NCP data volatility was not included in the model.  All 
RCV(3) model durations indicate that period E was significant positively to the overall 
mean of soybean nearby futures price volatility.  The SRA model indicates that soybean 
nearby futures price volatility was negatively affected by USA economic data (not world) 
and regulatory period F was only significant when data was of long duration and no other 
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variables were included in the model.  NCP data was not a significant variable under the 
SRA model. 
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Figure 40: Soybean Price Volatility Econometric Model Comparison 
 
 
The corn results are summarized in Table 17 and graphically presented in Figure 
41 (detail reports See Appendices 21 and 22).  For models incorporating regulatory 
period and economic variables (1980 to 2015), the models are very dissimilar in that corn 
nearby futures price volatility was not significantly different from one period to the next 
in model A (R2 = 0.38), but period F was significantly higher to the overall mean of corn 
nearby futures price volatility for Model B (R2 = 0.15).  Economic data was not 
significant in Model B but in Model A USA economic data volatility was positive and 
world economic data volatility was negative. 
Between 1986 and 2015, adding NCP data to the models, Model A regulatory 
period and NCP volatility were not significant but USA economic data volatility was 
significantly positive.  In Model B, regulatory period F remained significantly above the 
overall corn nearby futures price volatility, NCP data had a significantly negative 
correlation to corn nearby futures price volatility, and USA economic data was 
significant but had a negative effect. 
Between the high volatility dates of 2006 to 2015, and fine tuning the NCP data, 
Model A showed no significant difference in soybean nearby futures price volatility 
between regulatory periods; economic data volatility and NCP data volatility were not 
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significant.  Model B again revealed the significantly negative effect of USA economic 
data on corn nearby futures price volatility. 
The RCV(3) model indicates that corn nearby futures price volatility was 
positively affected by USA economic data volatility but regulatory period and NCP data 
volatility had no significant effect.  No independent variables had any significance on 
corn futures price volatility in models of short duration.  The SRA model indicates that 
USA economic data negatively affected corn futures price volatility and that period E 
was above the overall corn nearby futures volatility mean and period F was below.  NCP 
data only had a significantly negative effect on corn nearby futures volatility between 
1986 and 2015 under Legacy COT. 
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Figure 41: Corn Price Volatility Econometric Model Comparison 
 
 
The wheat results are summarized in Table 18 and graphically presented in 
Figure 42 (detail reports See Appendices 23 and 24).  For models incorporating 
regulatory period and economic variables (1980 to 2015), both models indicate that 
wheat nearby futures volatility in period C was significantly lower to the overall mean of 
wheat nearby futures price volatility.  Model A (R2 = 0.30) indicates period E volatility 
was higher than the overall mean where Model B (R2 = 0.13) has no other period 
significant beside period C.  For data covering 1980 to 2015, no economic data volatility 
has any significance with wheat nearby futures volatility in Model A; but for Model B, 
USA economic data has a significant negative correlation with the dependent variable. 
Between 1986 and 2015, adding NCP data to the models, Model A NCP volatility 
was significantly positive but no economic data volatility was significant.  Period C was 
significantly below and period F was significantly above the overall mean of wheat 
nearby futures price volatility.  For Model B, NCP data was not significant, USA 
economic data had a significant negative correlation with the dependent variable; 
regulatory period C and F were respectively significantly below and above the overall 
mean wheat nearby futures price volatility. 
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Between the high volatility dates of 2006 to 2015, and fine-tuning the NCP data, 
Model A indicated both a positive significant effect for both NCP data volatility and 
World economic data volatility.  No regulatory period was significant.  For Model B, 
USA economic data had a negative effect, period E was below the mean wheat nearby 
futures price volatility, and NCP data was not significant. 
The RCV(3) model indicates that wheat nearby futures price volatility 
significantly differed from period to period, was positively affected by NCP volatility, 
but not affected by economic data volatility except maybe World economic data volatility 
during the 2006 to 2015 time frame.  The SRA model indicates that wheat nearby futures 
price volatility was negatively affected by USA economic data and regulatory period was 
significant whether data was of short or long duration.  NCP data was not a significant 
variable under the SRA model. 
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Figure 42: Wheat Price Volatility Econometric Model Comparison 
 
 
The composite results are summarized in Table 19, graphically presented in 
Figure 43 (detail reports See Appendix 25), and graphically compared to each individual 
commodity’s volatility in Figure 43.  For the model including the regulatory indicator 
variable only, R2 = 0.45.  The RCV(3) method indicates that the average nearby futures 
price volatility across the four commodities was historically high in period A, generally 
on the decline in period B, below the overall mean in periods C and D, rose significantly 
in period E, and remained high in period F (though declining).  Composite nearby futures 
price volatility was significantly different between regulatory periods in the CV(3) 
models with and without the inclusion of economic data volatility and NCP volatility 
variables (except in the model including the NCP CIT supplement). 
Economic data volatility was significant in all composite RCV(3) models where it 
was included.  USA economic data volatility was of greater positive significance than 
world economic data volatility’s negative significance, reflecting that the futures markets 
under study were for United States delivery only.  World economic data volatility was a 
significant factor in models of longer duration than shorter duration. 
NCP volatility is only a significant variable affecting composite nearby futures 
price volatility under the Disaggregate report (that is the most inclusive of NCP); the data 
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duration is only from 2006 to 2015 and it is for futures contracts only (not options).  Thus 
for the period between mid-2006 and mid-2015, the Composite RCV(3) model indicated 
that USA economic data volatility and NCP volatility were both significant variables 
affecting a composite of nearby futures price volatility before (rising) and after 
(declining) Dodd-Frank (2010) enactment. 
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Figure 43: Composite Price Volatility RCV(3) Econometric Model 
 
 













Though the two types of methodology, RCV(n) and SRA, yield different findings, 
the models indicate the following.  First, previous nearby futures price volatility 
significantly affects subsequent nearby futures price volatility.  Second, previous 
commodity price volatility is statistically more significant than expectations of changes in 
commodity supply and demand, non-commercial participation, and shifts in commodity 
futures regulatory policy.  Finally, commodity economic information is inherent in 
previous commodity futures price movement.  Generally, across models based on cotton, 
soybean, corn, and wheat nearby futures price volatility between 1973 and 2015, it is 
apparent that aggregate nearby futures price volatility was relatively high pre-1975, 
declined from 1974 to 1981, declined further from 1981 until 1991, steadily rose from 
1991 to 2000, then rose dramatically from 2001 o 2011, before declining after 2013. 
Economic variables were consistently significant across commodity models, with 
USA economic data and volatility more significant than world economic data and 
volatility.  Since 2000, world commodity specific economic data (and volatility) has 
gained significance over USA commodity specific economic data (and volatility) due to 
the accumulation in world stocks after the global financial crisis of 2007-2009 (especially 
for the cotton market).  Both models indicate that NCP in futures contracts has a more 
significant affect on nearby futures price volatility than futures and options contracts 
combined, indicating that NCP is greater in futures contracts than in options.  For the 
higher volatility commodities (cotton and wheat), the RCV(3) model indicates that NCP 
volatility is a more significant factor affecting nearby futures price volatility than it is in 
the soybean and corn markets.  In the lower volatility corn market, the SRA model 
indicates NCP data has a significant effect on nearby futures price volatility longer term.  
The composite RCV(3) model indicates that both USA economic data volatility and NCP 
volatility were significant variables affecting composite nearby futures price volatility 
before and after Dodd-Frank (2010). 
The results indicate that a change in volatility is not solely a result of a shift in 
regulatory policy intended to alter market variability.  There are many variables that 
determine market volatility over a given period of time.  The market reaction (increased 
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volatility) to CFMA (2000) did not fully occur until 2007 as a result of a lag effect.  It 
appears to have taken some time for financial firms to develop more unregulated OTC 
products related to commodity futures and educate customers in the less regulated 
environment of relaxed position limits.  Despite the passage of Dodd-Frank (2010), 
legislative intent to reverse CFMA (2000), historical volatility increased rather than 
declined.  The fact that the market volatility increased can be explained by the failure to 
implement the policies of Dodd-Frank (2010).  However, as Dodd-Frank (2010) became 
more of a reality, volatility levels subsided as shocks were fewer and smaller in 
magnitude. 
The evidence is that commodity futures regulatory policy is not one of gradual 
and incremental change, but one of long periods of stability interrupted by sporadic bursts 
of policy activity.  Including economic variables, non-commercial participation, and past 
prices into the equation explaining volatility change appears to deplete the significance of 
a commodity regulatory policy shift. 
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“By 2010…because of the recklessness and avarice of many banks, bankers, and 
financial entities, the call for expanded regulation of the financial industry gained a 
prominent place on the policy agenda.  However, as the economic situation improved and 
medical reform pushed to the fore, financial regulation lost momentum.  Estimates are 
that reform legislation will be moderate in tone.” 
James Anderson, 2011, p.329; citing Peter Stone, “Financial Guns of August,” 





The 2007-2008 financial crisis, the subsequent recession, and stagnant economic 
growth in the United States coincided with increased commodity futures market price 
volatility.  Both mainstream media and scholarly research have focused on the economic 
issues of those events more than the regulatory policies that shaped them.  Economics 
matter, but the policy process that produces regulation is also important; financial market 
regulatory policy determines financial market success.  Commodity futures market 
regulation involves a public policy process and public policy is a political process, not 
just an economic one (Ransom, 2013). 
In Chapter 2, Baumgartner and Jones’ (2009) theory of punctuated equilibrium 
was applied to explain how temporal policy shifts in commodity futures regulation 
occurred in bursts of change preceded and followed by incremental change.  The research 
focus there was more economic than political as a way to explain policy shifts.  The 
CFTCA (1974) may not be considered a policy shift but more of a policy transition when 
the regulation of commodity futures markets was moved from the CEA to the newly 
formed CFTC.  The minor regulatory actions by the CFTC regarding position limits 
(1981 and 1991) could be viewed as incremental instead of being real jolts to the system. 
The two major commodity regulatory policy shifts in recent history have been the CFMA 
(2000) and Dodd-Frank (2010), polar opposite in their approach to market regulation. 
Another policy concept that can explain such a policy change is Paul Sabatier’s 
(1993) Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF).  Where the punctuated equilibrium 
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analysis is quantitative, applying econometric models; the ACF analysis is qualitative, 
identifying the stakeholders and coalitions within policy subsystems that induce change.  
These two conceptual models complement each other.  They aid in the understanding of 
the policy process of how the issue of agricultural commodity price volatility comes 
before government authorities that must determine the policies to correct market, and 
sometimes government, failure. 
 
3.2.0 The Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
The Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier, 1993) is a public policy theory 
where policy change over time is a function of three sets of processes: (1) interaction of 
competing advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem, (2) changes external to the 
subsystem in socio-economic conditions, system-wide governing coalitions, and output 
from other subsystems that provide opportunities and obstacles to competing coalitions, 
and (3) the effects of stable system parameters (institutional rules ~ formal and informal) 
on the constraints and resources of the various subsystem actors.  In conjunction with the 
ACF is the concept of Policy-Orientated Learning (Sabatier, 1993).  Policy Orientated 
Learning (POL) is concerned with changes over time in the distribution of beliefs of 
people within a coalition or within the broader policy subsystem. 
Looking through the ACF policy change lens, two factors are identified: (1) key 
members of opposing advocacy coalitions influencing policy and their vested interest and 
(2) the external subsystem conditions that represented opportunities or constraints to 
policy advocates.  By applying aspects of ACF theory, a better understanding of why and 
how commodity futures regulatory policy experienced two major and opposite changes in 
a decade.  Specifically, ACF theory applied to commodity futures market regulation 
states that commodity futures market regulatory policy change is the result of the efforts 
of advocacy coalitions translating their policy beliefs into commodity futures regulatory 
policy, and the effects of exogenous factors or systematic events on the resources and 
opportunities available to subsystem actors.  The ongoing process of POL led to the 
alteration of beliefs of policy subsystem members, especially those of government 
authorities. 
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3.3.0 Applying the Advocacy Coalition Framework 
 
Commodity futures market regulatory policy has changed over time as result of 
external subsystem events allowing an advocacy coalition to dominate the commodity 
futures market regulatory policy subsystem, enabling that coalition to influence 
government authorities to alter enforcement of commodity position limits, the dominant 
policy instrument, in that coalition’s favor. 
 
3.3.1 Null Hypothesis:  Advocacy coalitions do not affect regulatory policy change 
 
A growing and healthy economy in the United States in the 1990’s provided an 
environment of perceived financial stability.  Institutions in favor of deregulated financial 
markets, due to their vested interest of financial gain through the growth of commodity 
and financial derivatives, influenced policy makers to ensure that OTC markets remain 
free from regulatory supervision.  The passage and implementation of CFMA (2000) 
ensured the deregulation of OTC financial derivatives.  The Economic Crisis of 2007-
2009 changed public opinion against Wall Street and changed Congress’s attitude toward 
financial market regulation.  Institutions in favor of regulated financial markets 
influenced policy makers to revert back to the policies that preceded CFMA (2000).  The 
passage of Dodd-Frank (2010) promised to control excessive speculation and tighten 
financial market regulation by requiring the CFTC to impose position limits on traders.  
Unfortunately, many of the Dodd-Frank (2010) requirements have been challenged well 
after the Act’s enactment.  Three years after the passage of Dodd-Frank (2010), market 
volatility remained high in the agricultural commodity futures markets.  The following 
hypotheses, similar to those presented in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1, are tested in the 
research. 
 
The first hypothesis is: if financial and commodity markets experience periods of 
moderate volatility, economic growth is positive, and market regulatory policies are 
perceived to be an industry constraint, then the opportunity arises for a policy change to 
less restrictive market regulatory policy. 
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The second hypothesis is: if financial and commodity markets experience periods 
of high volatility, economic growth is slow or negative, and market regulatory policies 
are perceived not to be an industry constraint, then the opportunity arises for a policy 
change to more restrictive market regulatory policies. 
The third hypothesis is: if a change in regulatory policy focused on altering 




Data sources include articles from the Congressional Quarterly Weekly, journal 
articles, scholarly books, CFTC reports and testimonies, futures industry reports, 
commodity industry reports, Congressional Acts, and agricultural, financial and futures 
market periodicals over the past thirty years.  These sources have been accessed to 
identify members of the respective advocacy coalitions within the policy subsystem, the 
various stakeholders, changes external to the subsystem that provide opportunities and 





A qualitative study design is employed to apply the ACF (Sabatier, 1993) theory 
of policy change in order to understand why commodity futures regulatory policy has 
changed over time.  Particular attention focuses on regulation that utilizes positions limits 




Appendix 26 is a chronology of events between 1922 and 2015 that are important 
to the policy process surrounding CFMA (2000) and Dodd-Frank (2010).  The 
commodity futures regulatory process occurred in three phases; the first phase led to the 
passage of the CFMA (2000), the second phase led to the passage of Dodd-Frank (2010), 
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and the third is the implementation of Dodd-Frank (2010), as it pertains to commodity 
futures market position limits.  For a complete overview of CFMA (2000) and Dodd-




The key stakeholders of the commodity regulatory policy subsystem include three 
factions: (1) the Advocacy Coalition of Commercial Participants (CP) in commodity 
futures markets, (2) the Advocacy Coalition of Non-Commercial Participants (NCP) in 
commodity futures markets, and (3) Government Authorities (GA) overseeing the 
regulation of commodity futures markets. 
 
Policy Subsystem: Advocacy Coalition ~ Commercial Participants (CP) 
 
The CPs consist of those who participate in commodity futures markets for 
hedging reasons.  Members share the belief that regulated futures markets provide a safe 
and secure price discovery mechanism, allowing them to manage financial risks in order 
to engage in forward commerce.  Until the advent of financial futures in the 1970’s, 
participants had been primarily physical commodity industries, of which agricultural 
contracts were the most established contracts.  CP typically desire free markets and 
operate for profit in their businesses.  Since market failure threatens the stability of 
commodity markets, CP favor market regulation that seeks to prevent manipulative 
practices, but encourages moderate speculation for market liquidity. 
The resources of the CP consist of organizations such as commodity trade 
associations, commodity councils, the American Farm Bureau, the Commodity Markets 
Council, farmer cooperatives, and other agricultural groups from the grains, oilseeds, 
cotton, and cattle industries.  Prior to the advent of the growth in financial futures and 
before the transformation to corporate exchanges, the individual member exchanges, such 
as the New York Board of Trade, Chicago Board of Trade, and Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange, were considered part of the CP coalition.  However, as de-regulation enhanced 
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the growth of various financial products and exchange volumes increased, futures 
exchanges appeared to be shifting their loyalty (Bettelheim, August 12, 2000). 
 
Policy Subsystem: Non-Commercial Participants (NCP) 
 
The NCP consists of those who participate in commodity futures markets purely 
for financial gain, not commercial commodity interests.  Members share the belief that 
highly regulated financial and futures markets limit their ability to participate, innovate, 
and compete with overseas markets.  Until the 1970’s, NCP’s did not directly engage in 
futures markets; but with the end of Breton Woods and increased globalization of 
financial markets, their need for risk management tools increased.  As advances in 
computer and communication technology decreased the cost of financial information and 
transaction costs and increased the innovation of financial products, participation in 
financial and commodity derivative markets exploded.  The merging of commercial and 
investment banks led to financial powerhouses trading for profit in physical commodity 
markets where they could easily leverage into financial products on behalf of clients or 
for their own proprietary trading. 
The resources of NCP consist of organizations such as the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, 
money managers, index funds, hedge funds, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J P 
Morgan, various other financial institutions, and large customers of these organizations.  
After the transition from membership exchanges to publicly listed companies, futures 
exchange organizations, such as Intercontinental Exchange (ICE), Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange Group (CME) and the Futures Industry Association (FIA), shared NCP beliefs 
and supported their regulatory policy strategies (Bettelheim, August 12, 2000). 
 
Policy Subsystem: Government Authorities (GA) 
 
GA consists of the CFTC, Congress, the President, and the courts.  Where their 
core beliefs lie and what ultimate policy decisions they make, depends on many factors.  
Those factors include the same external subsystem events and institutional rules that 
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affect the CP and NCP, as well as the degree of influence the two advocacy coalitions 
have upon them.  The chairman and commissioners of the CFTC, the President and his 
staff, members of Congress, and judges all come and go.  Academic researches are 
chosen as expert witnesses usually by the coalition their findings support and not by what 
Sabatier terms a policy broker.  Though the perception would be that the CFTC would 
serve as a policy broker in the commodity futures regulatory policy subsystem, this is not 
the case.  The CFTC does function in a neutral capacity in attempt to regulate on behalf 
of all participants but the evidence suggests that the agency’s actions are biased towards 
one of coalitions, depending on the individual chairing the agency.  The President, 
Congress, and judges have their own core beliefs about financial regulatory policy.  
Those beliefs are shaped by changes in socio-economic conditions and public opinion, 
but are also heavily influenced by the advocacy coalitions (of which they may be a 
member). 
The evidence suggests that Republicans tend to side with the NCP and Democrats 
with the CP.  Presidents are not necessarily consistent along coalition and party lines; Bill 
Clinton (D) signed CFMA (2000), but it was the President’s Financial Working Group 
(PWG) consisting of ex-Wall Street and Chicago-school free-market economists that set 
White House policy on financial market regulation.  Clinton appointed Brooksley Born, a 
regulation advocate, to chair the CFTC; but she was out numbered on the PWG and in 
confronting a Republican controlled Congress.  The data has observed only one instance 
of a court ruling which was in favor of the NCP coalition (ironic, since Judge Wilkins 
was President Obama’s (D) appointee who was not favored by some Senate 
Republicans). 
  
ACF of the 1990’s that led to the passage of the CFMA 2000 
 
Diagram 1 illustrates the ACF (Sabatier, 1993) as it applies to the passage of the 
CFMA (2000).  For a chronology of events that led to the passage of CFMA (2010), see 
Appendix 26.  The 1990’s regulatory tone of financial and commodity markets had its 
origins in the 1970’s and 1980’s with the growth of financial futures and OTC 
derivatives.  The financial industry’s success led to a close relationship with the 
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Republican Party.  The party of Wall Street backed regulatory legislation that kept the 
money pouring into lower Manhattan.  The pace of financial success was so rapid that the 
regulatory authority, the CFTC, appeared to either complacent, or was just not able to 
keep up with the financial product innovations that were taking place.  The exemptions 
from regulation of futures position limits, OTC derivatives and swaps, and hybrid 
instruments in 1991, 1992, and 1993 by the CFTC were major victories for NCP’s.  It 
was not only Wall Street lobbying in Washington, it was also Wall Street’s large 
customers, such as Enron, that had the Republican Party convinced that deregulated 
financial markets were the recipe for economic growth. 
When Clinton succeeded Bush, surprisingly, the NCP maintained control of the 
White House.  Clinton’s financial PWG consisted of the de-regulation trio of Federal 
Reserve Chair, Alan Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, and Deputy-Treasury 
Secretary Larry Summers7.  These men were set on having the United States maintain 
financial leadership and dominance in world financial markets.8  But as early as 1994, a 
GAO report warned that in times of financial panic or market stress, derivatives may 
have the potential to “rock the markets” should a major derivatives dealer go under.  The 
liquidity of the market could be threatened because other dealers’ transactions with the 
failed trader would be tied up. Illiquidity would impose risks to investors, including 
federally insured banks, and the financial system as a whole (Taylor, May 21, 1994).  
Opponents to regulation of OTC derivatives, which included both Democrats and 
Republicans in the House and Senate, warned that if the GAO recommendations were 																																																								
7 In his statement before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry against the CFTC 
concept release, Summers (1998) stated, “…clearly…derivatives can also be abused…more broadly, 
questions have been raised as to whether the derivatives markets could exacerbate a large,	sudden market	
decline.  But in the case of OTC derivatives, the parties of these kinds of contract are largely sophisticated 
financial institutions that would appear to be eminently capable of protecting themselves from fraud and 
counterparty insolvencies and most of which are already subject to basic safety and soundness regulation 
under existing banking and securities laws.” 
8 In his testimony before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Alan Greenspan (1998) stated “…participants in financial futures markets are predominantly professionals 
that simply do not require customer protections that may be needed by the general public.  The primary 
source of regulatory effectiveness has always been private traders being knowledgeable of their 
counterparties.  Government regulation can only act as a backup.”  In his testimony a year later, Associate 
Director, Division of Research and Statistics, Federal Reserve Board, Patrick Parkinson (1999) stated, “ 
…professional counterparties simply do not require the kind of investor protections the CEA (1936) 
provides.  Such counterparties typically are quite adept at managing credit risk…Financial derivatives are 
not susceptible to manipulation and professional counterparties do not need protections that retail investors 
do.” 
 	 125	
implemented, the regulations would increase the cost of derivatives and curb their 
availability, which would harm corporations and investors who need them to manage risk 
(Taylor, May 21, 1994). 
From 1990 until 1999, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) gained 318%; it 
was a tough battle for anyone who wanted to increase regulation in the financial and 
commodity markets.  Financial lobbyists pushed the threat of losing opportunities to less 
regulated European markets.  The CP coalition was experiencing its usual roller-coaster 
financial environment to the extent that changes in legislation went unnoticed, or they did 
not have a sympathetic ear in government. 
 
Diagram 1: ACF of Commodity Regulatory Policy Change – 1990’s (Sabatier, 1993) 
 
 
After a succession of Republican CFTC chairs, Clinton appointed Brooksley Born 
chairman in 1996.  The PWG and the Republican Senate Agricultural Committee in 1998 
publicly used elitism tactics of condemnation in attempt to force her to back down.  
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With a complacent CFTC enjoying the growth in financial futures 
markets (early 1990’s) the big pockets of Wall Street lobbying for 
unregulated financial products, the strong influence of the financial 
sector on the Republican party (Wall Street and Enron factions), the 
deregulatory and free market members of President Clinton’s PWG 
(Greenspan, Rubin, Summers), a positive economic environment, the 
traditional coalition not realizing the change that was taking place, 
and despite the new Chairman of the CFTC fighting for regulatory 
control over OTC derivatives and tighter regulations,  Congress 
passed the CFMA of 2000 in December of 2000.  A Republican, 















Though she was later recognized for her tough fight against the PWG, a Republican 
dominated Congress, and Wall Street, the inevitable passage of CFMA led to her 
resignation in 1999.  Leading into the November elections, the Chicago commodity 
exchanges and the securities industry (CBOE and NYSE) contributed heavily to 
congressional and presidential candidates, parties, and leadership PACs (Bettleheim, 
August 12, 2000).  In the final rounds of negotiations, investment banks hired several 
lobbyists who usually represent growers and processors of sugar, corn, and other 
commodities to help press their case for regulatory relief before the House and Senate 
Agricultural committees (Bettleheim, August 12, 2000).  Between 1998 and 2000, Wall 
Street banks spent over $5 billion to lobby for the Gramm-Leach-Bailey Act (an overhaul 
of Glass-Steagall) and the more obscure CFMA (2000) (Bloomberg, 2013).  When 
Clinton signed CFMA (2000) in December 2000, evidence of financial catastrophe was 
beginning to emerge in the case of Long-Term Capital Management.9 
 
ACF of the 2000’s that led to the passage of Dodd-Frank 2010 
 
Diagram 2 illustrates the ACF (Sabatier, 1993) as it applies to the passage of the 
Dodd-Frank (2010).  For a chronology of events that led to the passage of Dodd-Frank 
(2010), see Appendix 26.  From the time George W. Bush took office in January 2001, 
with the exception of the Enron collapse in October 2001, the financial markets roared 
and the banking industry profited from the housing and derivatives boom.  Enron built 
much of its controversial energy trading business by taking advantage of a divided 
regulatory scheme in which publicly traded energy futures and options were regulated 
while private trading in forward contracts and price swaps on fuel and electricity (and 
other commodities) were not (Adams, February 2, 2002).  In late 2007 the de-regulatory 
model began to unravel. 
Though not known at the time, the Great Recession began in December 2007, 
right after the DJIA reached its high in October.  In March of 2008, as the Federal 																																																								
9 Long-Term Capital Management was a hedge fund that applied financial leverage to absolute-return 
trading strategies.  Founded in 1994, the firm was defunct by 1998 following the Asian and Russian 
financial crises.  Despite a recapitalization by numerous Wall Street banks, supervised by the Federal 
Reserve, the master fund of the firm was liquidated and dissolved in early 2000 (Lowenstein, 2000). 
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Reserve bailed out Bear Stearns, the demise of legendary Wall Street and Front Street10 
firms began.   Within two years, the names of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, 
Dunavant Cotton, Weil Brothers Cotton, and Paul Reinhart Cotton would no longer be 
participants in their respective industries.  The DJIA plummeted to a low of 6547, 
unemployment rose, the public read about Congressional hearings regarding the 
manipulation of energy markets, the effects of high food prices around the globe, and 
something called credit default swaps (CDS) that drove some established Wall Street 
firms to bankruptcy. 
The new Obama administration was not sympathetic to Wall Street; neither were 
a Democratic controlled Senate and House.  The CP had victories when Obama chose 
Timothy Geitner as Treasury Secretary and appointed Gary Gensler as chairman of the 
CFTC.  Gensler, an aggressive former Goldman Sachs executive, was determined to 
obtain regulatory control over derivative markets.  For commodity futures markets, 
position limits were the primary policy tool chosen by Gensler and Congress to 
accomplish this mission (Wetjen, 2013).  The CP coalition had limited resources 
compared to Wall Street, but they did have a presidential administration, both houses of 













 																																																								10	Historic Front Street in Memphis, TN, where all major cotton firms had offices.	
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Diagram 2: ACF of Commodity Regulatory Policy Change – 2000’s (Sabatier, 1993) 
 
 
Despite hundreds of millions more dollars, thousands more visits and phone calls 
to Senate and House members by the top US banks and financial institutions, protecting 
their vested interest in the very profitable and still growing OTC derivative, swap, and 
hybrid financial markets, and the end of the Great Recession in June 2009, Congress 
passed Dodd-Frank (2010). 
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The agenda was set, policy formulation re-established, adoption completed, but 
Dodd-Frank (2010) implementation was slow.  A Republican controlled House starting in 
2011, the Obama White House set on healthcare reform, and the vague language of 
Dodd-Frank (2010) meant that the NCP still had a fighting chance.  Goldman Sachs made 
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With the collapse of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Dunavant 
Cotton, Weil Brothers Cotton, Paul Reinhart Cotton, Michael Masters 
testimony before Congress, an Democratic Executive branch not 
sympathetic to Wall Street, Democrats in control of the Senate, an 
aggressive CFTC chairman determined to obtain regulatory control 
over derivative markets, unemployment rising, stock markets in free 
fall, traditional coalition lobbying with restricted resources, Congress 
passes Dodd-Frank despite millions of dollars, thousands of visits and 
phone calls to Senate and House members by the top US banks and 
financial institutions who try to protect their vested interest in the very 
profitable OTC derivative, swap, and hybrid financial markets. 
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150 visits and calls to the CFTC between April 2010 and July 2013; the top banks made 
more than 1000 contacts with the agency (Brush and Schmidt, 2013; Levinson, 2015). 
As early as January 2011, the CFTC proposed new curbs on speculative position 
limits on a range of commodities, including cotton, soybeans, corn, and wheat.  But upon 
appeal from the International Swaps and Derivatives Dealers Association (ISDA), a trade 
group representing participants in the market for over-the-counter derivatives, and the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA), a trade group 
representing firms, banks, and asset mangers, in September of 2012, Judge Robert 
Wilkins of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the 
CFTC had overstepped its authority with its new system of position limits (Peterson, 
2012). 
After another year of regrouping, the CFTC, led by Gensler, proposed a new rule 
setting position limits on physical commodity futures markets, again inclusive of cotton, 
soybeans, corn, and wheat.  The new rule has yet to be overturned in court, but 
modifications were made as late as September 2015 (Federal Register, September 29, 
2015).  Since 2013, agricultural commodity futures markets have seen price volatility 
similar to that prior to 2007.  U.S. swap trades did not vanish; the lobbying effort by the 
big banks between 2010 and 2013 helped win a ruling from the CFTC that left U.S. 
banks’ overseas operations largely outside the jurisdiction of U.S. regulators.  After the 
loophole passed, U.S. banks simply shipped more trades overseas. By December of 2014, 
certain U.S. swaps markets had seen 95 percent of their trading volume disappear in less 
than two years (Levinson, 2015). 
House Republicans began introducing bills to modify Dodd-Frank (2010) as early 
as 2011; they also attempted to cut funding for both the CFTC and SEC (Weyl, 2011, 
2012, 2014; Carter and Ackley, 2013).  The attempts continued through early 2015, but 
with a Democrat in the White House and the party in control of the Senate, both actions 
were to no avail.  In July 2015, Dodd-Frank (2010) was five years old.  The financial 
services industry has spent hundreds of millions of dollars lobbying against the Act since 
it became law.  Though it is unlikely to be repealed, out of the nearly 400 rules to come 





1. The events of the 1990’s proved that when financial and commodity markets 
experience periods of moderate volatility, economic growth is positive, and market 
regulatory policies are perceived to be an industry constraint, then the opportunity 
arises for a change to less restrictive market regulatory policy. 
2. The events of the 2000’s proved that when financial and commodity markets 
experience periods of extreme volatility, economic growth is negative, and market 
regulatory policies are perceived not to be an industry constraint, then the opportunity 
arises for a change to more restrictive market regulatory policies. 
3. Since the passage of Dodd-Frank (2010), regulatory policy has not been fully 
implemented, and agricultural commodity futures market volatility, especially this 
study’s composite futures volatility (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.0, Table 12), was 
very volatile for three years after Dodd-Frank (2010).  It remains to be seen if a 
November 2013 CFTC rule setting position limits for physical futures and options 
contracts will go unchallenged in the courts from ISDA and SIFMA and that 
agricultural commodity futures market volatility will remain at levels that existed 
between the mid-1970’s to the mid-2000’s. 
 
3.4.0 Policy Orientated Learning 
 
In the case of commodity futures regulation in the 1990’s and 2000’s, it was not 
observed that any particular policy actor reversed their position along party lines as a 
consequence of conditions and developments that led to de-regulation in 2000 or 
regulation in 2010 in the reform process; the reversal was brought about by the people of 
the United States through elections.  Throughout the period of study, CP and NCP were 
generally drawn on party lines. 
The only observed exception was the Clinton administration, where a Democrat 
President’s PWG consisted of Wall Street investment bankers, a Chicago-school 
economist, and a regulation advocate CFTC chair (whom the President appointed).  
President Clinton, a Democrat, signed CFMA (2000) into law where Obama, a Democrat, 
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signed Dodd-Frank (2010) into law.  The Clinton Administration certainly had closer ties 
to Wall Street than President Obama.  President Bush was an oilman, with strong 
connections to Enron; Enron was the king of OTC energy derivative markets and 
certainly did not want to be further regulated.  It has not been discovered that any key 
members of Congress reversed their position on the matter. 
The one exception outside party lines that reversed its position is the chairman of 
CFTC itself.  Between Chairman Born and Gensler’s tenure, no chair made a strong stand 
on the issue.  But Gensler, a onetime Goldman Sachs prodigy who helped undo 
regulation when he was the Treasury Department’s undersecretary for domestic finance 
in the last two years of the Clinton administration, reversed roles to fight for regulation.  
Gensler’s was the key player for the CP in the passage of Dodd-Frank (2010) and the key 
force in its implementation against the fight by Wall Street.  In the end, Gensler 
sacrificed his ambition, creating so many political enemies in Congress and the financial 
industry that his chances for a second term as chairman were dim (Bloomberg, 2013).  
This rejection later proved to be the case. 
The commodity futures regulation case suggests that a key factor in understanding 
the policy change process is the relating of policy preferences to exogenous factors.  The 
efforts of advocacy coalitions and the impact of exogenous factors are not independent of 
each other, rather; they are highly interdependent.  The activity of relating them by policy 
actors constitutes an important dynamic in the policy change process (Sabatier, 1993).  
The events between 2000 and 2009 had more of an effect on Gensler than any 
government authority or policy actors.  Without conditions conducive to policy change, 
the regulation thrust of Dodd-Frank (2010) would have been moderate, absent the ability 
of deregulation advocates such as Gensler to exploit, as well as create, opportunities to 
promote their position.  This point emphasizes the strategic and dynamic relationship 
between core belief systems and observable conditions (Brown, 1993). 
 
3.5.0 PE and ACF as Compliments 
 
The more precisely one analyzes a situation, the more likely one is to see 
underlying themes in the general pattern of events.  The role of theory is to separate the 
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true themes from merely the curious (Sabatier, 1993).  This research has applied two 
policy theories, Baumgartner and Jones’ (2009) theory of punctuated equilibrium (PE) 
and Paul Sabatier’s (1993) Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to help understand 
why commodity futures market volatility changes over time and who and what are behind 
commodity market regulatory policy shifts. 
PE has been applied to understand why commodity price volatility experiences 
temporal changes.  Using quantitative analysis over longitudinal study, one can see how 
commodity regulatory policy is not gradual and incremental but that it is “disjointed and 
episodic” (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009, p. xvii).  Chapter 2 describes the relationship 
between major shifts in commodity regulatory policy and commodity futures market 
price volatility.  When integrated with other variables, the relationship becomes less 
apparent though at times still significant.  Economic events, whether positive or negative, 
can lead to significant change in market price volatility and shifts in market regulatory 
policy. 
The ACF has been applied to further explain the politics of the policy process, 
why subsystems emerge and how commodity regulatory policy is actually changed or 
prevented from changing.  Using qualitative analysis over longitudinal study, one can see 
how those in positions of authority, influenced by stakeholders, can drive policy change.  
In Appendix 26, through the pattern of events from the early 1970’s until 2015, the 
tremendous impact that powerful financial institutions have had on commodity futures 
regulatory policy is obvious. 
Though they are different lenses from which to view the policy process, PE and 
ACF complement each other and together offer a joint explanation as to why agricultural 
commodity markets have seen both significant changes in market volatility and shifts in 
commodity regulatory policy.  By introducing complementing theories that rely on 
longitudinal study, both quantitative and qualitative data are compiled to better 
understand how policy subsystems and / or events can change suddenly to alter 





3.6.0 Market Failure and Political Failure 
 
Public policy research centers around two main categories of study, economics 
and political science.  The application in this research of PE (Baumgartner and Jones, 
2009) can be viewed more as an economic evaluation and the application of the ACF 
(Sabatier, 1993) can be viewed more as a political science evaluation.   This research 
makes apparent that the two philosophical sciences attempt to tackle the same problems 
and issues, though originating from different cultures and mindsets.  The economic lens 
through which one views policy studies entails a perspective that assumes individuals and 
groups are rational in their thinking and are driven by incentives in order to achieve a 
desired level of happiness.  The political science lens is also grounded in theory and 
research.  Instead of focusing on the supply and demand factors that drive human 
behavior, the focus is more on institutional and social norms. 
The key benefit of applying economics in public policy research is the 
identification and evaluation of problems and issues.  Applying econometric analysis 
(statistical analysis of observed data rather than experimental) to quantitative data, one 
can infer as to the degree of relationship and impact that explanatory variables have on 
responses.  Cost-benefit and consumer welfare analyses are other economic methods that 
can measure outcomes. 
Historically, economics has attempted to rely on quantification to explain human 
behavior based on a model of rational behavior and efficient markets, but recently the 
field has broadened to include behavioral economics and public choice economics, areas 
of economic theory that overlap with political science.  The key benefit of studying 
political science is not only understanding the motives of the individual but also how 
those individuals can live harmoniously without harming the survival or happiness of 
each other.  The contributions of renowned economists are just as important to political 
science as they are to economics.  Public policy is enhanced by not studying one or the 
other, but by integrating the two fields of study. 
Two recent publications seem to bring the two fields together, A Theory of 
Entangled Political Economy, with Application to TARP and NRA (Smith, Wagner, and 
Yandle, 2011) and Madmen, Intellectuals, and Academic Scribblers: The Economic 
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Engine of Political Change (Leighton and Lopez, 2013).  It is ironic that economists 
author both of these books, but they have referred to theoretical concepts, frameworks, 
and models that bear a close resemblance to the work of Baumgartner and Jones and 
Sabatier.  Though the terminology and modeled approach are different, both illustrate the 
connections between economics and political science.  The former is based on rational 
theory of incentives that is supported by quantitative analysis and the latter is based on 
behavioral and social theory that is supported by qualitative analysis. 
Smith, Wagner, and Yandle’s (2011) theoretical framework of “entangled 
political economy” may explain that the events in financial and commodity markets 
between 2007 and 2009 are not just a result of market failure but a combination of market 
and political failure.  Smith, Wagner, and Yandle (2011) argue that (1) a polity (political 
entity) crisis is a manifestation of excessive regulation, the remedy for which is less 
regulation; and (2) an economic crisis is an instance of market failure that demonstrates 
the need for stronger regulatory control over markets.  The question is how to combine 
these pure forms to arrive at political economy.  Under “sequential addition,” market 
equilibrium is established theoretically prior to and independently of political action, with 
subsequent political intervention establishing an alternative equilibrium.  A “separated 
framework” leads to efforts to locate the source of disturbance as originating in either 
polity (political action) or economy (market processes).  With Smith, Wagner, and 
Yandle’s (2011) “entangled and simultaneous framework,” crisis is a system feature of a 
constitutional system of “entangled political economy.”  The economic crisis between 
2007 and 2009 and the legislative battle from 2010 that continues today both exemplify 
the entangled political economy of United States financial market regulation. 
Leighton and Lopez (2013) explain how public choice economics is the process 
by which policy is dictated in the United States.  Tracing the history of economic and 
social philosophy thought through Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, John Maynard Keynes, 
Ronald Coase, James Buchanan, Robert Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, the authors 
illustrate that  “policy entrepreneurs” (Kingdon, 2003) drive policy reform or change in 
the United States.  Leighton and Lopez (2013) define public choice as the study of 
government as practiced by imperfect individuals, with human goals and aspirations, 
operating under recognized rules of the game and figuring out how to work together 
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through compromise and exchange.  Public choice is revolutionary because it turns the 
new lens of economic theory onto the political process; it is counterrevolutionary 
because it poses a challenge to proponents of market failure.  The message is that 
government failure is at least as plausible as market failure.  Buchanan, Tollison, 
Tullock, and other scholars, who have not relied on quantitative models to explain 
reality, developed public choice economics.  Economists view public choice as the 
incentivizing of political science.  The reverse classification could be called the 
politicizing of economics, where economics is driven by policy. 
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“It makes me wonder whether pure regulatory agencies are a good idea.  Maybe if they 
had some other job to do, in addition to regulating, they could please the “boss” 
(Congress) without having to show each year that the noose has been tightened further 
around an industry’s neck.  The danger posed by pure regulatory agencies is not that 
they police an industry, but that there is no other way that they can satisfy the internal 
and external pressures for constant growth.” 
Philip McBride Johnson, CFTC Chair, 1982  
 
 
4.1.0 The CFTC 
 
This chapter examines the relevance of the CFTC’s organizational structure, 
culture, and incentives to the agency’s implementation of regulatory policy.  Four key 
challenges faced by the CFTC as a bureaucratic agency are: (1) lack of sufficient funding 
and staff resources, (2) jurisdictional coordination with other regulatory agencies, (3) 
agency leadership, and (4) the agency dilemma of the principal-agent relationship.  
Though the CFTC is an overseer and regulator, ultimately the organization’s actions 




As previously mentioned, the CFTC was formally created in 1974 to regulate 
commodity futures contracts.  Dodd-Frank (2010) gave the Commission authority to 
regulate OTC swaps markets.  The Agency’s mission is to protect market participants and 
the public from fraud, manipulation, abusive practices, and systemic risk related to 
derivatives – both futures and swaps – and to foster transparent, open, competitive, and 
financially sound markets (CFTC, 2015).  The specific role of the CFTC consists of 
licensing of futures exchanges, registering of brokers and futures commission merchants, 
regulating trader positions, surveillance of trading, regulating trade positions, publicizing 
market reports, and investigating complaints and prosecuting violators. 
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The CFTCA (1974) extensively amended its predecessor, the Commodity 
Exchange Authority (CEA).  The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA, 1936) provides 
federal regulation of all commodities and futures trading activities and requires all 
commodity futures and options to be traded on organized exchanges.  The Act speaks of 
the objective of eliminating excessive speculation that causes sudden or unreasonable 
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in commodity prices (Clapp and Helleiner, 2010).  
CFTCA (1974) established a five-member federal commission and transferred all 
authority under the CEA from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to 
the CFTC  (Stassen, 1982).  Congress did not give the CFTC a permanent charter; its 
statute is reviewed periodically, usually in line with United States Farm Bill legislation.  
Unlike other regulatory agencies, the CFTC is entirely funded by Congressional 
appropriation (Markham, 2009). 
The CFTC oversees the National Futures Association (NFA, 2015), a result of the 
Futures Trading Act of 1982.  The NFA has a government mandated membership 
composed of private firms in the industry.  The NFA enforces standards of ethics aimed 
at preventing fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, particularly with respect to 
audit, trading, and sales procedure (Kane, 1984). 
The creation of the CFTC began in confusion when Congress enacted CFTCA 
(1974).  The Act expanded the CEA to encompass all agricultural futures (including 
previously regulated agricultural commodities such as grain, cotton, and sugar), precious 
metals, petroleum products, Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) 
certificates, U.S. Treasury bonds, bills, and notes.  Just a few months after its 
inauguration in 1975, the CFTC designated the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) as a 
contract futures market in GNMA certificates, the first major financial futures contract; 
the jurisdictional battle with the SEC had begun (Stassen, 1982).  The term commodity 
no longer referred to a physical product; it was now also a security. 
For over a quarter of a century, commodity market regulatory policy change was 
incremental without any major shift.  After a period of relative complacency, despite 
rapid expansion, financial market regulatory policy saw a major shift with CFMA (2000).  
CFMA (2000) ensured the deregulation of financial products, known as OTC derivatives.  
OTC derivatives were not subject to regulation under the CEA (1936) as futures contracts 
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(CFMA, 2000).  Specifically, the Act clarified that certain OTC derivative transactions 
were outside the jurisdiction of the CFTC.  CFMA (2000) was the most significant 
commodity regulatory legislation since CEA (1936) (Kloner, 2001) and represented a 
shift in government policy from a pro-regulatory stance to a de-regulatory stance on 
derivative markets.  For the CFTC, the pinnacle de-regulatory action occurred in 2007, 
when the Commission proposed the creation of a risk management exemption where 
position limits would have been waived for approved index funds (Clapp and Helleiner, 
2010 via U.S. Senate, 2009:109). 
Greenberger (2011) refers to the economic meltdown between 2007 and 2009 as a 
“regulatory black hole” because the result was the failure of OTC derivatives regulation, 
or complete lack of.  After the turmoil of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, regulatory policy 
shifted back to tight regulation.  In August 2009, the CFTC eliminated the two 
exemptions for position limits relating to soybeans, corn, and wheat that it had granted 
Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs back in 2006, marking the first time that exemptions 
had been revoked (Clapp and Helleiner, 2010).  The tide formally turned with Dodd-
Frank (2010). 
Dodd-Frank (2010) provisions require the CFTC (and SEC) to write rules (rule-
makings), receive public comment, re-write rules, and then enact those rules.  This 
deliberate process has meant that provisions are not final until the CFTC finalizes 
respective rules.  Thus, getting Dodd-Frank (2010) to the implementation stage was a 
three-year process that is still unfinished.  By July 2013, three years since enactment, 
with over 2000 external meetings, Commission meetings, and public roundtables, 59 
rules were complete.  Implementation is still underway for (1) initial capital and margin 
requirements for swap dealers (still being finalized as of March 15, 2015), (2) the 
Volcker Rule (not fully effective until July 2015 and still under contention by House 
Republicans), and (3) position limits (as of September 29, 2015, still no implementation 








The CFTC appears to have both mechanistic and organic systems (Burns and 
Stalker, 1961) within its organizational structure.  The organizational chart has a 
traditional pattern of hierarchy where formal rules, vertical communications, and 
structured decision-making are possible.  The agency is also very organic due to the 
complexity of the industry it serves.  Staff must define and redefine their positions and 
relationships in order for the various divisions to function and fulfill the organization’s 
mission.  Many individuals come together in a team effort to solve problems and promote 
new methods of compliance for the futures industry.  The CFTC is based in Washington, 
DC, with three regional offices in Chicago, New York, and Kansas City (CFTC, 2015). 
The President of the United States, with the advice and consent of the Senate, 
appoints five commissioners to the CFTC to serve staggered five-year terms.  One 
commissioner is designated to serve as chairman.  No more than three commissioners at 
any one time may be from the same political party.  Four divisions, or operating units, 
consist of: (1) Clearing and Risk (DCR), which oversees derivatives clearing 
organizations and other major market participants, (2) Enforcement (DOE), which 
investigates and prosecutes alleged violations of the CEA and CFTC regulations, (3) 
Market Oversight (DMO), which conducts trade surveillance and oversees trading 
facilities, and (4) Swap Dealer and Intermediary Oversight (DSIO), which oversees 
registration and compliance by self regulatory organizations (SRO) and registration of 
swap dealers and major swap participants. 
The CFTC has Advisory Committees that were created to provide input and make 
recommendations to the Commission on a variety of regulatory and market issues that 
affect the integrity and competitiveness of U.S. markets.  The committees facilitate 
communication between the Commission and U.S. futures markets, trading firms, market 
participants, and end users.  The committees, governed by the provisions of the Federal 
Advisory Committee Act, currently include: Agricultural Advisory Committee, Energy 
and Environmental Markets Advisory Committee, Global Markets Advisory Committee, 
Market Risk Advisory Committee, Technology Advisory Committee, and the CFTC-SEC 
Joint Advisory Committee. 
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Eight offices of the Chairman include: Chief Economist (OCE), Data and 
Technology (OTD), Executive Director (OED), General Counsel (OGC), Inspector 
General (OIG), International Affairs (OIA), Legislative Affairs (OLA), and Public 
Affairs (OPA). 
 
OCE provides economic support and advice to the Commission, conducts research on 
policy issues facing the Commission, and educates and trains Commission staff.  The 
OCE plays an integral role in the implementation of new financial market regulations by 
providing economic expertise and cost-benefit considerations underlying those 
regulations. 
 
OTD provides technology and data management support for Commission market and 
financial oversight, surveillance, enforcement, legal support, and public transparency 
activities.  ODT also provides general network, communication, storage, computing, and 
information management infrastructure and services. 
 
OED ensures the Commission’s adaptation to the ever-changing markets it is charged 
with regulating, directs the allocation of CFTC resources, develops and implements 
management and administrative policy, and ensures program performance is measured 
and tracked Commission-wide.  The OED also oversees the Commission’s 
Whistleblower and Consumer Affairs programs, and the Office of Diversity and 
Inclusion. 
 
Office of OCG provides legal services and support to the Commission and all of its 
programs.  These services include: representing the Commission in appellate, bankruptcy 
and other litigation; assisting in the performance of adjudicatory functions; providing 
legal advice and support for Commission programs; drafting and assisting in preparation 
of Commission regulations; interpreting the CEA; and advising on legislative, regulatory, 
and operational issues. 
 
OIG is an independent organizational unit at the CFTC.  Its mission is to detect waste, 
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fraud, and abuse and to promote integrity, economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the 
CFTC’s programs and operations.  It has the ability to review all of the Commission’s 
programs, activities, and records.  In accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, 
the OIG issues semiannual reports detailing its activities, findings, and recommendations. 
 
OIA advises the Commission regarding international regulatory initiatives; provides 
guidance regarding international issues raised in Commission matters; represents the 
Commission in international organizations, such as the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO); coordinates Commission policy as it relates to 
international initiatives of the G20, Financial Stability Board and the US Treasury 
Department; and provides technical assistance to foreign market authorities. 
 
OLA is the Commission’s liaison with Congress. OLA coordinates the provision of 
reports, briefings and informational materials to Congressional offices and the testimony 
of agency officials before Congressional Committees.  The office monitors legislative 
activities that affect the work of the Commission and also manages the Commission’s 
response to inquiries on behalf of constituents and other communications from the 
legislative branch. 
 
OPA is the Commission’s liaison with the general public and news media.  OPA issues 





The environment at the CFTC is challenging and exciting, but it is also stressful 
(Brush and Schmidt, 2013).  The exogenous influences are dynamic and the endogenous 
influences are perceived to be traditional and individualistic.  Over time, the CFTC has 
been caught in the dilemma of what it desires to regulate and what public policy 
empowers it to regulate.  It has a narrow span of control (Kane, 1984), but its jurisdiction 
is complex and overlaps with other agencies.  Private concerns, the public, and other 
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stakeholders have influenced Congress as to what degree of regulation best suits financial 
markets.  The result is an organization whose culture changes with the markets it governs 
and the leadership that it inherits.  The quote at the beginning of this chapter is a remark 




The exogenous influences on the agency’s culture are the futures industry’s 
traditional base in agriculture, the free enterprise stance of the futures industry, and the 
complex and global reality of today’s commodity markets.  The United States derivatives 
industry has its roots in the organized agricultural markets that began in the mid-19th 
century, the predecessors to today’s modern futures exchanges.  In both production and 
trading, the agricultural markets were independent of government regulation; it was not 
until the 1930’s that Congress, via the Agricultural Adjustment Act and CEA (1936), 
instigated formal oversight.  From this origin, the derivatives industry has long resisted 
regulation; the futures industry culture advocates free enterprise and market discipline 
and opposes too much government oversight.  The marketplace is not only domestic but 
also global and the CFTC has had to adopt an international role.  During the 1990’s the 
CFTC lead an urgent effort to design and implement international regulatory mechanisms 
to address systemic risks posed by the derivative markets (Born, 2001).  Since the 1990’s 
the marketplace has continued to change: transaction and information costs are lower, 
exchanges are no longer privately held but are for-profit public companies, transactions 
are now high-frequency, and global participation does not apply to just markets in 
developed countries. 
The endogenous influences are also found in its history.  Part of the agency’s 
culture began with its predecessor, the CEA.  When the CFTC was formed it had to 
create its own legal staff, recruiting SEC and SEC alumni lawyers.  But the pro-
regulatory stance of the SEC-trained lawyers conflicted with the hands-off regulatory 
attitude of CEA staff and the commodity futures exchanges (Markham, 2009).  
Consistent with its independent and anti-regulatory history, the institutional culture is 
principle-based.  The CFTC sets broad regulatory goals and permits industry to set 
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specific rules and guidelines.  A principle-based approach reduces the needs for volumes 
of regulations that seek to control every aspect of financial services operations 
(Markham, 2009).  The CFTC allows futures exchanges to self-certify that rule changes 
comply with regulatory requirements and places the burden on the CFTC to judge 
otherwise.  Though very autonomous in its regulation with its exchanges, the CFTC still 
enforces many rules, but not as many under a rule-based system.  Because most 
information used in trading derivatives involves “market” information rather than 
“inside” information about a public corporation, the CFTC believes that traders should 
freely use market information to better price commodities.  It recognizes that market 
information is asymmetrical and believes that better pricing is more likely when traders 
are induced by the possibility of profit to bring information into the market by signaling 
with their trades.  According to Markham (2009), that view was adopted by the 2008 
amendments to CEA (1936). 
The dynamics of the marketplace have forced the culture of the CFTC to evolve 
to one of more understanding and cooperation with other regulatory agencies.  From 1994 
to 1995 the CFTC participated in the Derivatives Policy Group, a task force established 
to address the onslaught of new derivative products.  The CFTC’s mere participation was 
considered a success by Faerman, McCaffrey, and Slyke (2001).  The 1990’s also saw the 
CFTC begin cooperation with regulatory agencies in other countries through bilateral and 
multilateral memorandums of understanding, declarations, and industry associations 
(Born, 2001).  Examples of the need for this coordination include the Barings Bank 
Failure of 1995, Sumitomo Corporation’s manipulation of the copper market in 1996, and 
the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998.  The goal was to move toward 
international regulatory convergence. 
Despite a leadership push towards increased regulation domestically and 
internationally, from the early 1990’s to the mid 2000’s, the exogenous influence was a 
demand for less regulation of financial markets.  Until Dodd-Frank (2010), the CFTC had 
no authority to review the futures contract margin rules employed by the commodities 
exchanges.  Despite its relatively laissez-faire attitude toward margins on futures and 
options, the CFTC did not have the authority to establish “temporary emergency margin 
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levels” for any futures contract whenever it had reason to believe that an emergency 




The passage of Dodd-Frank (2010) expanded the role of the CFTC in derivative 
markets.  The Agency now oversees the OTC derivatives market, commonly known as 
the swaps market, where previously it only had jurisdiction over ET futures and options 
markets for commodity and financial instruments.  Dodd-Frank (2010) gives the CFTC 
much discretion on a range of issues related to the regulation of swaps.  Dodd-Frank 
(2010) transformed the regulation of OTC derivatives by generally requiring that swaps 
be subject to clearing and exchange-like trading, including capital and margin 
requirements (Greenberger, 2011).  The Act requires that all swap dealers and major 
swap participants register with the appropriate banking regulators, the CFTC and / or the 
SEC.  The Act also requires swap dealers and participants to disclose any risks of swaps 
and incentives or conflicts of interest, meet capital and margin requirements, conform to 
business conduct rules set by regulators, conform to position limits on their trading 
volume in commodity swaps, and report all swap transactions.  In brief, Dodd-Frank 
(2010) imposes clearing and exchange-like trading requirements on standardized swap 
transactions.  The burden of overseeing all of this rests predominantly with the CFTC. 
Where the passage of Dodd-Frank (2010) was a huge opportunity for the CFTC, it 
was also a threat.  During the lobbying efforts by a thirteen-bank coalition from 2010 to 
2013 to reverse rulings of Dodd-Frank (2010), many CFTC employees who were lobbied 
at these meetings went on to work for banks.  During this period, there were fifty CFTC 
staffers who met with the top five banks ten or more times.  Of those fifty employees, at 
least twenty-five ending up working for the big five or other top swaps-dealing banks, or 
for law firms and lobbyists representing banks.  An aide to Commissioner Mark Wetjen, 
Scott Reinhart, met with the top five banks thirty six times, more than anyone else at the 
CFTC.  Reinhart later left the CFTC to join the law firm of Cleary Gottlieb and Hamilton, 
the derivatives law firm hired by the thirteen-bank coalition to fight a clause in an 




Government regulators have strong incentives to prevent market failure because if 
investors worry about the reliability of contracts they will withdraw from financial 
markets (Faerman, McCaffrey, and Slyke, 2001).  It is assumed that this concern is what 
drives the staff of the CFTC.  The Commission’s former chair, Gary Gensler, was a 
former executive at Goldman Sachs prior to being an assistant secretary at the Treasury 
who advocated derivative de-regulation.  After seeing the pitfalls of not regulating all 
banking activities, Gensler rebuffed the banking community and saw his duty as serving 
the interest of taxpayers (Brush and Schmidt, 2013). 
Historically, the CFTC was a zealous organization that rode the wave of financial 
innovation in the 1970’s and 1980’s, battling with the SEC over jurisdiction.  But by the 
1990’s, the financial engineers and Wall Street tycoons were way ahead of the regulators 
in circumventing regulations and enforcement.  When regulation of complicated and 
hybrid instruments became difficult, the CFTC issued policy statements that exempted 
such instruments from its regulatory reach.  This was the case with swaps in 1989 and the 
first exemption from futures position limits for swap dealers in 1991.  The uncertainty 
over its power “to exempt” was reinforced in the Futures Practices Act of 1992 
(Markham, 2009) that gave the Commission authority to do so.  This was the beginning 
of relaxed regulation for the CFTC until its new Chairman in the late 1990’s started 
sounding warning bells of potential problems.  Using the case of Long-Term Capital 
Management to support that the CFTC should regulate OTC derivatives, Brooksley Born 
found deaf ears in Congress and the lobbyists from Wall Street, and an economy that 
supposedly did not need strict regulation imposed on a fruitful financial system. 
Who and what drives the CFTC comes down to its leadership, especially that of 
the chairman; but ultimately the power play still rests with Congressional oversight 
committees.  In the 1970’s and 1980’s the CFTC had the ability to mobilize 
Congressional agriculture committees and the politically powerful farm lobby in support 
of its interests (Kane, 1984), but that is not the case today.  As expressed in his testimony 
before the CFTC, Petzel (2009) stated that it could be erroneous for the CFTC to step in 
and impose their own view on legislation; it is unlikely that there is incentive to strike the 
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right balance on an issue, i.e. position limits.  The pressure would be political and 
reflective of only the moment.  When position limits on 28 physical commodities were 
proposed in 2012 following Dodd-Frank (2010) legislation in 2010, the proposal was 
contested in court and rejected by a federal judge (Peterson, 2012). 
Leadership in the CFTC is not independent of Presidential and Congressional 
influence and it is not free from industry pressure.  The Chicago Mercantile Exchange 
(CME Group), which controls virtually all regulated futures trading in the United States, 
has effectively captured its regulator, the CFTC.  According to Markham (2009), this 
dominant exchange will not relinquish control to a more independent SEC-style 
regulator.  The CME Group also exerts a strong influence over the agricultural 
committees in Congress (Markham, 2009). 
With the implementation of CFMA (2000) and after its leadership changed, the 
CFTC created a multi-tiered derivatives market in which each tier was subject to 
differing levels of oversight based on the nature of the participants, the commodity 
traded, and the type of trading.  The CFMA did leave traditional futures markets with 
cumbersome regulatory requirements, while upstart electronic execution facilities 
remained virtually unchanged (Markham, 2009). 
Market participants do not want to fund the CFTC.  In 1982 the comment was 
made that the industry thought it was sad enough that it was saddled with the CFTC and 
did not want to pay for it too.  In 2008, user fees were proposed by the CFTC, claiming 
that the industry was benefiting from regulation and should pay for it; the proposal had 
not advanced as of 2009 (Markham, 2009).  Though the funding and fees issue was a 
point of discussion during the formation of Dodd-Frank (2010), nothing has changed. 
 
4.3.0 Key Challenges 
 
Dodd-Frank (2010) has more than doubled the responsibilities of the CFTC but its 
resources have not increased.  Staff numbers are not much different to the early 1990’s 
and its appropriation has only increased moderately with Dodd-Frank (2010).  Since the 
early 1980’s, there has been discussion between the executive and the legislative 
branches to merge the SEC and CFTC; but given the historical and cultural differences 
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between the two organizations, a merger is unlikely.  Being chairman of the CFTC is not 
an easy task; there are huge challenges.  Confronting the de-regulatory forces of Wall 
Street, Chicago, and Washington can be done, with a little help from market turmoil.  
Serving multiple masters with conflicting interests is a dilemma for any principal or 
organization.  The CFTC has had to deal with that challenge from the beginning and will 




The CFTC is not confronted with major challenges to fully implement commodity 




Data sources include articles from the Congressional Quarterly Weekly, journal 
articles, scholarly books, CFTC reports and testimonies, futures industry reports, 
commodity industry reports, Congressional Acts, and agricultural, financial and futures 








The CFTC faces four key challenges as a bureaucratic agency operating in a 
dynamic, complex, and globalizing market: (1) sufficient resources in funding and staff, 
(2) jurisdictional coordination with other regulatory agencies, (3) agency leadership, and 






Having been presented in 48 testimonies by CFTC Chairmen since the passage of 
Dodd-Frank (2010), Congress has not met the modestly requested appropriations by the 
agency (CFTC, 2015, Speeches and Testimony).  Prior to Dodd-Frank (2010), Randall 
(2008) recommended an increase in the CFTC budget so that the agency could broaden 
its mission, provide greater transparency, and limit the effects of speculation on 
commodity prices.  The battle for adequate appropriation is a constant political war.  As 
Table 20 indicates, between 2009 and 2014 the volume of United States futures and 
option contracts increased 200 percent and the notional value of United States ET and 
OTC markets increased 40 percent.  Over the same period, CFTC staff increased 33% 
percent and its operating budget increased 47 percent. 
 
Table 20: CFTC Resources and Budget (2009 – 2016) 
 
As revealed in Figure 45, since the enactment of Dodd-Frank (2010), the ratio of 
U.S. futures and options contract volume (millions) per staff member has more than 
doubled.  The ratio of the U.S. notional value of ET and OTC markets to the annual 
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budget of the CFTC (millions) has not changed since the enactment of Dodd-Frank 
(2010).  The data presented does not take into account the growth in contract volume and 
market value outside the United States, where greater increases have occurred. 
 
Figure 45: CFTC Resources and Budget (2003 – 2016) 
 
 
According to Chair Massad’s testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on December 10, 2014 (CFTC 2015, Speeches and 
Testimony), in the absence of additional resources, the CFTC would be limited in its 
ability to: (1) review and approve in a timely manner the many new registration 
applications it faces; (2) perform thorough examinations of these same participants and 
other market registrants on a regular basis; (3) engage proactively on emerging risks in 
cyber security; (4) respond in a timely and thorough manner to the concerns of the public 
and the users of derivative markets; (5) maintain and improve information technology 
systems and resources that are vital to its mission, especially for swaps industry data; (6) 
engage in the necessary level of market surveillance and oversight to detect and engage in 
robust enforcement efforts with respect to excessive risk, fraud, manipulation or other 
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abusive practices; and (7) hire and retain enough economists to perform critical analysis. 
Testifying again before the U.S. House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee 
on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and related agencies 
on February 11, 2015 (CFTC 2015, Speeches and Testimony), CFT Chair Massad 
detailed the 2016 appropriation request.  The Commission requested a budget of $322 
million and 895 full-time equivalents (FTE) for FY 2016 (See Figure 46).  This was an 
increase of $72 million and 149 FTE over the FY 2015 enacted level.  (1) Of the 
requested $72 million increase, nearly $28 million was allotted for additional 
information technology investments that will help to modernize the Commission’s 
capabilities.  The increase would supplement the approximately $51 million the agency 
planned on spending on technology in FY 2015.  The remaining $44 million of the 
increase would provide for an additional 149 FTE for related mission-activity support, 
specifically targeting critical areas such as surveillance, enforcement, examinations, 
registration, and compliance.  (2) The budget request sought $62.4 million for 
surveillance; an increase of $5.9 million and 42 FTE over the FY 2015 enacted level.  (3) 
The Commission requested approximately $70.0 million and 212 FTE for enforcement 
activities, an increase of $20.7 million and 48 FTE over the FY 2015 enacted level.  (4) 
The Agency requested $35.4 million and 135 FTE for examinations, an increase of $6.7 
million and 21 FTE over the FY 2015 enacted level.  (5) The Commission requested 
$17.8 million and 63 FTE for registration and compliance activities, an increase of 
$1million and 3 FTEs over the FY 2015 level.  (6) The 2016 budget request included 
$108 million for the data and technology mission area, consisting of $79 million for 
information technology investments (e.g., hardware, software, and contractor services), 
and approximately $29 million for staffing and other indirect costs.  This was an increase 
of approximately $28 million from the FY 2015 level.  Data and technology accounts for 
almost 40 percent of the agency’s requested $72 million budget increase.  Of the $108 
million, $45 million represents amounts directly attributable to particular functional 
activities and $63 million is data and technology support.  The CFTC received $250 








Miller (2013) highlights two key resource challenges post Dodd-Frank (2010), (1) 
obtaining the funding during reauthorization and (2) efficient use of those funds after 
appropriations have been made.  The appropriations process follows two steps: (1) an 
authorization measure is enacted that may create or continue an agency, program, or 
activity as well as authorize the enactment of appropriations and (2) Congress enacts 
appropriations to provide funds for the authorized agency, program, or activity. 
For the CFTC and CEA (1936), reauthorization is under the control of the House 
and Senate agricultural committees.  Prior extensions of the expiring CEA (1936) 
authorization provisions have been used as vehicles to effectuate change to other aspects 
of CEA (1936) (after the authorization provision had expired).  The CFTC was recently 
reauthorized under the Customer Protection and End-User Relief Act of 2014.  Congress 
has sought to increase the requirements for cost-benefit analysis conducted in the CFTC 
rulemakings.  Proponents argue that this change would improve the quality of CFTC 
rulemaking.  H.R. 1003 amends the CEA to mandate that (1) before promulgating a rule 
or order, the CFTC must assess both qualitative and quantitative costs and benefits; (2) 
the CFTC could only adopt a regulation if it made a reasonable finding that the benefits 
of the intended rule or order justify the costs; and (3) the bill provides a list of 11 items 
the CFTC must evaluate in making its determination of costs and benefits.  Critics argue 


















































difficult to quantify benefits; and (3) such measures make it easier for industry groups to 
challenge in court, or a court to overturn a CFTC decision. 
 




Pre Dodd-Frank (2010), the coordination challenge was jurisdictional competition 
with the SEC.  The fight with the SEC started in the 1970’s over the listing of futures 
trading including government securities (Markham, 2009).  The SEC saw this market as 
its jurisdiction because of GNMA debt being a government security.  The CFTC saw it as 
its market because the derivative was a futures contract.  Jurisdiction remained under the 
CFTC and the battle continued into the early 1980’s with the listing of stock index 
futures, i.e. S&P and DJIA, as the CFTC did not slow its request for approval for 
financial instrument futures contracts.  The approval of stock index futures in 1982-83 
and subsequent financial futures contracts, which the SEC continued to view as securities 
industry products, continued the long-running war between the SEC and CFTC over 
which agency should have jurisdiction over such instruments (Markham, 2009).  But the 
battle goes deeper than the fight over the control of new financial derivatives; it lies deep 
in the cultural differences of the two organizations. 
Historical and political differences go back to the banking committees that 
oversee the SEC and the agricultural committees that oversee the CFTC in Congress.  
Despite protest by the SEC in 1978 during the CFTC’s reauthorization hearings, it was 
clear that the futures markets had powerful friends on the agricultural committees (which 
considered the legislation) who were not about to cede the jurisdiction to the banking 
committees (Markham, 2009).  Contrary to the SEC, futures industry participants 
generally do not believe that they need intrusive regulation to gain credibility.  The 
futures industry would rather have that burden self-imposed by a free competitive 
environment that would economically punish wrongdoers more efficiently than 
government regulators (Markham, 2009).  According to Kane (1984), the CFTC is not as 
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interventionist as the SEC.  It does not employ regulatory “overkill;” but has been 
accused of leaving “too much” to market discipline when compared to the SEC. 
The SEC and CFTC have diverging views on margin; margins on futures 
contracts are set by the exchanges, and not by the government agency.  The securities 
industry has embraced regulation and generally supported the SEC.  The SEC favors 
higher margin requirements generally than the CFTC, especially on stock indexes 
(Markham, 2009).  The two agencies also have different views on short selling.  Futures 
traders view short sellers as important as long buyers in the price discovery process.  The 
SEC has historically viewed short selling as inherently manipulative (Markham, 2009).  
Overall, the CFTC administers a principle-based regulatory scheme versus the SEC’s 
institutional culture that seeks to influence corporate behavior through a rule-based 
regulatory scheme (Markham, 2009). 
Though the ongoing convergence of securities and derivative markets makes a 
combination or merger attractive, there are obstacles.  (1) Allocation of jurisdiction 
among competing congressional committees; neither the congressional banking 
committee (SEC) nor the agricultural committees (CFTC) will be happy to give up 
jurisdiction.  (2) The previously mentioned immense challenge in conflicting cultures, a 
history of the two clashing over jurisdiction and their regulatory approaches are often 
sharply distinctive and incompatible.  (3) The Treasury Department Blueprint of 2008 
sees a merger effective only if the principle-based regulatory system is employed 
(Markham, 2009). 
In the 1980’s, the futures industry was of the opinion that that a two-agency 
system was optimal, they felt that it was the American way.  Although it makes in the 
short-run for messy organization charts and an abundance of government agencies, the 
competition improves the long-run adaptive efficiency of government regulation.  
“Regulatory competition helps the American financial industry to adapt itself to the 
evolving needs of the real economy” (Kane, 1984, pp. 383-384).  Under the Shad-
Johnson accord in 1982, the two agencies came to an understanding that confirmed the 
CFTC’s authority to approve certain futures and options on futures contracts (Markham, 
2009).  After the 1987 stock market crash, the jurisdictional battles between the SEC and 
CFTC were fought through the President’s Working Group (PWG).  Set up by Ronald 
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Reagan, the PWG was composed of the heads of the Department of the Treasury, Federal 
Reserve Board, SEC, and CFTC; the Secretary of the Treasury led the group (Markham, 
2009).  After its formation, the PWG took up regulatory issues concerning OTC 
derivatives, hedge funds, private equity, and various policy initiatives involving the 
financial markets. 
Not until the recent financial crisis, March 2008, did the two agencies announce a 
memorandum of understanding for coordinating their activities in anticipation of the 
Treasury Blueprint in order to avoid duplication and unnecessary costs (Markham, 2009).  
In the Treasury Department’s March 2008 report (Treasury Blueprint), a single regulator 
was discussed, but a “twin-peaks” approach was recommended.  The report envisioned a 
central bank that focuses on prudential supervision, and a single business practices 
regulator that focuses on business conduct and consumer protection.  The Treasury 
Blueprint recommended that the SEC and CFTC be merged to function as the single 
business practices regulator.  It also recommended that the SEC adopt a principles-based 
approach, like the CFTC, to make the merger more workable; but many obstacles, 
including a different approach to regulation and differing cultures lead to much 
opposition and mild support when it was published (Markham, 2009).  It has been 
reported that the Obama Administration supported a merger between the CFTC and SEC, 
but it was not prepared to take on a fight between the banking and agriculture committees 
(Markham, 2009).  Jurisdictional issues between the SEC and CFTC continue, although a 
joint report of the two agencies seeks uniformity in future regulation of many derivative 
varieties (Topham, 2010). 
The distraction of Dodd-Frank (2010) implementation has put merger 
considerations on hold.  As has been pointed out, those who opposed a merger do so on 
the grounds of different cultures, different views on specific issues such as margins and 
short-selling, the congressional agricultural committee (CFTC) versus the financial 
committees (SEC), and the principles-based versus rules-based approach to regulation.  
The establishment of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) enhanced 
regulatory agency coordination in the rule-makings of Dodd-Frank (2010).  CFTC 
chairmen have reported before Congress (CFTC 2015, Speeches and Testimony) that 
communication and coordination with the SEC has been very positive as well as the 
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Federal Reserve, FDIC, and Comptroller of the Currency.  The CFTC has appeared to 
move faster than the SEC in implementing Dodd-Frank (2010) reforms, but much 
improved communication, despite cultural differences, has led to clear responsibilities 
and jurisdiction. At the present time, it appears that the memorandum of understanding 




Post Dodd-Frank (2010), the challenges are not with coordinated domestic 
regulation with the SEC, but with international regulatory agencies in uniform enactment, 
implementation and enforcement of derivative markets.  CFTC chair Massad stated in 
September 2014 (CFTC 2015, Speeches and Testimony) that two key challenges were (1) 
to see that international counterparts build a strong global regulatory framework and (2) it 
is followed up with robust compliance and enforcement.  One element that Massad was 
referring to was what Miller (2013) identified as the exemption from Dodd-Frank (2010) 
requirements on swaps for overseas branches or affiliates of U.S. organizations and for 
foreign organizations trading with U.S. persons.  To what degree did Congress intend, 
and did Dodd-Frank (2010) authorize, the CFTC to regulate swaps that may extend 
beyond U.S. borders, or transacted between U.S. and non-U.S. persons?  According to 
Miller (2013), Section 722(d) of Dodd-Frank (2010) states that swaps reforms shall not 
apply to activities outside the U.S. unless the activities have a “direct and significant 
connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the U.S.” 
Following much debate regarding the risk to the U.S. financial system versus the 
risk of swap business migrating to other jurisdictions with less advanced reform 
initiatives, and proposed guidance by the CFTC and proposed rules by the SEC, the 
House passed legislation (H.R. 1256) on June 12, 2013.  H.R. 1256 mandates the CFTC 
and SEC to issue joint, identical rules “relating to cross-border swaps and security-based 
swaps transactions involving U.S. persons or non-U.S. persons.”  H.R. 1256 also requires 
the CFTC and SEC to allow non-U.S. persons in compliance with the laws of any 
countries with one of the nine largest swap markets to be exempt from U.S. regulatory 
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requirements on swaps unless that country’s regulatory requirements are not broadly 
equivalent to U.S. swap requirements. 
 
4.3.3 Leadership and the Authorizing Environment 
 
Much of the CFTC’s culture is not only derived from the organization’s history 
and outside influence but is also dependent on the chairman of the organization, and that 
appointment in turn is influenced by politics.  The challenge to overcome cultural 
differences, political bias, jurisdictional issues, maneuvering (with Congressional 
committees), and expanding (the CFTC’s) resources have been highlighted by Randall 
(2008), Markham (2009) and Topham (2010), but specific research has not pinpointed the 
ability of individual chairmen to meet the challenge.  Four appointed chair 
administrations (not interim) since 1988 provides insight into how critical leadership in a 
bureaucracy, such as the CFTC, truly is. 
Wendy Gramm, a Reagan / Bush Republican appointment was chair from 1988 to 
1993.  Under her term, and previously encouraged by Congress (US Senate, 2009: 74, 
106 via Clapp and Helleiner, 2010), the first exemptions of futures position limits were 
granted by the CFTC in October of 1991.  Also during her tenure, the Futures Trading 
Practices Act of 1992 granted the CFTC authority to exempt OTC derivatives from 
CFTC regulation (CFTC website, Hirsh, 2010).  For the first time, the trading of OTC 
derivatives was allowed without any oversight.  In January 1993, the CFTC exempted 
certain swap agreements and hybrid instruments from regulation under CEA (1936) 
(CFTC, 2015).  Before leaving office, Gramm exempted Enron from regulation in some 
trading of energy derivatives (Hirsh, 2010).  Gramm was the wife of Republican senator 
Phil Gramm of Texas, who was also a strong proponent of exempting OTC derivatives 
from regulation; she was later a board member of Enron (Topham, 2010). 
Brooksley Born, a Clinton Democrat appointment, was chair from 1996 to 1999, 
following three interim chairs between 1993 and 1996.  Born was pro-OTC derivative 
regulation but she was overpowered and outmaneuvered by the PWG and Congress.  
Treasury Secretary Rubin, Deputy Treasury Secretary Summers, SEC Chair Levitt, and 
Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan shared common beliefs with the Republican 
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dominated Congress that completely free markets were the recipe for continued financial 
prosperity (Brush and Schmidt, 2013; Hirsh, 2010).  A minority supported Born in her 
efforts, including the well-known economist Joseph Stiglitz and Jerry Corrigan of 
Goldman Sachs (Hirsh, 2010, pp. 196-197).  After being chastised by the PWG and 
Congressional Agriculture Committees, and after the Long-Term Capital Management 
hedge fund crisis over high-leverage bets on OTC derivatives, Born received 
compliments in October 1998 from the Senate Banking Committee regarding her OTC 
derivative regulation concept release of May 1998 (Brush and Schmidt, 2013).  Despite 
being caught in the war of understanding and regulation, Born was later to receive the 
JFK Profiles in Courage Award in May 2009 (Brush and Schmidt, 2013) in recognition 
for her efforts to push for the regulation of OTC derivative markets in the late 1990’s. 
In order to guide an underfunded agency in regulating the most complicated and 
international of financial products, the chair must be a strong and passionate leader to 
fully implement and enforce regulatory legislation.  The CFTC chair from December 
2008 to until January 2014, Gary Gensler, was a warrior in the passage and rule-making 
process of Dodd-Frank (2010).  An Obama Democrat appointment, Gensler was firm 
with Wall Street and a Republican controlled House (Brush and Schmidt, 2013, Topham, 
2010).  Gensler called for the re-establishment of position limits and warned of the 
exemption dangers.  He worked diligently with House and Senate lawmakers on Dodd-
Frank (2010).  He did not rush the rule-making process; he led a very deliberate 
Commission.  He stood up to Wall Street and Congress and won the battle to regulate 
derivative markets and to re-establish tools that deterred manipulative behavior in the 
markets.  Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry in 
2011 (CFTC, 2015, Speeches and Testimony), he stated, “In 2008 the financial system 
failed and the financial regulatory system failed.”  Admitting that the result of having no 
universal or mandatory system of margin in the OTC market was the market failure of the 
financial regulatory system, was a confession that many in government and the financial 
industry would not admit. 
Gary Gensler made many enemies on Wall Street and in the halls of Congress, but 
he was a major catalyst in shifting regulatory legislation back to “pre-2000” policies that 
historically have proved effective in deterring market failure in commodity and financial 
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markets.  Not only was he successful in changing policy, he was also persistent in 
implementation.  He ensured that the CFTC benefitted from significant public input 
throughout the rule-writing process.  He testified in forty-five Congressional hearings 
post-Dodd-Frank (2010) (CFTC, 2015, Speeches and Testimony).  Before the end of his 
term as chairman of the CFTC in 2013, he pushed for the re-submission of position limits 
on certain commodity futures contracts (that were rejected by a Federal Judge in 2012 
from an appeal by lobbyists of the banking industry).  To date, those proposals have not 
been contested in court.  The timing to push for regulatory change was certainly easier for 
Gensler than Born; the jolt to the system that inflamed public opinion was the financial 
crisis of 2007 to 2009. 
Tim Massad, Gensler’s successor and current CFTC chair since June 2014, has 
focused on finishing and fine-tuning all Dodd-Frank (2010) regulations.  But, like his 
predecessor, he has identified that the Commission is underfunded and understaffed to 
fulfill the tasks today and in the future.  By late September, 2015, Massad was still 
making further modifications to the proposed rule modifications on the proposed position 
limits (part 150 of the Commission’s regulations) of November, 2013, in response to the 
court ruling of September, 2012 that overturned the CFTC’s original proposed position 
limits of November, 2011, following the enactment of Dodd-Frank (2010) (Federal 
Register, September 29, 2015).  No contentions have been filed to date. 
According to Moore (1995), public executives have a moral obligation to search 
for public value.  In that search they are duty bound to have and articulate a vision; but 
that vision has to accommodate the aspirations of those in the administrator’s 
“authorizing environments” (AE).  Moore (1995) defines the AE as the actors from 
whom a manager needs authorization and resources to survive and be effective.  The AE 
consists of both internal and external influences on the political appointee.  Internally, the 
public executive’s AE consists of the elected official who appointed him (or her), 
overhead agencies, legislative committees and overseers, political bosses, aides, staff, and 
clients.  Externally, the courts, elected legislature, interest groups, the media, and 
professional associations are part of the executive’s AE. 
Moore (1995) explains that the interests, demands, and expectations of those who 
inhabit an executive’s AE constitute the essential material executives must use to fashion 
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powerful and effective mandates.  The interest of the varied players in the AE may be 
combined to produce a mandate through the existence of common understandings about 
the nature of a problem and the way in which to deal with it.  Ultimately, authorization 
comes from political authorities, but innovation must come from executives (operational 
managers).  They must consider how much work they need to do with their political AE 
to create the room they need to innovate at the rate they think appropriate.  Finally, they 
need feedback and evaluation from their AE after actions have been taken. 
Oftentimes the feedback and pressures they receive from the forces in their 
authorizing environment will carry them forward in their search and away from past 
practices.  In those circumstances they must bear the moral burden of deciding how 
deeply they should challenge their organizations, and the employees who have to attach 
meaning to the organization, as it operated in the past (Moore, 1995, p. 305).  Wendy 
Gramm did not have to challenge her AE as she was part of the coalition that rode the 
wave of de-regulation.  Brooksley Born challenged her AE, but she did not realize the 
resource depth and advocacy strength behind the coalitions that opposed her.  Gary 
Gensler challenged his AE head on but his arsenal of support included a financial crisis 
and economic recession from which his AE could not counter-challenge.  Tim Massad is 
now engaging his AE in a more “after the fact” consulting role by means of evaluations 
and implementation versus the challenging stance of previous chairs.  The difficulty for 
the CFTC leadership  (as with any government bureau) is the dynamic environment to 
which they have to adapt; the AE is always changing as well as the political coalitions, 
not to mention unforeseen game changing events. 
 
4.3.4 Agency Dilemma 
 
The CFTC has an agency dilemma in serving multiple principals and in doing so 
ensuring that derivative markets reflect true supply and demand.  Wilson (1989) defines 
the principal-agent problem as how a principal can arrange the incentives confronting an 
agent so that the latter does what the former desires.  In the case of the CFTC, it has a 
unique situation where it acts as the agent but it has multiple principals, all with different 
incentives. 
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Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, participants in commodity futures 
markets were classified as either commercial hedgers or non-commercial speculators.  
Theoretically hedgers desire to reduce risk where speculators accept risk.  As stated 
previously, theoretically hedgers may ultimately make or take delivery of the commodity 
where speculators have no interest in taking possession of the underlying commodity of 
the futures or derivative contract.  Out of the financial crisis, a third classification 
emerged, swap dealers, one that accounted for both hedging and speculation (See 
Appendix 27: New Participants – Accounting for Swap Dealers and Index Funds). A 
fourth principal could be included, the general public.  Information asymmetry occurs 
when Wall Street banks and larger financial institutions send false demand signals to the 
markets as they bet on upward (or downward) price direction, causing commodity prices 
to rise (or fall) despite equilibrium between supply and demand.  Manipulation of 
commodity and financial markets is not new; there are numerous cases of attempts by 
entities to corner markets. 
Miller (2013) identified a few key challenges and contentious issues that are part 
of the CFTC’ agency dilemma.  (1) The prevention of regulators from imposing margin 
requirements on swaps for both counterparties in which one counterparty is a non-
financial firm, known as “end user” of derivatives.  (2) The exemption from clearing 
requirements for swaps between affiliates within an umbrella organization.  (3) The 
implementation of the Volcker Rule prohibiting proprietary trading by banking entities.  
(4) The challenge of the tradeoff between transparency and disruption for all swaps to be 
cleared and traded on an exchange or exchange-like swap execution facility.  (5) The 
proposed position limits to constrain commodity market volatility.  (6) Enforcement 
challenges as exemplified by recent MF Global, Peregrine Financial, and the LIBOR 
scandals.  (7) The monitoring of high frequency trading in derivative markets.  These are 
still challenges but have been eased through the rule-making process post-Dodd-Frank 
(2010). 
A key provision of Dodd-Frank (2010) is the requirement that swap contracts be 
cleared through a clearinghouse (or “central counterparty”) regulated by one or more 
federal agencies.  Many nonfinancial firms have complained that their use of derivatives 
posed no systemic threat and should not be subjected to the cost of clearing OTC 
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derivatives (margin cost).  Known as “the end user debate” or “end users” of derivatives, 
Dodd-Frank (2010) Section 723 includes a broad exemption from the clearing 
requirement for firms that are primarily non-financial in nature.  Responding to the 
concerns post Dodd-Frank (2010) regarding the enactment of non-financial firms 
incurring hedging costs, House Republicans have attempted to prevent regulators from 
imposing margin requirements on swaps for both counterparties in which one 
counterparty is an “end-user” (Carter and Ackley, May 13, 2013). 
Title VII of Dodd-Frank (2010) has raised questions as to (1) the extent to which 
swap affiliates within an umbrella organization, such as a financial or corporate 
conglomerate, should be subject to the clearing and other requirements of Dodd-Frank 
(2010); (2) whether derivatives trading between affiliates within an umbrella organization 
could pose substantial risks of losses to either affiliate, or spread losses outside the 
organization; and (3) the extent of risks posed within the conglomerate between affiliates’ 
swap trading.  Following CFTC proposed exemptions for certain inter-affiliated swaps 
from Title VII in 2012 and 2013, House Republicans also passed bills that would create a 
statutory exemption from Dodd-Frank (2010) requirements for certain swaps between 
affiliates, provided that neither affiliate is also a “swap dealer that is an insured 
depository institution” – among other restrictions (Carter, June 17, 2013). 
Section 619 of Dodd-Frank (2010) prohibits banking entities from engaging in 
proprietary trading or sponsoring certain classes of funds, such as hedge funds or private 
equity funds, which speculate in financial markets.  “The Volcker Rule” attempts to 
prevent bank holding companies whose depository banks have access to the taxpayer-
assisted safety net from speculating in financial markets.  The difficulty is determining 
for whom the bank is speculating, itself or the customer.  The CFTC issued its proposed 
rule implementing Section 619 in February 2012.  Implementation continues to pose a 
challenge as critics deem it too strict, lengthy, and burdensome while proponents say that 
it does not go far enough to prevent banks form proprietary trading, such as derivative 
trading. 
Under Dodd-Frank (2010), swaps traded by financial entities are required to be 
cleared and traded on an exchange or exchange-like “swap execution facility” (SEF), 
regulated by the CFTC.  The intent is to (1) promote more transparency in the swaps 
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market (prices and volume) and (2) such swap trades must be reported to data repositories 
(tracking).  In May 2013 the CFTC ruled what SEFs must look like but the challenge has 
been the tradeoff between transparency and disruption; many swaps are so customized 
that the market can be illiquid.  House Republicans again sought to amend the definitions 
of SEFs and security-based swap execution facility (SBSEF) in Dodd-Frank (2010) but 
no legislation has been introduced (Carter, June 17, 2013).  One industry group has 
opposed “Core Principles and Other Requirements for Swap Execution Facilities” but 
House Republican proposals will not resolve some of the questions regarding market 
transparency and disruption because the bills could not get through a Senate Democratic 
majority (Weyl, January 6, 2014) and are unlikely to do so despite Republicans control 
since early 2015. 
Unexplained price volatility in a range of commodities during the 2008 to 2011 
period, especially crude oil, fostered apprehension that financial speculation in 
derivatives might be creating such volatility in commodity prices.  Congressional reports 
have identified that excessive speculation has had undue influence on price movement, 
but economists are divided on the question of whether financial trading in derivatives 
contributes to increased commodity price volatility.  Position limits can place a ceiling 
either on the number of contracts a speculator may control or on a position size threshold 
beyond which a large position must be explained to the futures exchange.  Specifically, 
Title VII of Dodd-Frank (2010) enhances the CFTC’s authority in financial derivative 
markets.  The legislation is intended to insulate commodity prices from the impact of 
excessive speculation and manipulation by enhancing the CFTC’s power to set margin 
and position limits and to prohibit manipulation in markets for commodities and swaps.  
For margin requirements, Section 736 of the Act grants the CFTC the authority to set 
margin requirements (but not specific margin amounts) for futures exchanges as the 
CFTC finds to be necessary and appropriate.  Section 737 of Dodd-Frank (2010) (the 
Position Limits Rule) directs the CFTC to establish position limits for swaps and futures.  
The CFTC’s proposed limits for 28 physical commodities was challenged in September 
2012 (Peterson, 2012).  The court could not give deference to the CFTC’s interpretation 
of the statute because the agency had erroneously found the statute to be unambiguous.  
The Commission proposed new rules for position limits in November 2013 that have 
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gone unchallenged, but modifications were proposed in September 2015 (Federal 
Register, September 29, 2015). 
MF Global, a large brokerage firm registered with both the SEC and CFTC, filed 
for bankruptcy in October 2011.  Customers’ funds for futures margining were supposed 
to be segregated from the bank and essentially safe from the bankruptcy process.   
However, roughly $1 billion in customer funds were reported missing soon after the 
bankruptcy.  Within 16 months, roughly 93 percent of customer funds had reportedly 
been returned.  The failure raised questions about (1) the enforcement mechanisms for 
segregation of futures market funds being reliable and (2) the effectiveness of regulatory 
cooperation during failure of a financial institution.  Peregrine Financial Group’s founder 
and former CEO of the futures trading firm was sentenced to fifty years in prison in 
January 2013 for stealing more than $215 million from customers.  Peregrine’s failure 
and loss of customers’ funds raised further questions.  Thus, in November 2012, the 
CFTC proposed a rule aimed at (1) increasing disclosure requirements for futures brokers 
to give customers heightened funds disclosure (2) and increasing standards for auditors.  
Complaints against the proposed rule focused on imposing excessive costs for the 
industry.  British bank Barclays admitted to submitting false survey responses to 
manipulate the LIBOR index and attempting to manipulate a similar index, EURIBOR.  
The CFTC and the U.S. Department of Justice reached settlements with Barclays in 
which the bank agreed to admit fault and pay a large fine.  Subsequently Union Bank of 
Switzerland and Royal Bank of Scotland have also entered into settlements with the U.S. 
government.  Fines total approximately $2.5 billion, inclusive of civil monetary penalties 
to the CFTC of more than $1.2 billion.  The CFTC has called for reforms as to how 
LIBOR is calculated, i.e. tied to transactions rather than surveys.  Reforms to LIBOR as a 
benchmark interest rate are underway. 
High Frequency Trading (HFT) refers to computerized trading based on 
algorithms in which transactions are completed in very small fractions of a second via 
supercomputers.  Executing massive amounts of trades, HFT comprised over 60 percent 
of all futures volume in 2012 on U.S. futures exchanges.  Proponents argue that HFT 
increases liquidity, but opponents raise concerns over fairness and market stability.  The 
CFTC continues to investigate whether HFT at times flood the markets with “wash” 
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trades and “flash crashes.”  In May 2013, the CFTC issued an interpretive guidance on 
disruptive trading practices as Section 747 of Dodd-Frank (2010) prohibits disruptive 
trading practices in futures, options, or swaps; however, it is still unclear what impact the 




1. Though financial and human resources have increased from those that existed pre-
Dodd-Frank (2010), the evidence indicates that the CFTC does not have sufficient 
financial and human resources to meet the demands in achieving full implementation 
and enforcement of Dodd-Frank (2010). 
2. Dodd-Frank (2010) and subsequent proposed legislation has eased the competitive 
tension between the CFTC and SEC, but there are many issues of jurisdiction still to 
be clarified not only domestically but also internationally with regulatory bodies in 
Europe and Asia. 
3. From the term of Wendy Gramm until that of Gary Gensler, it has been evident that 
leadership drives policy at the CFTC.  That leadership has been determined by which 
political party controls the executive branch of government.  A Republican chair 
drives de-regulatory policy, and a Democratic chair drives pro-regulatory policy. 
4. The CFTC has two masters, (1) the commodity exchanges and Wall Street who desire 
loose regulation in order to expand financial derivative products and (2) commercial 
industries and the general public who desire transparent, non-manipulative, and credit 
worthy markets.  Enforcement (or lack of) cannot positively affect one without 
negatively affecting the other. 
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Conclusion: Policy Tools to Address the Problem 
 
 
“The economic justification for regulation is that unregulated markets cause a socially 
undesirable transfer of resources and bring markets themselves into disrepute.  In 
financial markets, there are two kinds of market failure that can justify intervention by 
elected or appointed authorities.  First is held to be asymmetric information: trading 
companies and brokers know a lot more about the working of futures markets than do 
members of the investing public and the public has a right to be protected from 
unscrupulous people posing as investment advisers.  It is often felt that this danger is 
greater in the futures (derivatives) markets because the investment is highly leveraged.  
Thus investors need to be protected, it is suggested, by disinterested third parties, which 
in turn will encourage investors to participate in the markets, giving them much-needed 
liquidity.  To the extent that the economy as a whole has an interest in seeing that there 
are free and fair “level playing fields” to determine prices, regulation, it is said, cannot 
be left to the market itself.  The second problem is that of maintaining the market.  
Financial markets lie at the center of the economy, and distress in the financial systems 
can cause extremely serious problems in the real economies of the world.  On the other 
hand, financial regulation seems to be self-justifying, self-accelerating, and stifling the 
very initiatives that protect the system itself.   But there is equal danger if regulations 
are not enforced, or are too lax: this provides an environment where fraud can flourish 
and the public losses confidence in market institutions.” 





Commodity futures markets have grown exponentially to include ET and OTC 
financial products as well as traditional hard (industrial) and soft (agricultural) 
commodity markets.  Futures and OTC swaps markets are essential to the American and 
world economy and the way that businesses and investors manage risk.  Farmers, 
ranchers, producers, commercial companies, municipalities, pension funds and others use 
derivatives to lock in a price or a rate and focus on what they do best – innovating and 
producing goods and services for the economy.  The CFTC works to ensure that 
commodity hedgers and other market participants can use these markets with confidence; 
the Commission has an obligation to ensure that transparency, without manipulation and 
fraud, underpins a sound economy. 
Commercial hedgers need non-commercial (speculative) participants to provide 
liquidity in the marketplace.  But as they themselves need to comply with principles, 
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rules, and regulations to prevent market manipulation, speculators also must comply in 
order to deter market failure.  The problem is that the game has changed to the extent that 
the speculative element has more capital resources than the commercial participants and 
thus, at times, may have an “unnatural” influence on the markets (Topham, 2010).  To 
limit that possible influence, discriminatory rules must exist in order to find economically 
tenable market balance among participants. 
During the 1990’s, the CFTC granted a series of exemptions regarding position 
limits for futures trading entities and the push for unregulated OTC derivative markets 
was successful with the enactment of the CFMA (2000).  The financial crisis and global 
food crisis between 2007 and 2009 were necessary for a policy correction to be enacted. 
Dodd-Frank (2010) was designed to regulate all derivative markets, and give the CFTC 
and the SEC more salient enforcement tools to deter market manipulation and price 
distortion.  The enactment of Dodd-Frank (2010), along with other financial market 
regulatory reforms, required the CFTC to limit the amount of futures contracts that a 
single trader or firm could hold on a commodity (Dodd-Frank, 2010; Clapp and 
Helleiner, 2010 via US House of Representatives, 2010: 354). 
Challenges remain in the relationships that the CFTC maintains with the 
participants in ET futures and OTC swaps markets because of the concentration of the 
financial industry (small number of large firms) and diversification of commercial 
industries (large number of small firms).  Those challenges include (1) compromising the 
control of market volatility with respect to position limits for agricultural commodities 
based on percentage of deliverable supply; (2) banks waiting on public comment 
regarding the ability to achieve dual objectives in the Volker Rule for proprietary trading; 
(3) commercial hedgers (non-financial end-users) not being required to post margin on 
swap transactions; (4) swap dealers putting a firewall in place to prevent conflicts of 
interest between trading, clearing units, and research units; (5) foreign companies dealing 
on U.S. markets being subject to the same rules; and (6) exchanges not being over or 
under-regulated to discourage participation in the markets. 
These challenges of governing an evolutionary market for the CFTC have not 
changed over time.  In the 1920’s the rhetoric was that agricultural futures markets were 
nothing more than legalized gambling pits, by the 1980’s the new “exotic” futures on 
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financial commodities were targeted by the critics.  Today, over-the-counter derivatives 
such as credit default swaps are called “weapons of mass destruction” (Topham, 2010).  
Critics of derivative markets in Congress have conceded that agricultural futures’ trading 
is economically desirable, and in fact vital to the United States economy.  The natural and 
necessary evolution of the financial futures trading mechanism clearly also benefits the 
nation’s economy.  The danger is in prohibiting and over-regulating these commercial 
tools.  Targeted regulation is necessary; over-regulation is harmful.  Finding the balance 
is the never-ending challenge of the CFTC and Congress.  The noose must be tight, but 




This paper has not identified the specific economic, market inefficiency, or one 
rule or law that can be attributed to the recent pronounced market volatility in the cotton, 
soybean, wheat, and corn agricultural futures market.  But what this paper has done is 
examine why and how changes were made in regulatory policy which is intended to 
guide general market behavior.  This research has found that commodity regulatory 
policy, along with many other variables, is associated with changes in market volatility. 
In the Introduction, Granger causality established that futures prices were a 
suitable dependent variable to represent the cotton, soybean, corn, and wheat markets in a 
study of commodity market volatility change over time.  The coefficient of variation 
(CV) and a rolling coefficient of variation (rolling CV(n)) both yielded like results to 
other measures of volatility; the RCV(n) proved its effectiveness in accounting for trend, 
seasonality, and lagging effects. 
In Chapter 1, the particular risk that commercial hedgers face in using futures 
markets for risk management purposes was addressed.  Basis is the cash (or spot) price 
minus the futures price.  The basis study revealed that composite basis volatility across 
the four agricultural commodities, as measured by a RCV(4), had a positive correlation to 
cash and futures market volatility for weekly price data between 1992 and 2015.  Basis 
volatility rose along with cash (spot) and futures volatility from the early 2000’s until 
2010/11 marketing season.  Between the 2011/12 and 2014/15 marketing seasons basis 
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volatility was at a premium to futures volatility.  The peak for basis volatility came 
during the 2008/09 marketing season for the composite and cotton, a time when three 
major international cotton organizations met financial hardship. 
In Chapter 2, with respect to independent variables, a significantly positive 
relationship between composite futures price volatility, as measured by a RCV(4), and 
USA stocks to use (S/U) ratio volatility (economic) was established on data from 1973 to 
2015.  World S/U ratio had a negative relationship with the composite RCV(4), but the 
results were not statistically significant.  Across three categories of non-commercial 
participation (NCP) data (based on CFTC COT reports) from 1986 to 2105, it was 
established that (1) NCP was more active in futures than option on futures markets, (2) 
NCP increased about 10 percent (from 50 percent to 60 percent) relative to commercial 
participation (CP) from the mid-1990’s to 2015, and (3) there was not a significant direct 
relationship between composite futures volatility and either NCP or NCP volatility.  For 
Commodity Index Traders (CIT), between 2006 and 2105, (1) volatility was greater for a 
change in their net position (long or short) versus the volatility of their participation and 
(2) CIT participation volatility was not significantly related to composite futures price 
volatility, except for the 2008/09 marketing season where CIT participation significantly 
increased as did composite and cotton futures price volatility. 
Also in Chapter 2, no significant correlation was established between the 
composite volatility of USA and world supply numbers and composite futures OI, TOI, 
and NCP as a percentage of composite USA and world supply.  However, where previous 
studies in the energy markets have emphasized the increase of outstanding (open) futures 
contracts relative to world supply and demand (as does this research), composite NCP 
increased between 10 percent and 15 percent relative to composite CP as a percentage of 
composite USA and world supply (consistent with the change in net COT participation). 
Having established that composite futures price volatility and NCP level increased 
between 1986 and 2015, but that there was no significant relationship between composite 
price futures volatility and NCP volatility, econometric models constructed in Chapter 2 
attempt to establish cause and effect.  A model that tested mean levels of futures price 
volatility before and after five regulatory policy shifts found that futures price volatility 
was significantly different in four out of five cases.  To make the model more 
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dynamically complete by including the previously mentioned independent variables, 
Baumgartner and Jones’ (2009) policy theory of punctuated equilibrium (PE) was put to 
the test. 
Applying two types of autoregressive models, RCV(n) and squared residual 
analysis (SRA), the following conclusions were made.  (1) Commodity and composite 
futures price volatility followed the same patterns across periods as in previous measures 
and models.  (2) USA S/U ratio and S/U ratio volatility were significantly higher than 
that of the world but since the mid-2000’s, world has gained significance over the USA.  
(3) USA S/U ratio volatility and NCP volatility were significant variables affecting 
composite nearby futures volatility before and after Dodd-Frank (2010).  (4) A change in 
volatility is not solely the result of a shift in regulatory policy but is a result of many 
variables, each exerting their influence at different times.  No one variable consistently 
stands out to significantly affect any specific commodity or composite futures price 
volatility, but no variable, regulatory policy shift, economic, or non-commercial 
influence, can be ruled out of the equation. 
Given that shifts in commodity regulatory policy are one of several factors 
affecting agricultural commodity market volatility, Sabatier’s (1993) Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) complements PE’s findings in Chapter 3.  Covering over forty years 
of qualitative research, application of the ACF showed how policy subsystems in 
conjunction with external subsystem events, relatively stable parameters, coupled with 
the constraints, and resources of subsystem actors, bring about commodity regulatory 
policy change.  The enactment of CFMA (2000) and Dodd-Frank (2010) were the result 
of money, power, and influence, all with vested interests behind them.  PE was applied to 
emphasize the policy change by means of quantitative measurement and ACF was 
applied to emphasize the stakeholders and coalitions within policy subsystems that 
induce major shifts in commodity regulatory policy through qualitative study.  Together, 
the story is better understood and clearly unfolds through numbers, graphs, and diagrams. 
To correct the problem of increased volatility in agricultural futures markets, one 
must understand the organization that regulates commodities and the challenges it faces 
in implementing policy.  Chapter 4 not only covered the history of commodity 
regulation that has led to the unique culture of the CFTC, but also examined the 
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Commission’s inadequate resources, jurisdictional competition with the SEC and 
overseas markets, changing leadership, and the conflicts of interest in serving two distinct 
masters.  These organizational challenges can explain why policy enforcement has been 
substandard and full implementation of Dodd-Frank (2010) has been slow. 
This research concurs with two recent studies conducted by institutions outside of 
the United States.  Europe and Australia, though different in market size, both have 
sophisticated financial systems that rival those of Wall Street and Chicago.  The 
interconnectedness of financial and commodity markets worldwide, and the recent 
financial and food crises, has led to an equal amount of research study and political 
debate as in the United States. 
In a recent report by the European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) and the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Price Formation in Commodities Markets: 
Fanancialization and Beyond (CEPS, 2013), five points were made.  (1) The empirical 
analysis conducted in the report confirmed that demand and supply fundamentals remain 
solid drivers of futures price formation across all commodities markets covered by the 
report.  (2) The growing interconnection between financial and non-financial assets, and 
between regional physical markets, has amplified the reaction to market shocks, such as 
the recent financial crisis and the global economic downturn, and thus created volatility 
peaks in the short term. Short-term volatility remains above pre-crisis levels, in particular 
for agricultural commodities.  (3) The empirical analysis confirms that the expansion of 
commercial futures positions has been leading price formation in futures markets, 
through the steady increase in futures positions and OTC financial activities.  Non-
commercial futures positions have become by far the biggest component of futures 
markets, though evidence still points to commercial participants leading price formation 
in futures markets.  (4) The evidence in the report suggests that the role of non-
commercial participants in commodities markets has been generally “benign.”  The 
growth of index investments has not so far caused distortions in price formation.  (5) The 
claim that the size of futures markets is many times larger than physical markets (and 
thus may distort price information based on underlying physical transactions) cannot be 
proven, but also cannot be ruled out. 
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The Reserve Bank of Australia’s International Department (Dwyer, Gardner, and 
Williams, 2011), when examining the factors behind the increase in the level and 
volatility of commodity prices, concluded that while financial investors can affect short-
run price dynamics for some commodities, the level and volatility of commodity prices 
appears to be primarily determined by fundamental factors. 
 
5.3.0 Effective Regulation and Enforcement 
 
Anderson (2011) identifies the final three stages of the policy process as policy 
adoption, policy implementation, and policy evaluation.  It is in these three stages that 
market and political failure occur.  To take Anderson’s procedure and customize it for the 
commodity futures market, the market and political failure that occurred in the 
agricultural markets between 2008 and 2011 can be attributed to (1) a prior shift in 
commodity regulatory policy, (2) lack of enforcement of the policy tool, and (3) 
evaluation through information. 
 
5.3.1. Adoption via Policy 
 
Two legislative acts, following a period of substantial United States economic 
growth and the triumph of the free-market system over the controlled-state, led to a more 
deregulated financial environment.  The Graham Leach Bliley Act of 1999 (GLB) 
repealed Glass Steagall’s prohibited regulation of security-based swap agreements and 
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA, 2000) officially ensured the 
deregulation OTC derivatives and clarified that certain OTC derivative transactions were 
outside the jurisdiction of the CFTC. 
CFMA (2000) was the most significant commodity regulatory legislation since 
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA, 1936) and represented a shift from a pro-
regulatory stance to a de-regulatory policy stance on derivative financial markets.  
Through amendments to the CEA (1936), the CFMA (2000) provided standards for 
identifying those transactions in specified commodities, excluded commodities, exempt 
commodities, hybrid instruments, and swap transactions that were not subject to 
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regulation under CEA (1936) as futures contracts.  The Act clarified that certain OTC 
derivative transactions were outside the jurisdiction of the CFTC.  The Act removed the 
bar that existed since the Shad-Johnson Accord of 1982 to the trading of futures contracts 
on single stocks and narrowly based stock indices.  However, given the joint regulatory 
jurisdiction of the CFTC and SEC, and the different cultures of the two organizations, 
smooth governance was not easy. 
OTC derivatives were generally regarded as a beneficial innovation that 
distributed financial risk more efficiently and made the financial system more stable, 
resilient, and resistant to shocks.  However, they have been blamed for the financial crisis 
of 2007 to 2009.  Between 2000 and 2008, the growth in derivatives was explosive.  The 
OTC market was dominated by a dozen or so financial firms fulfilling the role of swap 
dealers.  There was no universal or mandatory system of margin in the OTC market.  
Large uncollateralized (leveraged speculative positions) losses built up in the OTC 
market by firms (such as AIG) and their creditors and trading partners (such as Lehman 
Brothers and Bear Stearns).  The OTC derivatives market was a major source of systemic 
risk.  Ultimately, after the fall of several financial institutions, the United States 
government injected hundreds of billions of dollars in government credit into firms and 
derivative dealers via federal intervention, such as the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
TARP. 
Passed in response to the financial crisis of 2007-2009, termed “the Great 
Recession,” the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
(Dodd-Frank, 2010) creates the most significant changes to financial regulation in the 
United States since the regulatory reforms that followed the Great Depression (Securities 
Exchange Act of 1933, Glass Steagall Act of 1932, and the Commodity Exchange Act of 
1936) and reversed the intent of CFMA (2000).  Dodd-Frank (2010) has made changes in 
the United States regulatory environment that affect all federal financial regulatory 
agencies and almost every part of the nation’s financial services industry.  There are 
many who argue that the Act does not go far enough to prevent another financial crisis 
and others who argue that the Act goes too far in restricting financial institutions to 
compete in the global marketplace. 
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With respect to derivatives market regulation, according to Michael Greenberger 
(2011), Dodd-Frank (2010) has transformed the regulation of over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives by requiring that swaps be subject to the same clearing and capital and margin 
requirements as formal exchange trading.  The Act requires that all swap dealers (SD) 
and major swap participants (MSP) register with the appropriate federal regulators, the 
CFTC and the SEC.  The former Chair of the CFTC, Gary Gensler, stated (just before the 
bill’s enactment) that that the Wall Street reform bill brings comprehensive regulation to 
the swaps marketplace for the first time.  Swap dealers will be subject to robust oversight 
and standardized derivatives will be required to trade on open platforms and be submitted 
for clearing to central counterparties.  Dodd-Frank’s (2010) intention is to lower risk, 
promote transparency, and protect the American public (CFTC, 2015). 
 
5.3.2 Implementation via Enforcement 
 
While they were once the only derivatives markets around, the past forty years 
have seen the agricultural commodity futures markets in the United States become part of 
the much larger global financial derivatives market.  Vested interests are at work when it 
comes to the regulation of commodity futures markets, irrespective of the economic laws 
of supply and demand.  Potential manipulation needs to be controlled and one way is via 
position limits, i.e. limiting the amount of participation any one entity can have in the 
market.  Historically, margining and position limits have been preferred regulatory 
instruments used to prevent market failure.  Unfortunately, there has been only limited 
academic research on the effect these policy tools have had on abnormal market 
volatility. 
Though not emphasized in this research, another tool for controlling participation 
in commodity futures markets is the level of margin requirements on trading set by the 
exchanges themselves.  Adrangi and Chatrath (1999) investigated the impact of margin 
requirements on trading activity and volatility in the soybean and corn futures markets.  
The authors found that trading activity became more sensitive to margin changes the 
closer one gets to contract maturity.  Adrangi and Chatrath (1999) found that margins 
have a negative impact on the trading activities of all participants, though there is some 
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evidence that margin alterations bring about changes in the type of participant in the 
market.  As expected, they found that margins are likely to be raised during periods of 
high volatility, and reduced during periods of relative stability, serving as insurance for 
exchanges for contract performance. 
Sanders and Irwin (2015) conducted a study of daily data for a specific long-only 
index fund that focused on the firm-level position across thirteen U.S. agricultural futures 
markets.  Their results found no causal relationship between the fund’s outright buying 
and selling and market returns.  Sanders and Irwin (2015) also found there was consistent 
evidence of a negative relationship between roll transactions of the fund and the change 
in the nearby-deferred futures spread.  They concluded that the proposed position limits 
by the CFTC on 28 commodity futures markets are unnecessary.  Etienne, Irwin, and 
Garcia, (2015) found that commodity index trader positions do not significantly affect the 
probability of a positive bubble occurring in grain futures markets, using 2004 to 2013 
data.  The authors are of the opinion that commodity index trader positions tend to reduce 
negative bubble occurrence, while general speculative activity reduces the probability of 
a positive bubble. 
As the CFTC historically has left the level of margin requirements up to the 
individual exchanges (and Dodd-Frank has not changed that policy), the general focus by 
the Commission has been speculative position limits.  The studies based on index fund 
data have focused only on one component of non-commercial participation in the 
commodity futures markets.  This research agrees with their findings regarding index 
funds but not speculative participation as a whole.  In particular this research does not 
support their statement that speculation has little effect or negative effects on price 
explosiveness.  Like speed limits on the highway, most of the time position limits are not 
necessary; but they are precautionary and do prevent many accidents from happening. 
Despite the shortage of actual research as to the effect of position limits on 
market volatility in agricultural commodity futures markets, several known academics 
have recommended their enforcement.  According to Michael Greenberger, University 
of Maryland Law Professor and former director of the CFTC’s Division of Trading and 
Markets, “speculators can be useful, but speculators can cause markets to be 
dysfunctional.”  One of the foremost regulatory tools is speculative (position) limits 
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(Cranford, June 2, 2008).  In his testimony before Congress in July of 2009, Chief 
Counsel for the CFTC, Dan Berkowitz, stated, “…exchanges for dealing in securities 
and commodities are necessary and of definite value to our commercial and agricultural 
life.  Nevertheless, it should be our national policy to restrict, as far as possible, the use 
of these exchanges for purely speculative operations” (Berkovitz, 2009). 
CFTC chair, Timothy Massad recently commented on the latest modification to 
the position limit proposal (Part 150 of the Commission’s regulations for Dodd-Frank).  
He stated that the imposition of positions limits helps to restrict market participants from 
amassing positions that are sufficient in size potentially to cause sudden or unreasonable 
fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of a commodity derivatives contract, or 
to be used to manipulate the market prices.  The proposed exemptions would allow an 
owner to disaggregate the positions of an owned entity in circumstances where the 
Commission has determined that the positions are less risk of disrupting market operation 
through coordinated trading.  The Commission believes that the proposed exemptions 
would not materially inhibit the use of commodity derivatives for hedging, as bona fide 
hedging exemptions are available to any entity regardless of aggregation of positions and 
exemptions from aggregation. (Federal Register, September 29, 2015) 
Through the CFTC, the commodity futures market has a protective regulatory 
policy (Birkland, 2011) that seeks to protect market participants and the public from 
market problems that cause financial distress and hardship.  However, the CFTC has been 
inconsistent in the past and recently hindered from implementing policy that it sees as a 
partial solution to limiting market volatility.  The granting of exemptions and loosening 
of enforcement on position limits, between the early 1990’s and 2007, were among the 
factors that led to a slippery slope in financial regulation that ended in financial crisis.  
The evidence does not point to lack of resources at that time as a reason why the CFTC 
failed to be more prudent in their implementation of policy, it was partisan leadership 






5.3.2 Evaluation via Transparency 
 
In their report on Price Formation in Commodities Markets: Financialization and 
Beyond, the ECMI and CEPS task force (CEPS, 2013) made the following 
recommendations.  (1) By channeling information about supply and demand 
fundamentals to the physical and futures markets, together ensuring smooth management 
and aggregate transparency of inventories, the functioning of commodities price 
formation mechanisms can be improved.  (2) Proper surveillance mechanisms and 
supervision of exchanges policies are essential.  More time and data (such as CFTC COT 
reports) are needed to improve the analysis of trading practices in the short term and the 
long-term effects of financial participants on price information.  (3) There must be 
effective public enforcement mechanisms to ensure the reliability of futures trading 
(volumes aggregated by category of trader) data.  (4) Full transparency of methodologies 
and governance, and accessibility to underlying market data, is a crucial aspect for 
regulators to ensure the smooth functioning of price assessment services. 
The ECMI and CEPS task force does not seem to consider the human and 
financial resource constraints of today’s CFTC.  The derivatives market of today is far 
larger than in the 1990’s and 2000’s, when enforcement was not stringent.  The resources 
at that time were available to enforce; today, the agency is underfunded and understaffed.  
Also, given the less strict regulation of European financial markets compared to those in 
the United States, the European-based report does not emphasize the application of 
position limits to curb high speculative participation and abnormally high price volatility 
that may result.  The common word in the ECMI/CEPS report is “transparency.”  The 
only way for data to be transparent is for someone to collect and publish it.  To do that, 
there need to be regulations and enforcement.  By establishing the position limit rules for 
speculative traders, the mere fact that data is being collected and monitored helps curbing 
potential manipulation.  Without the monitoring of data, the markets remain wide open 





5.3.4 Policy Recommendations 
 
The tools for effective commodity futures regulatory policy have existed in the 
past.  Technological innovation has enabled some participants to stay one-step ahead of 
regulation.  Given ample resources, regulators have an opportunity to monitor progress in 
derivative market innovation.  For the success and sustainability of commodity futures 
markets in the United States, the most difficult challenge is for those in political authority 
and regulatory enforcement to maintain consistency and discipline in their actions, given 
a dynamic economic and political environment. 
 
Congress should supply the CFTC with sufficient human and financial resources to do its 
job effectively.  It should always clarify and simply legislation in order for the 
Commission to avoid ambiguous interpretation of policy and especially legal challenges 
that delay implementation and enforcement. 
 
CFTC should enhance and continue to improve market data (COT reports) collection on 
all participant positions in derivative markets.  Second, the Commission should continue 
to make available COT data to all exchanges (and the general public) in order for each 
exchange to set feasible and practical initial and maintenance margin levels.  Thirdly, it 
should continuously analyze and utilize participation data to monitor and adjust position 
limits for non-commercial traders.  Finally and most importantly, the Commission should 
enact and enforce commodity futures position limits on non-commercial accounts 
regardless of the economic and political climate. 
 
The President should appoint the CFTC chair and commissioners who fully understand 
the law and their authorizing environment in order to implement and effectively enforce 
regulatory policy.  The office should also submit budgets to Congress that allow for the 
Commission to regulate the derivatives market effectively. 
 
Commodity Groups should continue to solicit the CFTC for greater transparency of 
commodity market participation, especially in the OTC swaps market.  Information has 
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not been forthcoming until just before the financial crisis of 2007-2009.  The swaps 
market continues to grow across all physical commodity and financial markets 
worldwide.  Commodity industry lobbyists should also continue to demand a balance 
between commercial and non-commercial (speculative) participation for markets to 
possess liquidity and integrity for both participants and the general public at large. 
 
5.4.0 Future Research 
 
For future research, this paper could be extended in of itself and three other areas 
of study.  (1) Instead of regulatory policy shifts, actual position limit levels of specific 
commodities could be applied as indicator variables.  This may be one way to actually 
measure the effect that position limits have on commodity price volatility when 
incorporated with other variables.  (2) To focus more on the risk of commercial hedgers, 
actual basis levels and basis volatility could become a dependent variable in place of 
commodity price or volatility.  As per Section 1.3.0, extreme and extended divergence of 
basis is a sign of market failure; if futures prices do not converge to cash prices by the 
end of the delivery period for a futures contract, then the futures market is not functioning 
as a price discovery mechanism.  (3) Randomized complete block design (RCBD) is a 
statistical technique where independent variables are grouped into blocks to control 
variation.  Instead of applying a matched-pair design, comparing volatility from decade to 
decade or before and after a regulatory shift, an RCBD could be applied using each 
commodity as the block.  Greater understanding of these issues would aid in policy 
authorities deciding whether there should be uniform or discriminatory application 
amongst different classifications of commodity futures market participants. 
 
Time and again, through the history of capitalism and free markets, predatory and 
manipulative practices have had to be challenged and controlled.  If not, consumers 
(social welfare) suffer at the expense of greed (elitism).  This research has clarified that 
the chosen dominant policy instrument for commodity futures regulatory policy is the 
application of feasible position limits for certain participants in the commodity futures 
market.  Less regulation allows more participation and greater leverage by individual 
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participants to influence the market.  More regulation limits the degree to which 
participants can influence the market.  Regulatory policy is needed that allows a balance 
of both commercial and non-commercial participants, where one faction is not perceived 
to and does not dominate market activity.  Regulations need to be clear and not 
ambivalent in order for the regulatory agency to have a clear idea what is to be done.  





Appendix 1: Glossary 
 
Basis: the difference between cash and futures prices, specifically cash minus futures; the 
risk in hedging with futures.  Hedgers convert price risk into basis risk. 
 
Cash Contract: often referred to as a physical contract, can be a spot (nearby) or forward 
(distant) contract.  In either case, the seller ultimately delivers the actual product or asset 
to the buyer. 
 
Commitment of Traders Report (COT): a weekly CFTC report revealing the amount 
of open interest held by commercial and non-commercial firms; a supplemental COT (12 
agricultural markets) breaks down index trading. 
 
Derivative: a financial contract (agreement between two parties), the value that is 
derived from or linked to the value of an underlying asset (i.e. common stock, index, 
commodity). 
 
Forward Contract: an agreement to deliver a cash commodity from seller to buyer of 
specified quality and quantity at a specified future date where the price may or may not 
be determined (customized forward cash contract). 
 
Futures Contract: a transferable legally binding agreement to make or accept delivery 
of a standardized quantity and quality of a commodity at a standardized time and place 
for a price agreed upon today on an organized futures exchange. 
 
Hedging: taking a position in a futures (or forward) market opposite to a position held in 
the cash market to minimize the risk of financial loss from adverse price change; a 
purchase or sale of a futures or forward contract as a temporary substitute for a cash 
transaction that will occur later. 
 
Non-commercial: a trader not involved in the production, processing, merchandising, or 
other commercial activity in the commodity it is trading. 
 
Option: a contracted right or obligation to buy or sell a long or short position in a spot or 
forward asset or commodity. 
 
Over-the-Counter: spot, forward, or option contracts that are bought and sold outside of 
an organized exchange, i.e. foreign currency spot and forward transactions dealt from 
bank to bank or bank to client. 
 
Speculation: attempting to anticipate commodity price changes and to profit through the 
sale and purchase or purchase and sale of commodity futures contracts or of the physical 




Speculative Position Limit: The maximum position, either net long or short, in one 
commodity future (or option) month or in all futures (or options) of one commodity 
combined that may be held or controlled by one person or entity (other than one granted 
by a hedge exemption) as prescribed by the exchange and/or by the CFTC. 
 
Swap: a matched purchase and sale of a financial instrument for different delivery dates.  
The two legs of a SWAP correspond to an unhedged forward transaction and are 
designed to match a previously contracted forward sale and purchase (can be used to 
hedge or speculate like futures). 
 
Swap Dealer: an entity such as a bank or investment bank that markets swaps to end 
users, managed funds, or proprietary trades.  They often manage the risk associated with 











Daily Cotton   Obs: 5,852  (1/2/1992 to 9/30/2015) 
 Futs FOM  AR(2) 
 Futs LTD   AR(2) 
 Cash A Index  AR(2) 
Manova    α = 0.01 = *   
Data  Model  R2  Futst-1  Futst-2  Casht-1  Casht-2 
FOM  1 Futs  0.997  1.09*  -0.12*  0.01  0.02 
 2 Cash  0.999  0.46*  -0.46*  1.12*  -0.13* 
LTD  1 Futs  0.996  1.13*  -0.16*  -0.01  0.04 
 2 Cash  0.999  0.49*  -0.48*  1.12*  -0.12* 
 
Daily Cotton   Obs: 10,548  (1/2/1973 to 9/30/2015) 
 Futs FOM  AR(2) 
 Futs LTD   AR(2) 
 Cash A Index  AR(2) 
Manova    α = 0.01 = *   
Data  Model  R2  Futst-1  Futst-2  Casht-1  Casht-2 
FOM  1 Futs  0.995  1.08*  -0.10*  -0.00  0.03 
 2 Cash  0.999  0.39*  -0.39*  1.08*  -0.09* 
LTD  1 Futs  0.995  1.10*  -0.13*  -0.02  0.04 
 2 Cash  0.999  0.40*  -0.39*  1.08*  -0.09* 
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01/01/1992 01/01/1995 01/01/1998 01/01/2001 01/01/2004 01/01/2007 01/01/2010 01/01/2013
Futures Roll FOM Futures Roll LTD Cash Central, IL
 
Daily Soybeans   Obs: 5,946  (1/02/1992 to 9/30/2015) 
 Futs FOM  AR(1) 
 Futs LTD  AR(1) 
 Cash   AR(2) 
Manova    α = 0.01 = *   
Data  Model  R2  Futst-1  Casht-1  Casht-2 
FOM  1 Futs  0.998  1.01*  0.03  -0.04* 
 2 Cash  0.998  0.04*  1.02*  -0.06* 
LTD  1 Futs  0.998  0.96*  0.08*  -0.04* 
 2 Cash  0.998  0.05*  1.01*  -0.06* 
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01/01/1992 01/01/1995 01/01/1998 01/01/2001 01/01/2004 01/01/2007 01/01/2010 01/01/2013
Futures Roll FOM Futures Roll LTD Cash Central, IL
 
Daily Corn   Obs: 5,771  (9/01/1992 to 9/30/2015) 
 Futs FOM  AR(1) 
 Futs LTD  AR(1) 
 Cash   AR(2) 
Manova    α = 0.01 = *   
Data  Model  R2  Futst-1  Casht-1  Casht-2 
FOM  1 Futs  0.998  1.00*  0.06*  -0.06* 
 2 Cash  0.998  0.01*  1.05*  -0.06* 
LTD  1 Futs  0.998  0.99*  0.08*  -0.07* 
 2 Cash  0.998  0.02*  1.04*  -0.06* 
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Appendix 2D: Granger Causality Results – Wheat 
 
 












01/01/1992 01/01/1995 01/01/1998 01/01/2001 01/01/2004 01/01/2007 01/01/2010 01/01/2013
Futures Roll FOM Futures Roll LTD Cash Toledo OH
 
Daily Wheat   Obs: 5,850  (1/02/1992 to 9/30/2015) 
 Futs FOM  AR(1) 
 Futs LTD  AR(1) 
 Cash   AR(2) 
Manova    α = 0.01 = *   
Data  Model  R2  Futst-1  Casht-1  Casht-2 
FOM  1 Futs  0.996  0.99*  0.04*  -0.03 
             2 Cash  0.996  -0.01  1.04*  -0.03 
LTD     1 Futs  0.996  0.98*  0.05*  -0.03 
             2 Cash  0.996  -0.01  1.04*  -0.03 
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Cotton Cash 33.97 3 7 5852 
Cotton Futures 32.28 3 7 5852 
Soybean Cash 40.01 8 12 5758 
Soybean Futures 39.46 8 11 5758 
Corn Cash 46.69 8 12 5771 
Corn Futures 45.07 8 12 5771 
Wheat Cash 41.22 2 6 5850 







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Cotton Futs Soybean Futs
Corn Futs Wheat Futs
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Cotton -1.32 2.54 5666 
Soybean 0.13 0.91 5758 
Corn 0.25 1.86 5750 




































































































Cotton Soybean Corn Wheat
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A B C D E F G H I J
Left Scale: Cotton Poly(6) MAPFE
Right Scale: Cotton Poly(6) R2 Mean R2: 0.82  
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A B C D E F G H I J
Left Scale: Soybean Poly(6) MAPFE
Right Scale: Soybean Poly(6) R2 Mean R2: 0.82  
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A B C D E F G H I J
Left Scale: Corn Poly(6) MAPFE
Right Scale: Corn Poly(6) R2 Mean R2: 0.80  
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A B C D E F G H I J
Left Scale: Wheat Poly(6) MAPFE
Right Scale: Wheat Poly(6) R2 Mean R2: 0.76  
 	 198	

































Cotton experienced high global S/U during the 1985/86 marketing season due to 
stockpiling of USA cotton prior to the 1985 Farm Bill introduction in August 1986 and 
high S/U in 2014/15 due to Chinese stockpiling (in response to increasing prices between 
2007 and 2010).  The data shows a normal inverse relationship between cotton futures 
prices and USA S/U and World S/U (stocks relative to usage up – prices down) with the 
USA numbers more statistically significant than World numbers.*  The highest volatility 
marketing season, as measured by CV(4) for both S/U ratios (USA and World) and prices 
(cash and futures), since the high volatility marketing year 1986/87, was the 2010/11 
season; the lowest was 2005/06.  As in the table above, there is a positive relationship 
between futures volatility and USA S/U and World S/U volatility (S/U volatility up, 
futures price volatility up).  The USA numbers for futures price volatility vs S/U 
volatility are more statistically significant (R2 and P-value) than the World numbers.  
There is a negative relationship between futures price volatility CV(4) and USA and 
World S/U ratios,* but not as significant a relationship as futures volatility to S/U ratio 
volatility. 

































































































































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(4))
Right Scale: Mean (USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(4)) Mean (USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(4))
Marketing USA S/U CV(4) World S/U CV(4) 
Year Mean Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
A Ind CV(4) 42 0.05 +0.13 0.14 35 0.05 +0.41 0.19 
Aus CV(4) 29 0.10 +0.14 0.10 29 0.15 +0.56 0.04 
Futs CV(4) 42 0.03 +0.10 0.31 35 0.05 +0.43 0.19 
Monthly USA S/U CV(4) World S/U CV(4) 
Price Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
A Ind CV(4) 503 0.05 +0.08 0.00 417 0.01 +0.12 0.03 
Aus CV(4) 347 0.03 +0.06 0.00 347 0.03 +0.23 0.00 
Futs CV(4) 503 0.08 +0.13 0.00 417 0.01 +0.13 0.07 
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Soybeans experienced high global S/U in the 1986/87 marketing season due to 
large USA and World stock.  The USA and World S/U ratio began to diverge with the 
2000/01 marketing season with the World S/U ratio premium peaking in 2014/15.  A 
declining S/U ratio in the USA (2006/07 an exception), led to historically high prices 
from 2007/08 to 2012/13.  The data shows a normal inverse relationship between soybean 
futures prices and USA S/U ratio but a positive relationship to World S/U (stocks relative 
to usage up – prices up).*  Futures prices vs. USA and World S/U are statistically 
significant (R2 and P-value); USA economic numbers drive USA soybean futures prices 
(as reflected in both monthly and marketing season numbers).  The marketing season 
with the highest volatility, as measured by CV(4) for both S/U ratios (USA and World) 
and prices (cash and futures), since the high volatility marketing year 1974/75, was the 
2007/08 season; the lowest was 1992/93.  As in the table above, there is a positive 
relationship between futures volatility and USA S/U and World S/U volatility (S/U 
volatility up, futures price volatility up).  The USA numbers for futures price volatility vs 
S/U volatility are no more statistically significant for USA than World numbers.  There is 
a statistically significant negative relationship between futures price volatility CV(4) and 
USA S/U ratio,* but not a positive significant relationship with World S/U ratio. 

































































































































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price CV(4))
Right Scale: Mean (USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(4)) Mean (USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(4))
Marketing USA S/U CV(4) World S/U CV(4) 
Year Mean Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
Cash CV(4) 24 0.67 +0.10 0.00 24 0.02 +0.18 0.49 
Futs CV(4) 42 0.12 +0.14 0.02 35 0.02 +0.15 0.39 
Monthly USA S/U CV(4) World S/U CV(4) 
Price Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
Cash CV (4) 282 0.16 +0.13 0.00 282 0.89 +0.29 0.00 
Futs CV(4) 502 0.67 +0.09 0.00 417 0.05 +0.17 0.00 
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Corn experienced high global S/U in the 1986/87 marketing season due to large 
USA and World stock.  The USA and World S/U ratio began to diverge during the 
2006/07 marketing season, with the World S/U ratio premium peaking in 2001/02.  A 
consistently historically low S/U ratio in the USA led to high prices from 2007/08 to 
2012/13.  The data shows a normal inverse relationship between soybean futures prices 
and USA and World S/U ratios.*  Both USA and World numbers (futures prices vs. S/U) 
are statistically significant (R2 and P-value), but the USA relationship is statistically more 
significant.  The highest volatility marketing year, as measured by CV(4) for both S/U 
ratios (USA and World) and prices (cash and futures), since the high volatility marketing 
year 1985/86, was the 2006/07 season; the lowest was 1990/91.  There is a positive 
relationship between futures volatility and USA S/U volatility but a negative relationship 
with the World S/U volatility.  The USA numbers for futures price volatility vs S/U 
volatility are more statistically significant for USA than World numbers.  There is a 
statistically significant negative relationship between futures price volatility CV(4) and 
USA S/U ratio and a positive relationship with World S/U ratio.* 

































































































































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Month End Nearby Corn Futures Settle Price CV(4))
Right Scale: Mean (USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(4)) Mean (USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(4))
Marketing USA S/U CV(4) World S/U CV(4) 
Year Mean Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
Cash CV(4) 23 0.25 +0.28 0.02 23 0.00 0.00 0.99 
Futs CV(4) 42 0.01 +0.05 0.51 31 0.00 -0.04 0.81 
Monthly USA S/U CV(4) World S/U CV(4) 
Price Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
Cash CV (4) 274 0.25 +0.23 0.00 274 0.02 +0.14 0.01 
Futs CV(4) 502 0.01 +0.04 0.01 371 0.00 -0.01 0.85 
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Wheat experienced high global S/U in the 1986/87 marketing season due to large 
USA and World stock.  The USA S/U ratio was much higher than the World S/U in 
1999/00 and again in 2009/10.  After an historical low for both in 2007/08, the period 
from 2006/07 to 2014/15 was the highest volatility period for futures.  The data shows a 
normal inverse relationship between soybean futures prices and USA S/U, but a positive 
relationship to World S/U (the USA is almost consistently higher than the World).*   
Both USA and World numbers (futures prices vs. S/U) are statistically significant (R2 and 
P-value), but the USA relationship is statistically more significant than the world.  The 
highest volatility marketing year, as measured by CV(4) for both S/U ratios (USA and 
World) and prices (cash and futures), since the high volatility marketing year 1974/75, 
was the 2008/09 marketing season; the lowest was 1984/85.  There is a positive 
relationship between futures volatility and USA S/U volatility but a negative relationship 
between futures prices and World S/U volatility.  The USA numbers for futures price 
volatility vs S/U volatility are more statistically significant for USA than World numbers.  
There is a statistically more significant negative relationship between futures price 
volatility CV(4) and USA S/U ratio than the positive relationship with World S/U ratio.* 


































































































































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price CV(4))
Right Scale: Mean (USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(4)) Mean (USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(4))
Marketing USA S/U CV(4) World S/U CV(4) 
Year Mean Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
Cash CV(4) 24 0.06 +0.23 0.24 24 0.00 +0.05 0.92 
Futs CV(4) 42 0.24 +0.29 0.00 35 0.02 -0.22 0.46 
Monthly USA S/U CV(4) World S/U CV(4) 
Price Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
Cash CV (4) 282 0.01 +0.06 0.17 281 0.01 +0.20 0.06 
Futs CV(4) 503 0.03 +0.09 0.00 417 0.01 +0.12 0.09 
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Appendix 9B: Cotton Nearby Futures Price and Open Interest (OI and TOI) 
 
 
   
Mean SD Min Max Range CV(%) 
Futures Price 68.14 22.45 22.95 297.04 184.09 32.95 
Futures OI 107,199 63,302 19,732 299,206 279,474 59.05 
Option OI 60,504 43,563 11,839 279,020 267,181 72.00 
Total OI 185,755 96,955 63,308 572,626 509,318 52.19 
Legacy NCP % of 
Futures OI  
40.54 6.00 25.01 61.17 36.16 14.72 
Legacy NCP % Total 
OI 
39.93 4.19 27.30 50.63 23.34 10.49 
Disaggregated NCP % 
of Futures OI 
58.73 5.49 44.15 72.08 27.93 9.34 
Disaggregated NCP % 
of Total OI 
56.12 4.68 44.12 66.91 22.79 8.35 
CIT Sup NCP % of 
Total OI 
51.58 4.34 40.09 63.06 22.97 8.41 














































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Cotton Futures Price)
Right Scale: Mean (Cotton Futures Open Interest (Contracts)) Mean (Cotton Futures and Options Total Open Interest)
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Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Cotton Futures Rolling CV (2) then (4))




























































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Cotton Futures Rolling CV (2) then (4))































2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Cotton Futures Rolling CV (4) from 2006










Appendix 9J: Cotton COT NCP 
 






















01/01/2006 01/01/2007 01/01/2008 01/01/2009 01/01/2010 01/01/2011 01/01/2012 01/01/2013 01/01/2014 01/01/2015
Left Scale: Nearby Cotton Futures Price















1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Left Scale: Mean (Legacy Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation) Mean (Legacy Futures & Options  Non-Commercial (Other) Participaton)
Right Scale: Mean (Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation) Mean (Disaggregated Futures & Options Non-Commercial (Other) Participation) Mean (CIT SUP Non-Commercial Participation)
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Appendix 10B: Soybean Nearby Futures Price and Open Interest (OI and TOI) 
 
 
   
Mean SD Min Max Range CV(%) 
Futures Price 799.50 318.50 413.75 1771.00 1357.25 39.84 
Futures OI 304,206 200,839 57,348 833,271 775,923 66.02 
Option OI 128,358 88,149 23,080 475,866 452,786 68.67 
Total OI 482,081 281,169 158,430 1,259,806 1,101,376 58.32 
Legacy NCP % of 
Futures OI  
50.76 6.45 37.85 65.60 27.75 12.71 
Legacy NCP % Total 
OI 
50.77 4.55 41.44 66.80 25.37 8.96 
Disaggregated NCP % 
of Futures OI 
53.39 3.23 45.67 66.59 20.92 6.05 
Disaggregated NCP % 
of Total OI 
56.49 3.01 48.72 64.06 15.34 5.33 
CIT Sup NCP % of 
Total OI 
54.87 2.89 47.67 62.30 14.63 5.28 


















01/01/1986 01/01/1992 01/01/1995 01/01/1998 01/01/2001 01/01/2004 01/01/2007 01/01/2010 01/01/2013
Left Scale: Nearby Soybean Futures Price
Right Scale: Soybean Futures Open Interest (Contracts) Soybean Futures and Options Total Open Interest (Contracts)
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Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Soybean Futures Rolling CV (2) then (4))

























































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Soybean Futures Rolling CV (2) then (4))
































2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Soybean Futures) Rolling CV (4) from 2006






























01/01/2006 01/01/2008 01/01/2009 01/01/2010 01/01/2011 01/01/2012 01/01/2013 01/01/2014 01/01/2015
Left Scale: Nearby Soybean Futures Price







































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Legacy Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation) Mean (Legacy Futures & Optons Non-Commercial (Other) Participation)
Right Scale: Mean (Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation) Mean (Disaggregated Futures & Options Non-Commercial (Other) Participation) Mean (CIT SUP Non-Commercial Participation)
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Appendix 11B: Corn Nearby Futures Price and Open Interest (OI and TOI) 
 
 
   
Mean SD Min Max Range CV(%) 
Futures Price 329.00 151.75 142.75 831.25 688.50 46.17 
Futures OI 692,620 450,997 107,146 1,719,874 1,612,728 65.11 
Option OI 313,867 216,482 54,511 912,025 857,514 68.97 
Total OI 1,133,855 626,911 351,111 2,573,509 2,222,398 55.29 
Legacy NCP % of 
Futures OI  
48.40 4.62 38.28 60.10 21.82 9.54 
Legacy NCP % Total 
OI 
48.56 3.45 40.04 59.18 19.14 7.11 
Disaggregated NCP % 
of Futures OI 
54.82 4.42 46.66 65.49 18.83 8.06 
Disaggregated NCP % 
of Total OI 
57.02 4.03 48.16 66.65 18.49 7.07 
CIT Sup NCP % of 
Total OI 
54.83 4.19 45.91 65.3 19.39 7.65 

















01/01/1986 01/01/1992 01/01/1995 01/01/1998 01/01/2001 01/01/2004 01/01/2007 01/01/2010 01/01/2013
Left Scale: Nearby Corn Futures Price
Right Scale: Corn Futures Total Open Interest (Contracts) Corn Futures and Options Total Open Interest (Contracts)
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Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Corn Futures Rolling CV (2) then (4))
























































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Corn Futures Rolling CV (2) then (4))





























2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Corn Futures Rolling CV (2) then (4)) from 2006
































01/01/2006 01/01/2008 01/01/2010 01/01/2012 01/01/2014
Left Scale: Nearby Corn Futures Price







































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Legacy Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation) Mean (Legacy Futures & Options  Non-Commercial (Other) Participation)
Right Scale: Mean (Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation) Mean (Disaggregated Futures & Options Non-Commercial (Other) Participation) Mean (CIT SUP Non-Commercial Participation)
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Appendix 12B: Wheat Nearby Futures Price and Open Interest (OI and TOI) 
 
 
   
Mean SD Min Max Range CV(%) 
Futures Price 442.50 176.22 227.00 1240.00 1013.00 39.83 
Futures OI 216,296 158,643 23,153 562,198 339,045 73.35 
Option OI 69,368 40,388 15,149 185,607 170,458 58.22 
Total OI 330,058 185,847 72,083 722,923 650.840 56.31 
Legacy NCP % of 
Futures OI  
52.78 7.79 37.43 79.13 41.70 14.76 
Legacy NCP % Total 
OI 
51.10 5.73 38.54 67.95 29.41 11.21 
Disaggregated NCP % 
of Futures OI 
70.43 4.80 57.61 79.64 22.03 6.81 
Disaggregated NCP % 
of Total OI 
69.85 4.37 58.44 78.87 20.43 6.26 
CIT Sup NCP % of 
Total OI 
66.44 4.50 55.90 75.32 19.42 6.75 






















01/01/1986 01/01/1992 01/01/1995 01/01/1998 01/01/2001 01/01/2004 01/01/2007 01/01/2010 01/01/2013
Left Scale: Nearby Wheat Futures Price
Right Scale: Wheat Futures Open Interest (Contracts) Wheat Futures and Options Total Open Interest (Contracts)
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Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Wheat Futures Rolling CV (2) then (4))


























































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Wheat Futures Rolling CV (2) then (4))



























2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Left Scale: Mean (Nearby Wheat Futures Rolling CV (2) then (4)) from 2006





























01/01/2006 01/01/2008 01/01/2010 01/01/2012 01/01/2014
Left Scale: Nearby Wheat Futures Price











































































































































Left Scale: Mean (Legacy Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation) Mean (Legacy Futures & Options Non-Commercial (Other) Participation)
Right Scale: Mean (Disaggregated Futures Onlly Non-Commercial (Other) Participation) Mean (Disaggregated Futures & Options Non-Commerical (Other) Participation) Mean (CIT Sup Commercial Participation)
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Left Scale: Mean (Futures Only Open Interest as % of USA Supply) Mean (Futures & Options Open Interest  as % of USA Supply)
Right Scale: Mean (Futures Only Open Interest as % of World Supply) Mean (Futures & Options Open Interest  as % of World Supply)
General Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 





30 0.06 +5201 0.18 30 0.81 +1817 0.00 
Data Futures 
OI 





21 0.01 +1968 0.76 21 0.55 +2186 0.00 
Data Total 
OI 
1071 0.01 +2937 0.00 1071 0.47 +2249 0.00 
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Legacy Futs NCP / USA Supply
Legacy Futs NCP / World Supply
Legacy Total NCP / USA Supply
Legacy Total NCP / World Supply
Diaggregated Futs NCP / USA Supply
Disaggregated Futs NCP / World Supply
Disaggregated Total NCP / USA Supply
Disaggregated Total NCP / World Supply
Data Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
USA Supply World Supply 
Legacy Futures 
NCP 
1361 0.07 -0.00 0.00 1361 0.01 -0.00 0.01 
Legacy Total 
NCP 















509 0.02 +0.00 0.00 509 0.08 +0.00 0.00 
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Left Scale: Mean (Futures Only Open Interest as % of USA Supply) Mean (Futures & Options Open Interest as % of USA Supply)
Right Scale: Mean (Futures Only Open Interest as % of World Supply) Mean (Futures & Options Open Interest as % of World Supply)
General Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 





30 0.68 +11,616 0.00 30 0.90 +2291 0.00 
Data Futures 
OI 





21 0.58 +21,222 0.00 21 0.87 +3661 0.00 
Data Total 
OI 
1072 0.45 +18,744 0.00 1072 0.79 +3655 0.00 
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Legacy Futs NCP % of USA Supply
Legacy Futs NCP % of World Supply
Legacy Total NCP % of USA Supply
Legacy Total NCP % of World Supply
Diaggregated Futs NCP % of USA Supply
Disaggregated Futs NCP % of World Supply
Disaggregated Total NCP % of USA Supply
Disaggregated Total NCP % of World Supply
Data Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
USA Supply World Supply 
Legacy Futures 
NCP 
1362 0.46 -0.00 0.00 1362 0.60 -0.00 0.00 
Legacy Total 
NCP 















509 0.05 -0.00 0.00 509 0.03 -0.00 0.00 
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Left Scale: Mean (Futures Only Open Interest as % of USA Supply) Mean (Futures & Options Open Interest as % of USA Supply)
Right Scale: Mean (Futures Only Open Interest as % of World Supply) Mean (Futures & Options Open Interest as % of World Supply)
General Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
USA Supply World Supply 
Data Futures 
OI 
1362 0.66 +7467 0.00 1362 0.79 +2300 0.00 
USA Supply World Supply 
Data Total 
OI 
1072 0.63 10,864 0.00 1072 0.69 +3310 0.00 
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Legacy Futs NCP % of USA Supply
Legacy Futs NCP % of World Supply
Legacy Total NCP % of USA Supply
Legacy Total NCP % of World Supply
Diaggregated Futs NCP % of USA Supply
Disaggregated Futs NCP % of World Supply
Disaggregated Total NCP % of USA Supply
Disaggregated Total NCP % of World Supply
Data Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
USA Supply World Supply 
Legacy Futures 
NCP 
1362 0.19 -0.00 0.00 1362 0.12 -0.00 0.00 
Legacy Total 
NCP 















509 0.09 +0.00 0.00 509 0.40 0.00 0.00 
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1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015
Left Scale: Mean (Futures Only Open Interest as % of USA Supply) Mean (Futures & Options Open Interest as % of USA Supply)
Right Scale: Mean (Futures Only Open Interest as % of World Supply) Mean (Futures & Options Open Interest as % of World Supply)
General Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
USA Supply World Supply 
Data Futures 
OI 
1362 0.09 -5299 0.00 1362 0.68 +1679 0.00 
USA Supply World Supply 
Data Total 
OI 
1071 0.01 -2189 0.01 1071 0.61 +1933 0.00 
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Legacy Futs NCP % of  USA Supply
Legacy Futs NCP % of World Supply
Legacy Total NCP % of USA Supply
Legacy Total NCP % of World Supply
Diaggregated Futs NCP % of USA Supply
Disaggregated Futs NCP % of World Supply
Disaggregated Total NCP % of USA Supply
Disaggregated Total NCP % of World Supply
Data Obs R2 Est P-value Obs R2 Est P-value 
USA Supply World Supply 
Legacy Futures 
NCP 
1362 0.14 +0.00 0.00 1362 0.14 +0.00 0.00 
Legacy Total 
NCP 















509 0.02 +0.00 0.00 509 0.26 +0.00 0.00 
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Appendix 17A: Cotton Econometric Model A – Summary 
 
 
Appendix 17B: Cotton Economic Model A – Autoregression 
 
 
Cotton Response Price CV(3) AR (1,2,3,9) 
*** α < 0.01, ** α < 0.05, * α < 0.10 
WITH 7/86-8/86 transition WITHOUT 7/86-8/86 transition 
Obs R2 Ind Var  Period 
P-value 
Obs R2 Ind Var  Period  
P-value 
CV(3) AR 495 0.39 486 0.36 
CV(3) AR + Regulatory Period 495 0.39 0.52 477 0.38 0.02 
-C*,+E* 
CV(3) AR + Economic CV(3) + Period 418 0.41 USA** 0.52 409 0.40 USA*** 0.01 
-C**,+E**,+F* 
CV(3) AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP 
(COT Legacy Futs Only) CV(3) + 
Period 
355 0.39 USA** 
NCP* 




CV(3) AR + Econ CV(3) + NCP (Legacy 
Futs&Opts) CV(3) + Period 








CV(3) AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP 
(Disaggregate Futs Only) CV(3) + 
Period 
110 0.44 USA*** 
NCP*** 
0.82 110 0.44 USA*** 
NCP*** 
0.82 
CV(3) AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP 
(Disaggregate Futs&Opts) CV(3) + 
Period 
110 0.43 USA*** 
NCP** 
0.74 110 0.43 USA*** 
NCP** 
0.74 
CV(3) AR + Economic CV(3) + CIT SUP 
CV(3) + Period 
115 0.43 USA*** 
CIT* 
0.98 115 0.43 USA*** 
CIT* 
0.98 
Response Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) w/out 86 transition
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition














Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response






























Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition



























Appendix 17C: Cotton Econometric Model A – … + Regulatory Period 
 
 
Appendix 17D: Cotton Econometric Model A – … + Economic 
  
Response Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) w/out 86 transition
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition

















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition























































Response Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) w/out 86 transition
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Regulatory Period




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)



























































Appendix 17E: Cotton Econometric Model A – … + NCP Legacy Futures Only 
 
 




Response Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) w/out 86 transition
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Cotton Legacy Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation CV(3)
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Regulatory Period






















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)

























































Response Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) w/out 86 transition
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton Legacy Futures & Options  Non-Commercial (Other) Participation CV(3)
Regulatory Period






















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)





















































Appendix 17G: Cotton Econometric Model A – … + NCP Disaggregate Futures Only 
  
Appendix 17H: Cotton Econometric Model A – … + NCP Disaggregate Futs & Opts 
   
Response Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) w/out 86 transition
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Cotton Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation CV(3)
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)















































Response Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) w/out 86 transition
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton Disaggregated Futures & Options Non-Commercial (Other) Participation CV(3)























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
















































Appendix 17I: Cotton Econometric Model A – … + NCP CIT Supplement 
 
  
Response Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) w/out 86 transition
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton CIT SUP Non-Commercial Participation CV(3)























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(2) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(3) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Lag(9) Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price CV(3) AR(1,2,3,9) w/out 86 transition
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
















































Appendix 18A: Cotton Econometric Model B – Summary 
 
 




Cotton Response Log Price AR (1,5,10,12) 
*** α < 0.01, ** α < 0.05, * α < 0.10 
AR(1,5 )2 Residuals + IV + Period 




Log AR2(1,5) 489 0.01 
Log AR2(1,5) + Regulatory Period 489 0.05 0.00 
-B***,-C*+F*** 
Log AR2(1,5) + Economic + Period 420 0.06 -World* 0.00 
-B*,-C*+F*** 
Log AR2(1,5) + Economic + NCP (Legacy FutsOnly) + 
Period 
357 0.05 -World* 0.01 
-C**,-D**,+F*** 
Log AR2(1,5) + Economic + NCP (Legacy Futs&Opts) + 
Period 
247 0.08 -World*** 0.00 
-D***,+F*** 
Log AR2(1,5) + Economic + NCP (Disaggregate 
FutsOnly) + Period 
112 0.11 -World*** 0.01 
-E**,+F** 
Log AR2(1,5) + Economic + NCP (Disaggregate 
Futs&Opts) + Period 
112 0.11 -World*** 0.01 
-E**,+F** 
Log AR2(1,5) + Economic + CIT SUP + Period 117 0.11 -World** 0.00 
-E***,+F*** 
Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Effect Summary
Source
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))










Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response






























Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))


















Appendix 18C: Cotton Econometric Model B – … + Regulatory Period 
 
 








Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))












Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))














































Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio



















































Appendix 18E: Cotton Econometric Model B – … + NCP Legacy Futures Only 
 
 








Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Cotton Legacy Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio





















































Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio













































Appendix 18G: Cotton Econometric Model B – … + NCP Disaggregate Futures Only 
 
 




Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Effect Summary
Source
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Regulatory Period
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Cotton Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio







































Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Effect Summary
Source
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Regulatory Period
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Cotton Disaggregated Futures & Options Non-Commercial (Other) Participation


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
















































Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Log (Lag(1) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Log (Lag(5) Squared Residual Month End Nearby Cotton Futures Settle Price AR(1,5,10,12))
Cotton USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Cotton USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio








































Appendix 19A: Soybean Econometric Model A – Summary 
 
 




Soybean Response Price CV(3) AR (1,2,3) 
*** α < 0.01, ** α < 0.05, * α < 0.10 
Obs R2 Ind Var Period  
P-value 
AR 500 0.39 
AR + Period 500 0.41 0.01 
+A***,-C***,-D*** 




AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (COT Legacy Futs 
Only) CV(3) + Period 
355 0.44 0.05 
+E** 
AR + Econ CV(3) + NCP (Legacy Futs&Opts) CV(3) 
+ Period 
245 0.38 0.31 
AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (Disaggregate Futs 
Only) CV(3) + Period 
110 0.44 0.06 
+E*,-F* 
AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (Disaggregate 
Futs&Opts) CV(3) + Period 
110 0.44 0.05 
+E*,+F* 
AR + Economic CV(3) + CIT SUP CV(3) + Period 115 0.46 0.16 
Response Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)












Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response






























Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)






















Appendix 19C: Soybean Econometric Model A – … + Regulatory Period 
 
 




Response Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Regulatory Period














Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)



















































Response Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Regulatory Period


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)























































Appendix 19E: Soybean Econometric Model A – … + NCP Legacy Futs Only 
 
 




Response Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Regulatory Period
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)





















































Response Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Regulatory Period
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)

















































Appendix 19G: Soybean Econometric Model A – … + NCP Disaggregate Futs Only 
  





Response Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Regulatory Period
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Soybean Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation Rolling CV(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(3)




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)











































Response Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Regulatory Period
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Soybean Disaggregated Futures & Options Non-Commercial (Other) Participation Rolling CV(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
















































Response Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Regulatory Period
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Soybean CIT SUP Non-Commerical Participation CV(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Soybean Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)












































Appendix 20A: Soybean Econometric Model B – Summary 
 
 




Soybean Response Log (Price (AR (1,3,4)) 
*** α < 0.01, ** α < 0.05, * α < 0.10 
Log(AR(1,2,9)2) Residuals + IV + Period 




Log(AR2(1,2,9)) 492 0.09 
Log(AR2(1,2,9)) + Regulatory Period 492 0.13 0.00 
+F*** 
Log(AR2(1,2,9)) + Economic + Period 420 0.18 -USA*** 0.39 
Log(AR2(1,2,9)) + Economic + NCP (Legacy FutsOnly) + 
Period 
357 0.20 -USA*** 0.98 
Log(AR2(1,2,9)) + Economic + NCP (Legacy Futs&Opts) 
+ Period 
247 0.14 -USA*** 
+World* 
0.75 
Log(AR2(1,2,9)) + Economic + NCP (Disaggregate 
FutsOnly) + Period 
112 0.06 0.91 
Log(AR2(1,2,9)) + Economic + NCP (Disaggregate 
Futs&Opts) + Period 
112 0.06 0.99 
Log(AR2(1,2,9)) + Economic + CIT SUP + Period 117 0.09 0.87 
Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))












Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response






























Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))






















Appendix 20C: Soybean Econometric Model B – … + Regulatory Period 
 
 








Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))



















































Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Regulatory Period


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(9) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio























































Appendix 20E: Soybean Econometric Model B – … + NCP Legacy Futs Only 
 
 




Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean Legacy Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation





















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(9) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio





















































Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean Legacy Futures & Optons Non-Commercial (Other) Participation
Regulatory Period




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(9) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio

















































Appendix 20G: Soybean Econometric Model B – … + NCP Disaggregate Futs Only 
 
 




Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(9) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))





















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(9) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio











































Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(9) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))





















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(9) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
















































Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Effect Summary
Source
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(9) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean CIT SUP Non-Commercial Participation
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))





















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Lag(9) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Soybean Futures Settle Price AR(1,3,4))
Soybean USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Soybean USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio












































Appendix 21A: Corn Econometric Model A – Summary 
 
 




Corn Response Price CV(3) AR (1,2,3,4,12) 
*** α < 0.01, ** α < 0.05, * α < 0.10 
Obs R2 Ind Var Period  
P-value 
AR 
AR + Period 491 0.37 0.11 
AR + Economic CV(3) + Period 372 0.38 -World* 
+USA* 
0.43 
AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (COT Legacy Futs 
Only) CV(3) + Period 
355 0.37 +USA* 0.50 
AR + Econ CV(3) + NCP (Legacy Futs&Opts) CV(3) 
+ Period 
245 0.36 +USA* 0.67 
AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (Disaggregate Futs 
Only) CV(3) + Period 
110 0.38 0.38 
AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (Disaggregate 
Futs&Opts) CV(3) + Period 
110 0.38 0.39 
AR + Economic CV(3) + CIT SUP CV(3) + Period 115 0.39 0.54 
Response Month End Nearby Corn Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response






























Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)






























Appendix 21C: Corn Econometric Model A – … + Regulatory Period 
 
 




Response Month End Nearby Corn Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)



















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)






















































Response Month End Nearby Corn Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)


























































Appendix 21E: Corn Econometric Model A – … + NCP Legacy Futs Only 
 
 




Response Month End Nearby Corn Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Regulatory Period
























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)





























































Response Month End Nearby Corn Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn Legacy Futures & Optons Non-Commercial (Other) Participation Rolling CV(3)

























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)

























































Appendix 21G: Corn Econometric Model A – … + NCP Disaggregate Futs Only 
 
 




Response Month End Nearby Corn Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Corn Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation Rolling CV(3)
Regulatory Period
























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)



















































Response Month End Nearby Corn Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Regulatory Period
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
























































Response Month End Nearby Corn Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn CIT SUP Non-Commerical Participation CV(3)
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Regulatory Period
























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(3)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(4)
Corn Futs CV(3) Lag(12)
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)




















































Appendix 22A: Corn Econometric Model B – Summary 
 
 




Corn Response Log (Price AR (1,2,4,10,12)) 
*** α < 0.01, ** α < 0.05, * α < 0.10 
Log (AR(1,2,10,12)2) Residuals + IV + Period 




Log(AR2(1,2,10,12)) 481 0.09 
Log(AR2(1,2,10,12)) + Regulatory Period 481 0.12 0.00 
-C**,+F*** 
Log(AR2(1,2,10,12)) + Economic + Period 374 0.15 0.04 
-C*,-D*,+F*** 
Log(AR2(1,2,10,12)) + Economic + NCP (Legacy 
FutsOnly) + Period 
357 0.16 -NCP** 0.07 
+F** 
Log(AR2(1,2,10,12)) + Economic + NCP (Legacy 
Futs&Opts) + Period 
246 0.18 -USA* 
-NCP* 
0.47 
Log(AR2(1,2,10,112)) + Economic + NCP (Disaggregate 
FutsOnly) + Period 
112 0.16 -USA** 0.17 
Log(AR2(1,2,10,12)) + Economic + NCP (Disaggregate 
Futs&Opts) + Period 









Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))














Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response






























Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))


























Appendix 22C: Corn Econometric Model B – … + Regulatory Period 
 
 








Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))


















































Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Regulatory Period
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(12) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(12) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio






















































Appendix 22E: Corn Econometric Model B – … + NCP Legacy Futs Only 
 
 




Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn Legacy Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Regulatory Period
Lag(12) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))






















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(12) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio

























































Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Corn Legacy Futures & Options  Non-Commercial (Other) Participation
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(12) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Regulatory Period






















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(12) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio





















































Appendix 22G: Corn Econometric Model B – … + NCP Disaggregate Futs Only 
 
 




Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Effect Summary
Source
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Regulatory Period
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))






















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(12) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio















































Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Effect Summary
Source
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Regulatory Period
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(12) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn Disaggregated Futures & Options Non-Commercial (Other) Participation






















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(12) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio





















































Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Effect Summary
Source
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Regulatory Period
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(12) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))






















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(2) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(10) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Lag(12) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Corn  Futures Settle Price AR(1,2,4,10,12))
Corn USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Corn USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
















































Appendix 23A: Wheat Econometric Model A – Summary 
 
 




Wheat Response Price CV(3) AR (1,2,6) 
*** α < 0.01, ** α < 0.05, * α < 0.10 
Obs R2 Ind Var Period  
P-value 
AR 498 0.28 
AR + Period 498 0.31 0.00 
+A**,-C***-D** 
AR + Economic CV(3) + Period 418 0.30 0.02 
-C**,+E* 
AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (COT Legacy Futs 
Only) CV(3) + Period 
355 0.28 +NCP** 0.07 
-C**,+F* 
AR + Econ CV(3) + NCP (Legacy Futs&Opts) CV(3) 
+ Period 
245 0.27 0.42 
AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (Disaggregate Futs 
Only) CV(3) + Period 
110 0.33 +NCP*** 0.24 
AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (Disaggregate 
Futs&Opts) CV(3) + Period 
110 0.32 +NCP*** 
+World* 
0.32 
AR + Economic CV(3) + CIT SUP CV(3) + Period 115 0.32 +NCP** 0.47 
Response Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(6)












Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response






























Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)






















Appendix 23C: Wheat Econometric Model A – … + Regulatory Period 
 
 




Response Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)



















































Response Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Regulatory Period
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(6)
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(6)
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)























































Appendix 23E: Wheat Econometric Model A – … + NCP Legacy Futs Only 
 
 




Response Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Wheat Legacy Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation Rolling CV(3)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(6)
Regulatory Period
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(6)
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)





















































Response Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(6)
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Wheat Legacy Futures & Optons Non-Commercial (Other) Participation Rolling CV(3)
Regulatory Period




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(6)
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)

















































Appendix 23G: Wheat Econometric Model A – … + NCP Disaggregate Futs Only 
 
 




Response Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation Rolling CV(3)
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Regulatory Period




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(6)
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)











































Response Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Disaggregated Futures and Options Non-Commercial Participation Rolling CV(3)
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)





















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(6)
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
















































Response Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat CIT SUP Non-Commerical Participation CV(3)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(6)





















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Wheat Futs CV(3) Lag(6)
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)












































Appendix 24A: Wheat Econometric Model B – Summary 
 
 




Wheat Response Log (Price AR (1,5)) 
*** α < 0.01, ** α < 0.05, * α < 0.10 
Log (AR(1,5,6,13)2 Residuals + IV + Period 




Log(AR2(1,5,6,13)) 488 0.07 
Log(AR2(1,5,6,13)) + Regulatory Period 488 0.11 0.00 
-C***,+E***,+F*** 
Log(AR2(1,5,6,13)) + Economic + Period 420 0.13 -USA** 0.04 
-C** 
Log(AR2(1,5,6,13)) + Economic + NCP (Legacy 
FutsOnly) + Period 
357 0.13 -USA** 0.09 
-C*,+F* 
Log(AR2(1,5,6,13)) + Economic + NCP (Legacy 
Futs&Opts) + Period 
247 0.11 -USA** 0.76 
Log(AR2(1,5,6,13)) + Economic + NCP (Disaggregate 
FutsOnly) + Period 
112 0.08 -USA* 0.08 
+E*,+F* 
Log(AR2(1,5,6,13)) + Economic + NCP (Disaggregate 
Futs&Opts) + Period 
112 0.08 -USA* 0.09 
+E*,-F* 
Log(AR2(1,5,6,13)) + Economic + CIT SUP + Period 117 0.06 0.26 
Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))














Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response






























Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))


























Appendix 24C: Wheat Econometric Model B – … + Regulatory Period 
 
 








Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))






















































Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))




















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio



























































Appendix 24E: Wheat Econometric Model B – … + NCP Legacy Futs Only 
 
 




Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Regulatory Period
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat Legacy Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio






















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio

























































Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Effect Summary
Source
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat Legacy Futures & Optons Non-Commercial (Other) Participation
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio























Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio





















































Appendix 24G: Wheat Econometric Model B – … + NCP Disaggregate Futs Only 
 
 




Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Effect Summary
Source
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Regulatory Period
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))






















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio















































Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Effect Summary
Source
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Regulatory Period
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat Disaggregated Futures & Options Non-Commercial (Other) Participation
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))






















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
















































Appendix 24I: Wheat Econometric Model B – … + NCP CIT Supplement 
 
  
Response Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Effect Summary
Source
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Regulatory Period
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat CIT SUP Non-Commercial Participation






















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Lag(1) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(5) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(6) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Lag(13) Log (Squared Residual Month End Nearby Wheat Futures Settle Price AR(1,5))
Wheat USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio
Wheat USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio
















































Appendix 25A: Composite Econometric Model – Summary 
 
 




Composite Response Price CV(3) AR (1,2) 
*** α < 0.01, ** α < 0.05, * α < 0.10 
Obs R2 Ind Var Period  
P-value 
AR 501 0.42 
AR + Period 501 0.45 0.00 
+A***,-B*,-C***,-D*** 




AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (COT Legacy Futs Only) 
CV(3) + Period 




AR + Econ CV(3) + NCP (Legacy Futs&Opts) CV(3) + 
Period 




AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (Disaggregate Futs 
Only) CV(3) + Period 




AR + Economic CV(3) + NCP (Disaggregate 
Futs&Opts) CV(3) + Period 
110 0.46 +USA*** 0.09 
+E*,-F* 
AR + Economic CV(3) + CIT SUP CV(3) + Period 115 0.48 +USA*** 0.17 
Response Composite Month End Nearby Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)










Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response






























Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)


















Appendix 25C: Composite Econometric Model – … + Regulatory Period 
 
 




Response Composite Month End Nearby Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)













Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)















































Response Composite Month End Nearby Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Regulatory Period
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)














































Appendix 25E: Composite Econometric Model – … + NCP Legacy Futs Only 
 
 




Response Composite Month End Nearby Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Regulatory Period
Composite USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Composite USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)

















































Response Composite Month End Nearby Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Regulatory Period
Composite USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Composite USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)













































Appendix 25G: Composite Econometric Model – … + NCP Disaggregate Futs Only 
 
 




Response Composite Month End Nearby Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Composite Disaggregated Futures Only Non-Commercial (Other) Participation CV(3)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Regulatory Period


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Composite USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)







































Response Composite Month End Nearby Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Regulatory Period
Composite Disaggregated Futures & Options Non-Commercial (Other) Participation CV(3)


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Composite USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)








































Appendix 25I: Composite Econometric Model – … + NCP CIT Supplement 
   
Response Composite Month End Nearby Futures Settle Price CV(3)
Effect Summary
Source
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Composite CIT SUP Non-Commercial Participation CV(3)
Regulatory Period


















Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response




























Nominal factors expanded to all levels
Term
Intercept
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(1)
Composite Futs CV(3) Lag(2)
Composite USDA Current Season USA Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)
Composite USDA Current Season World Stocks to Use Ratio CV(3)








































Appendix 26: Chronology of Events surrounding the CFMA and Dodd-Frank  
 
Year  President, House, Senate control 
 
1880’s to Roughly 200 bills introduced in US Congress to regulate, ban, or tax 
1920’s  futures trading (Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
 
1922 Grain Futures Act of 1922 predecessor to CEA 1936 to criminalize 
manipulation and cornering of markets; first federal regulation (CFTC 
website). 
 
1933 Securities Act regulates original securities (stocks and bonds) in the 
primary market (CFTC website). 
 
1934 Glass Steagall Act separates commercial from investment banking and 
established the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation guaranteeing bank 
deposits (Hirsh, 2010, p. 158). 
Securities Exchange Act regulates the secondary market of securities 
(CFTC website). 
 
1936 Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) of 1936 enacted providing federal 
regulation of all commodities and futures trading activities and requires all 
commodity futures and options to be traded on organized exchanges 
(CEA, 1936). 
The Act speaks of the objective of eliminating excessive speculation that 
causes sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in 
commodity prices (Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
 
1944 Breton Woods Agreement calls for no fixed exchange rates opening the 
door for the creation of the IMM and later futures contracts for exchange 
rates in the early 1970’s (Leuthold, Junkus and Cordier, 1989). 
 
1974 R D D 
 Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Act of 1974 enacted to 
replace the Department of Agriculture’s Commodity Exchange Authority, 
as the independent federal agency responsible for regulating the futures 
trading industry (CFTCA, 1974). 
 CFTC authorized to establish position limits on non-commercial traders 
who are not bona-fide hedgers, i.e. those who are not commercial traders 
of the actual commodity (CFTC website). 
 Richard Nixon (R) president 
 
1975 R D D 
 Jimmy Carter (D) president  
CFTC approves first futures contract on financial instrument (CFTC 
website).  
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1981 R D R 
Ronald Reagan (R) president 
CFTC requires position limits on all commodity futures contracts (CFTC 
website).   
OTC swaps first introduced (CFTC website). 
 
1982    R D R 
 National Futures Association (NFA) founded as an independent self-
regulatory organization, overseer, and mediator of the commodities and 
futures industry in the United States (NFA website), a result of the Futures 
Trading Act of 1982. 
 
1986 R D R 
 Congress encourages the CFTC to consider expanding the criteria for 
providing exemptions on agricultural commodity position limits to include 
the need to hedge financial risks (US Senate, 2009: 74, 106 via Clapp and 
Helleiner, 2010). 
 
1987 R D D  
Oct         Stock market crash and stock-index futures at the center of debate as to 
who should regulate, the current CFTC, the SEC, or a newly formed 
merger (Cranford, February 6, 1988)? 
 
1988 R D D 
Feb Phil Gramm (R) argues against any “additional regulatory meddling in 
what is supposed to be a free market” during Senate Banking hearings 
(Cranford, February 6, 1988). 
 Dan Glickman (D) states that “the regulators who set margins on securities 
ought to set margins on the derivatives (of those securities)” (Cranford, 
February 6, 1988). 
 President Reagan (R) calls for 8 percent budget increase for the CFTC 
(CQ Weekly, February 20, 1988). 
Wendy Gramm (R) named CFTC Chairman (CFTC website). 
May Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan stops short of recommending 
intervention; but William Proxmire (D), chairman of Senate Banking 
Committee is a leading advocate of congressional action (Cranford, J., 
May 21, 1988). 
 SEC votes 3-2 to ask Congress to give it regulatory authority over stock-
index futures contracts that are regulated by the CFTC (Cranford, J., May 
28, 1988). 
Nov President Reagan (R) appoints Mary Schapiro to be a member of SEC; she 
is a former CFTC attorney and general counsel to the Futures Industry 
Association (CQ Weekly, November 26, 1988).   
 
1989  R D D 
Jan George H. W. Bush (R) president 
 	 279	
Aug Jerry Huckaby (D) withdraws amendment to HR2869 (reauthorization of 
the CFTC to increase margin levels due to magnitude of opposition 
lobbied by the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Cloud, August 5, 1989). 
Sep CFTC reauthorized by the House with a $40 mln budget for fiscal 1990 
and cracks down on certain trading abuses (Cloud, September 16, 1989). 
Oct Patrick Leahy (D) and Richard Lugar (R) of the Senate Agricultural 
Committee introduce legislation to toughen regulation on futures markets 
as well as to provide five-year re-authorization of the CFTC with a $41 
mln budget for fiscal 1990 (CQ Weekly, October 7, 1989). 
 
1990 R D D 
Jan Senate bill would permit CFTC to assess fees on the futures industry and 
use them to help fund the agency’s regulatory activities; the House bill 
does not (which is the way the politically powerful futures industry wants 
it) (CQ Weekly, January 6, 1990). 
Mar Turf battle between SEC and CFTC over regulation of stock-index futures 
heats up as Greenspan (one of four votes on White House working group 
on market regulation) said he favors transferring jurisdiction of stock-
index futures from the CFTC to SEC (Cranford, March 31, 1990). 
Apr Bill introduced in the House by Dan Glickman (D) and Dennis Eckart (D) 
that would merge the SEC and CFTC (CQ Weekly, April 7, 1990). 
Jul Senate debate over regulation of stock-index futures: NY-based stock 
markets and their regulator, SEC vs. Chicago-based commodity markets 
and their regulator, CFTC.  Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady (R) argues 
that stock-index futures should be placed under the control of the SEC; the 
nation’s agricultural community is on the other side (Cranford, July 14, 
1990). 
Aug Senate confirms Wendy Gramm (R) for five-year term as Chairman of the 
CFTC despite the agency coming under fire before and during her tenure 
as a weak regulator and opposes Treasury Secretary Brady that CFTC 
maintain control over stock-index futures (CQ Weekly, August 11, 1990). 
Dec Joseph Stiglitz paper warns of imperfection in markets and evidence of 
incompetency of banks (Hirsh, 2010, p, 105). 
 
1991 R D D 
Feb House Agriculture subcommittee votes against putting new restraints on 
the trading of stock-index futures contracts as the regulatory fight between 
the SEC and CFTC continues (Cranford, February 23, 1991). 
Mar House Agricultural Committee rejects a proposal to require that the CFTC 
regularly ensure that the margins are sufficient to protect the futures 
markets and public interest (Cranford, March 2, 1991). 
 House approves futures market regulation bill and Senate Agricultural 
Committee approved its version of the bill that introduces the Federal 
Reserve to regulate margins on stock-index futures contracts (Cranford, 
March 9, 1991). 
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Apr Senate approves compromise on regulation of stock-futures hybrids 
(swaps) via a mathematical formula for who should regulate, SEC or 
CFTC (Cranford, April 20, 1991). 
 Both House and Senate pass versions of multi-year authorization for 
CFTC but await House-Senate Conference committee to work out 
regulatory changes (Cranford, April 27, 1991). 
Oct First exemptions of futures position limits granted by CFTC (major bank 
and market participants) in response to request from Goldman Sachs that 
was developing the first commodity index swap (US Senate, 2009: 74, 107 
via Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
Dec Collapse of the Soviet Union ~ free market absolutism reigns over 
command economies (Hirsh, 2010, p. 24). 
 
1992 R D D 
Jan Gerald (Jerry) Corrigan of the Federal Reserve makes a speech to New 
York Bankers Association warning of off-balance sheet activities; OTC 
derivatives must be understood by traders, top management, and rocket 
scientists (Hirsh, 2010, p. 169).  Also points out “ there were more swaps 
than interest-rate deals to swap about.”  Later joins Goldman Sachs in 
1995, two years after leaving the Federal Reserve.  
Oct Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992 grants CFTC authority to exempt 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives (swaps and hybrids) from CFTC 
regulation (CFTC website, Hirsh, 2010), i.e. (under Wendy Gramm (R)) 
for the first time, the trading of OTC derivatives allowed without any 
oversight. 
 The Act also reauthorized the CFTC after a three-year effort inclusive of 
11-month conference negotiations between the House and Senate (CQ 
Weekly, October 31, 1992). 
 
1993  D D D 
Jan Bill Clinton (D) president and Democrats control all three branches of 
legislature. 
CFTC exempts certain swap agreements and hybrid instruments from 
regulation under the CEA (CFTC website). 
Before leaving, Wendy Gramm (R) exempts Enron from regulation in 
some trading of energy derivatives, then joined Enron’s board (Hirsh, 
2010).  
William Albrecht (R) acting CFTC Chairman (CFTC website). 
 
1994 D D D 
Jan President’s Working Group (PWG) on Financial Markets expands CFTC’s 
charter to encompass new developments in financial markets, including 
growth of OTC derivatives (CFTC website).   
Barbara Holum (R) acting Chairman CFTC (CFTC website). 
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May GAO report on the dangers posed by derivatives ~ the author James 
Bothwell “dumbfounded” by hearing Greenspan speaks out against margin 
requirements (Hirsh, 2010, p. 145). 
 GAO report stirs discussion in Congress.  Some Democrats (Evan Markey, 
Donald Riegle) look to draft a derivatives bill; but Republicans in House 
and Senate, along with Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bensten and a large 
group of Democrats lined up against any effort to interfere in the markets 
(Taylor, May 21, 1994).  
July House Banking Committee Chair, Jim Leach (R), accuses Mark Brickell 
of the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA) of making false 
statements (Hirsh, 2010, p. 181).  
Oct  Mary Schapiro (D) becomes CFTC Chairman (CFTC website). 
 
1995  D R R 
Jan  Republican majority in House and Senate 
Feb Newly appointed Treasury Secretary Rubin proposes Glass-Steagall to be 
dismantled (Hirsh, 2010, p. 182). 
Mar Derivatives Policy Group agrees to “Framework for Voluntary Oversight” 
(Hirsh, 2020, p. 181).   
Apr Heart of Asian Financial Crisis, Robert Rubin (D), Treasury Secretary; 
Larry Summers, Deputy Treasury Secretary; Alan Greenspan, Federal 
Reserve Chairman; Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman“…finance must be 
allowed to flow, markets should operate unencumbered and regulation 
kept at bay” (Hirsh, pp. 3-4, 2010). 
 Joseph Stiglitz speech warns about the dangers of too much certainty 
about free markets.  “Economies can suffer from too little regulation, just 
as they can suffer from too much of the wrong king of regulation” (Hirsh, 
2010, p. 197). 
 
1996 D R R 
Aug Brooksley Born (D) becomes CFTC Chairman (CFTC website), pro-OTC 
derivative regulation under CFTC (Born, 2001). 
Oct Born states that CFTC regulation of OTC derivatives should be limited to 
fraud and manipulation (Brush, 2013). 
Dec Greenspan’s warning against “irrational exuberance” (Hirsh, 2010, p. 
195). 
 
1997 D R R 
 
1998 D R R 
Apr PWG (Rubin, Born, Levitt, Greenspan) meet at office of Treasury; “Rubin 
stressed that Born should not release concept on derivative regulation as 
CFTC had no jurisdiction whatsoever over OTC swaps or options as it had 
granted exemptions from its own rules” (Hirsh, 2010, p 13). 
May CFTC issues concept release raising questions if OTC derivatives should 
be regulated (Born, 2001, Hirsh, 2010). 
 	 282	
Statement by Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan, Treasury Secretary 
Rubin / Deputy Treasury Secretary Summers, and SEC Chair Levitt 
expressing grave concerns about the release (Brush, 2013). 
Summers declares that it was “casting a shadow of regulatory uncertainty 
over an otherwise thriving market” (Hirsh, 2010).  
Jun Greenspan, Rubin, and Levitt publicly call on Congress to prevent CFTC 
from acting on OTC derivatives (Brush, 2013). 
July Senate Agriculture Committee hearing extracts promise from Born to 
cease efforts to regulate OTC derivatives and passes a law preventing the 
CFTC from changing its treatment of OTC derivatives through March 
1999 (Brush, 2013, Hirsh, 2010). 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan testifies before the Committee 
on Banking and Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives stating 
that the Federal Reserve Board supports a standstill of attempts by the 
CFTC to impose new regulations on OTC derivatives as a minimalist 
approach to the Federal Reserve Board’s longstanding concerns about 
CFTC assertions of authority in this area (Greenspan, 1998). 
Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers testifies before Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on the CFTC concept 
release, stating that the Treasury, Federal Reserve, and the SEC do not 
agree with the CFTC’s conclusion and do not view that swaps are not 
futures under the CEA (Summers, 1998). 
Sep Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) hedge fund crisis over high-
leverage bets on OTC derivatives (Brush, 2013). 
Oct  Born receives compliments from Senate Banking Committee regarding 
(May 1998) concept release (Brush, 2013). 
Dec   Senate Agricultural Committee hearing on LTCM matter (Brush, 2013). 
 
1999   D R R 
Mar  Corrigan, now of Goldman Sachs, oversees a report recommending 
enhanced regulatory reporting (on derivative positions) but Rubin, 
Greenspan, Summers, and other officials in Washington reject the idea 
(Hirsh, 2010, p. 196).  
Apr PWG on Financial Markets recommends that banks and brokerage houses 
maintain large cash reserves for protection against losses in trading 
derivatives, but stopped short of calling for more federal regulation 
(Greenblatt, May 15, 1999). 
May Lobbyists (such as Richard Grove, executive director of the swaps 
association) in the financial sector express sympathy for the futures 
industry that seeks less market regulation (losing market share to less-
regulated exchanges overseas) as the CFTC reauthorization occurs in 2000 
(Greenblatt, May 15, 1999). 
 Associate Director, Division of Research and Statistics of the Federal 
Reserve Board, Partrick Parkinson testifies before the Subcommittee on 
Risk Management, Research, and Specialty Crops, Committee of 
Agriculture, U.S. House of Representatives regarding the modernization 
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of the CEA (1936) and that OTC derivatives should be excluded from the 
Act (Parkinson, 1999). 
Jun  Brooksley Born resigns as CFTC chair over CFMA (3 of 4 commissioners 
support legislation that OTC derivatives not under CFTC jurisdiction) 
(Brush, 2013). 
 Ten years after Born’s proposal, the market in derivatives exploded from 
$27 trillion to more than $600 trillion, by comparison, the entire US 
economy was worth $14 trillion (Hirsh, 2010, p. 19). 
Oct GAO report does not recommend CFTC regulation of OTC derivatives 
(Brush, 2013). 
Nov President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (Treasury-Summers, 
FR-Greenspan, SEC-Levitt, CFTC-Rainer) release report recommending 
existing regulatory exemptions for OTC financial derivatives (Brush, 
2013). 
 Formal repeal of Glass Steagall by means of Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999, or Gramm-Leach-Baily Act (Hirsh, 2010, 
p.81).   
Larry Summers approves of Gramm-Leach-Baily (Hirsch, 2010, p. 199). 
Charles Schumer (D) applauds (but 12 years prior had warned against 
repeal by saying it would turn the banking system into a casino) (Hirsh, 
2010, p. 200). 
John Dingell warns on the House Floor of “too big to fail” and “taxpayers 
will be called upon to cure the failures” (Hirsh, 2010, p. 183).  
Joseph Stiglitz resigns from the World Bank (Hirsh, 2010, p. 199). 
William Rainer (R), cofounder of Greenwich Capital Markets (was later 
one of Wall Street’s biggest bundlers of subprime mortgage-backed 
securities) and old Clinton crony from Arkansas (Hirsh, 2010, p. 19), 
becomes CFTC Chairman (CFTC website). 
 
2000  D R R 
Feb President Clinton proposes to increase outlays for the CFTC by $7 mln to 
$71 mln and add about 60 full-time positions (CQ Weekly, February 12, 
2000). 
May Clinton administration introduces CFMA to House (Brush, 2013). 
Jun House and Senate panels take up bills to rewrite the nation’s commodities 
laws and overhaul the derivatives markets.  At a joint Senate Agriculture 
and Banking committee hearing, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan and Treasury Secretary Larry Summers urge lawmakers to pass 
a reauthorization bill that would prevent foreign markets from building a 
huge lead in single stock futures.  Representatives of the SEC and CFTC 
indicate that they still disagree on how to split jurisdiction over the 
contracts (Bettelheim, June 24, 2000). 
Jul House and Senate Agriculture Committees each move bills that would 
deregulate portions of the derivatives market and commodity futures 
exchanges, but lingering disagreements between the SEC and CFTC as 
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well as Phil Gramm (R) favoring limiting the SEC’s ability to claim 
jurisdiction over the OTC swaps market (Bettelheim, July 1, 2000). 
Aug Senate Agriculture Committee reports an amended version of CFMA 
(Brush, 2013). 
 The push to finish commodities law rewrite consists of multiple venues for 
debate and unusual lobbying tactics for the reauthorization of the CFTC 
because of the legislation to de-regulate derivatives.  Commodity and 
security exchanges donate heavily to campaigns directly and indirectly for 
both November congressional and presidential candidates.  A group of 
investment banks hire several lobbyists who usually represent growers and 
processors of sugar, corn, and other commodities to help press their case 
for regulatory relief before the House and Senate Agricultural committees 
(Bettleheim, August 12, 2000). 
Sep Three separate versions of the CFMA bill in the House (Brush, 2013). 
Oct Both Democrats and Republicans voice frustration.  House approves 
CFMA and President announces strong support (Brush, 2013) but Sen. 
Phil Gramm (R) insists that any legislation spell out more clearly the legal 
status of swaps as well as clarify rules on electronic derivatives trading 
(Bettelheim, October 28, 2000). 
Nov Sen. Phil Gramm (R) delays Senate approval of CFMA, warranting fewer 
restrictions (Gramm’s wife, Wendy Gramm (R), chairman of CFTC from 
1988 to 1993 when Enron received exemption from regulation in 
derivatives, she is later a board member of Enron) (Brush, 2013). 
Dec Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 enacted to officially 
ensure the deregulation of financial products known as OTC derivatives 
(includes excluded commodity, exempt commodities, CDS’s, swaps, and 
hybrid instruments ~ indexed securities) are not subject to regulation 
under the CEA as futures contracts (CFTC no functional regulation), i.e. 
explicitly prevented CFTC from regulating OTC derivatives (CFMA, 
2000).   
President’s Working Group hails as “important legislation” (Brush, 2013). 
 
2001  R R D 
Jan  President George W. Bush (R) president 
Oct  Enron collapses (Brush, 2013).  
 
2002  R R D 
Jan Congressional investigators ask questions about Enron and whether its 
trading of largely unregulated and complex commodity and derivatives 
instruments contributed to its demise (Perine, K, January 12, 2002). 
Feb Democrats call to revisit CFMA in light of Enron case, but challenging 
would be tough due to delayed implementation (Adams, February 2, 
2002). 
 President Bush (R) calls for $83 mln appropriation for CFTC (CQ 
Weekly, February 9, 2002). 
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Mar Senate Democrats (Dianne Feinstein and Maria Cantwell) to propose an 
amendment to CFMA but opposed by energy traders and banking 
associations along with Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and 
Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill (and soon SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt) 
who question the necessity to reopen the 2000 law (Adams, March 16, 
2002). 
Apr Faced with the pressures of a short legislative calendar and a raft of major 
pending legislation on agriculture, trade, and welfare, lawmakers (Senate 
Banking Chairman, Democrat Paul Sarbanes) appear to be accepting the 
argument made by financial services lobbyists that the Enron debacle is 
the work of creative liars and thieves, rather than a sign of deeper 
regulatory problems (Perine, April 6, 2002). 
 Dianne Feinstein (D) withdraws amendment to restore authority to the 
CFTC to regulate private trading of energy derivatives under pressure 
from energy companies (Bettelheim, April 13, 2002). 
 
2003  R R R 
Jan  Republicans control all three branches of legislature. 
 
2004  R R R 
 
2005 R R R 
Jul Reuben Jeffrey (D) becomes CFTC Chairman (CFTC website). 
Aug Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas annual conference in Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming.  Raghuam G. Rajan, chief economist of the IMF, presents a 
paper on possible dangers ahead for the financial system, i.e. banks taking 
on too much risk through leveraged proprietary trading (Hirsch, 2010, pp. 
235-236). 
Oct Jerry Corrigan of Goldman Sachs pushes a new set of industry rules that 
forbade passing on or novating trades without the explicit consent of the 
original counterparty (Hirsh, 2010, p. 245). 
 
2006 R R R 
Jul  Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson warns president Bush of market turmoil 
(Hirsh, 2010, p. 224).  
Sep Paul Singer (hedge fund manager), at a conference held by financial 
journalist James Grant, calls the subprime market a scam for the ages 
(Hirsh, 2010, p. 245). 
Nov Milton Friedman dies.  According to Larry Summers, “the most dominant 
figure in modern economics” (Hirsh, 2010, p. 240). 
 
2007 R D D 
Jan Democrat majority in House (split in Senate).   
CFTC reauthorization before Congress ~ issues up for debate include 
energy derivatives (Dugan, 2008). 
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Jul Two hedge funds backed by investment bank, Bear Stearns collapse after 
losing almost all their $1.6 bln value (Ives, March 17, 2008). 
Aug BNP Paribas stops investors from withdrawing money from three funds 
because it could not determine the market for their holdings (Hirsch, 2010, 
p. 249). 
Oct  Walter Lukken (R) acting CFTC Chairman (CFTC website). 
Nov CFTC proposes the creation of a risk management exemption where 
position limits would be waived for approved index funds (Clapp and 
Helleiner, 2010 via US Senate, 2009:109). 
Dec  Recession begins. 
 
2008 R D D 
Mar Bear Stearns receives loan from Federal Reserve (Brush, 2013). 
 PWG on Financial Markets, consisting of Treasury Secretary, Hank 
Paulson; Federal Reserve Chairman, Ben Bernanke; and the Chairmen of 
the SEC and CFTC, release a series of recommended regulatory changes 
regarding hedge funds (Ives, March 17, 2008). 
Apr CFTC holds roundtable discussion on agricultural markets (properly 
performing risk management function and price discovery) in light of 
eight years of financial and energy (many financial settlements regarding 
fraud) derivative growth (CFTC website).   
Food sector representatives urge for tighter regulation but are opposed by 
different strands of the financial industry (Clapp and Helleiner, 2010 via 
Stewart and Waldie, 2008). 
CFTC’s role as a de facto global regulator becomes apparent (Clapp and 
Helleiner, 2010). 
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson releases a sweeping proposal to 
transform the nation’s financial regulatory system.  A team of Treasury 
Department financial institution experts developed the plan.  Several 
leading Democrats (Barney Frank, Charles Schumer, and Christopher 
Dodd) praise the proposal as a good starting point for restructuring the 
regulatory apparatus (Rubin and Ives, April 7, 2008). 
May CFTC announces initiatives to increase transparency in energy markets 
(Dugan, 2008). 
Jun Michael Masters (hedge-fund manager) testifies before Congress 
regarding negative impact of speculation on oil prices, wins the ears of 
Democrats who release report in September (Dugan, 2008). 
 CFTC chief economist tells Congress that he found no evidence that price 
changes in the oil market were being driven by speculators and University 
of Maryland law professor and former CFTC attorney, Michael 
Greenberger warns that the central players in speculative oil trading 
operate offshore (outside CFTC jurisdiction) (Cranford, June 2, 2008). 
Pelosi (D) calls on President Bush to direct CFTC under emergency 
powers to curb excessive speculation in energy markets (Brush, 2013). 
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CFTC announces that it is withdrawing proposals to increase position 
limits on some agricultural futures as well as its November 2007 proposal 
for a risk management hedge exemption (Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
IMF price index of internationally traded food commodities up 56% from 
January 2007 (Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
FAO notes that futures prices for wheat in March 2008 were 60% beyond 
what could be explained by market fundamentals (Grant, 2008 via Clapp 
and Helleiner, 2010). 
CFTC convinces the London ICE Futures Europe exchange to accept 
position limits similar to those used on New York’s NYMEX exchange by 
means of a linked oil contract (Grant, 2008 via Clapp and Helleiner, 
2010). 
Jul CFTC Interagency Task Force on Commodity Markets Report account 
supply and demand factors best explain crude oil price increases (CFTC 
website). 
 Bernanke announces Regulation Z for tightening mortgage lending (Hirsh, 
2010, pp. 261-262). 
Sep Lehman Brothers bankruptcy (Brush, 2013).   
AIG failure due to OTC derivatives (Brush, 2013). 
CFTC staff report recommends a new classification for swap dealers and 
called for a review of the exemptions they had from position limits (Clapp 
and Helleiner, 2010). 
SEC, FR, and CFTC seek Congressional approval for OTC derivative 
clearinghouse (Protess, 2011). 
Oct Paul Reinhart Inc. (international cotton merchant) files for bankruptcy 
protection (Carter and Janzen, 2009). 
 TARP: direct capital injections by the government into the economy, 
market failure recognized in Washington; the government had to correct 
(Hirsch, 2010, p. 262). 
Nov Weil Brothers Cotton Ltd. (international cotton merchant) to cease cotton 
operations (Carter and Janzen, 2009).   
IMF price index of internationally traded food commodities down 50% 
from June 2008 (Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
With Democrat control soon to cover all three branches of government, 
Democrats are likely to push for tighter controls over risk-taking in the 
markets, and greater oversight of exotic financial products where free-
market advocates, including many Republicans, may resist some of those 
changes (CQ Weekly, November 10, 2008). 
Dec European Commission announces intention to examine the possibility of 
taking regulatory initiatives stressing the need to examine policy options 
in close contact with other non-EU regulatory authorities (in particular the 
US where the most important exchanges are located) (European 





2009 D D D 
Jan Barack Obama (D) president 
Democratic majority in House and Senate.   
CFTC approves NASDAQ OMX Inc. as clearinghouse for OTC 
derivatives (CFTC website). 
Mar CFTC announces formation of the Subcommittee on Convergence in 
Agricultural Futures Markets (CFTC website). 
Apr International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) fights to keep 
OTC derivatives unregulated but opposed by TS Geitner who favors a 
central clearinghouse for OTC’s (Brush, 2013). 
May President Obama (D) appoints Gary Gensler (D) CFTC chairman (CFTC 
website).   
Brooksley Born receives JFK Profiles in Courage Award (Brush, 2013). 
Jun Recession ends.   
Bank of International Settlements place derivative market near $604 
trillion (Accounts Outstanding of OTC Derivatives, 2010). 
Jul General Counsel for the CFTC, Dan Berkovitz, testimony on position 
limits and the hedge exemption (Berkovitz, 2009). 
Aug  CFTC eliminates the two exemptions for position limits relating to 
soybeans, corn, and wheat that it had granted Deutsche Bank and Gresham 
back in 2006, marking the first time that exemptions had been revoked 
(Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
Dunavant Enterprises (international cotton merchant) to merge with 
Allenberg Cotton Co. (Carter and Janzen, 2009). 
CFTC hearings on position limits and limiting excess speculation, CFTC 
Chair Gary Gensler for position limits (Acworth, 2009).   
Treasury Department sends Congress draft legislation (OTC Derivatives 
Market Act of 2009) to implement proposal to amend CFMA (Clapp and 
Helleiner, 2010). 
Sep OTC derivatives begin clearing through NASDAQ OMX (CFTC website).   
Office of Comptroller of the Currency reports five U.S. banks hold 97% of 
all U.S. bank derivative positions in terms of notional value ($204 trillion) 
and 88% of the total net credit risk exposure in event of default (OCC, 
2009). 
International Organization of Securities Dealers’ initiatives of task force 
report on greater transparency of commodity derivatives endorsed by G20 
leaders at Pittsburgh summit (Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
Hank Paulson’s March 2008 overhaul of the financial system is taking 
shape under the auspices of the Obama administration (Mattingly, April 
20, 2009). 
Oct Financial industry lobbying effort to maintain regulatory exceptions for 
OTC derivatives (Brush, 2013). 
 European Commission signals its willingness to follow the specifics of the 
US regulatory approach, stating that it intends to propose rules to give 
regulators the possibility to set position limits to counter disproportionate 
price movements or concentrations of speculative positions and that it 
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foresaw the introduction of more complete transaction and position 
reporting to financial regulators of derivative trading activity (European 
Commission, 2009: 9 via Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
Dec House revision of Treasury Department proposal to amend CFMA (early 
form of Dodd-Frank) (Brush, 2013). 
 
2010 D D D 
Jan CFTC Staff Report on Cotton Futures and Option Market Activity during 
the Week of March 3, 2008 does not find any manipulation of futures 
price activity (CFTC Staff Report, 2010).   
CFTC Chairman Gensler addresses bank executives in NY and expresses 
his views on regulation and warns of exemption dangers (Brush, 2013).  
CFTC votes to set position limits for energy futures (Clapp and Helleiner, 
2010). 
EU commissioner for financial services regulation, Michel Bernier, states 
“speculation in basic foodstuffs is a scandal when there are a billion 
starving people in the world (Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
Commodity Markets Oversight Coalition (created in 2007) allies with 
Americans for Financial Reform (coalition of 250 consumer, civil rights, 
investor, retiree, community, labor, religious, and business groups) and 
issues a joint statement of shared principles covering their commitment to 
issues such as aggregate position limits, mandatory exchange trading and 
clearing for standardized derivatives, greater international harmonization 
and the regulation of activity on foreign boards of trade that allow US 
access or that trade derivatives on commodities destined for delivery in the 
United States (CMOC and AFR, 2010 via Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
Feb Gensler column in Financial Times, “How to Stop Another Derivatives 
Inferno” (Brush, 2013). 
Mar Senator Christopher Dodd (D) financial services legislation releases 
financial regulation overhaul that proposes Financial Stability Oversight 
Council and the SEC and CFTC would have joint authority to regulate 
OTC derivatives (CQ Weekly, March 22, 2020). 
 Dodd’s bill has no support from Republicans and the financial industry 
has more than 900 members of the American Bankers Association swarm 
Capitol Hill (Sloan, March 22, 2010). 
Apr CFTC begins to address energy speculation and position limits by 
financial institutions (Brush, 2013). 
June Gensler in late night sessions with House and Senate lawmakers pressing 
for Dodd-Frank (Brush, 2013). 
Jul Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
enacted, along with other financial market regulatory reforms, requiring 
the CFTC to limit the amount of futures contracts (position limits) that a 
single trader or firm can hold on a commodity.  Specifically (Dodd-Frank, 
2010; Clapp and Helleiner, 2010 via US House of Representatives, 2010: 
354) (italics denotes direct effect on agricultural commodity markets): 
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• Provisions brought OTC markets under government regulatory control 
for the first time, mandating most OTC swaps to be cleared through 
central clearing houses and traded on exchanges. 
• Regulators given the authority to impose capital and margin 
requirements on swap dealers and major swap participants and also to 
collect aggregate information on all swaps and publicly report 
aggregate data at regular intervals. 
• Banks required to spin off their agricultural swap activities to 
separately capitalized affiliates that would no longer be backed by 
federal deposit insurance or have access to the Federal Reserve’s 
discount window. 
• Mandated regulators to impose position limits that are aggregated for 
the total position of institutions (including dealer banks) across all 
markets, including foreign markets and OTC swaps that perform or 
affect a significant price discovery function with respect to registered 
entities.  
• Encouraged the CFTC to press foreign boards of trade to establish 
comparable position limits in the same commodity as those in the US 
and to coordinate with foreign regulators to develop international 
standards concerning the regulation of swaps and commodity futures.  
• Prohibited foreign boards of trade from providing US participants with 
direct access to their trade systems for linked contracts unless these 
boards shared information with US authorities and abided by standards 
that are comparable to those in the US in areas such as adopting 
position limits, making trading information public, and addressing 
price manipulation and excessive speculation.  
16 cocoa processing and trading firms sign letter to the London futures 
exchange threatening to move their hedging business to New York if US-
style position limits are not introduced to stem market manipulation 
(Farchy, 2010 via Clapp and Helleiner, 2010). 
 
2011 D R D 
Jan Republican majority in House and Democrat majority in Senate.   
After months of deliberations, CFTC proposes position limits on 
speculative trading in 28 commodities (2 Democrats for, 2 Republicans 
against) (Protess, 2011). 
Apr Democrats staved off GOP efforts to cut funding for SEC and CFTC 
(Weyl, April 18, 2011). 
Jun  G20 Summit commitment to re-introduce position limits for agricultural 
commodities (Livingston, 2012). 
Oct CFTC Commissioners vote 3-2 to approve new position limit rules 
(Peterson, 2012). 
 CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler announces that a delay for dozens of rules 
to go in effect in July would be necessary until the end of the year because 
the CFTC and the SEC are having trouble deciding just whom the rule will 
apply to and under what circumstances (Weyl, October 24, 2011). 
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Nov CFTC publishes new position limits on 28 physical commodities 
(Peterson, 2012). 
 GOP introduces House bills to modify Dodd-Frank (Carter, November 21, 
2011). 
Dec House Financial Services Committee approves three measures that would 
change provisions in Dodd-Frank concerning regulation of derivatives 
(Carter, December 5, 2011). 
 CFTC receives $205 mln appropriation (Weyl, December 22, 2011).  
 
2012 D R D 
Jan House Republican bills to delay or restructure Dodd-Frank did not 
advance in the Senate; almost all Republicans opposed the regulatory 
overhaul and many called for its full repeal (Weyl, January 9, 2012). 
 House Agriculture Committee approved without dissent three bills 
designed to ease new derivative regulations, although Democrats 
questioned the wisdom of doing so before Dodd-Frank is in full effect 
(Gardner, January 30, 2012). 
May January 11 new law for position limits still not in place due to gridlock 
between SEC and CFTC as well as legislative battles.  The agencies are 
burdened with implementing other parts of Dodd-Frank, understaffed, and 
underfunded (Weyl, May 28, 2012). 
Jun Obama administration proposes $308 mln appropriation for CFTC but 
House Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee bill proposes $180 mln, 
a 12% cut from current spending when CFTC staff is just 10% larger than 
it was during the peak in the 1990’s despite an expanded mandate (Bade, 
June 11, 2012). 
Sep Judge Robert L. Wilkins (D), US District Court for D.C. rules that the 
CFTC has overstepped its authority with its new system of position limits 
on 28 physical commodities, in favor of International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) and Securities Industry and Financial 
Markets Association (SIFMA); CFTC appeals the ruling (Peterson, 2012). 
Commissioner Mark Wetjen (aide to Democrat Harry Reid) expresses 
disappointment in court ruling, given a Congressional mandate on Dodd-
Frank (Wetjen, 2013). 
Nov CFTC issues new rules to require certain swaps to be cleared by 
derivatives clearing organizations (DCO's) (CFTC website). 
 
2013 D R D 
Feb Coalition Ltd. Report states 10 largest Wall Street firms made $6 bln in 
commodity-based revenue in 2012 (Brush, 2013). 
Mar House Agriculture Committee approves seven bills that would modify 
derivative regulations under Dodd-Frank but Senate Democrats have 
shown little willingness to open the Dodd-Frank law even to minor 
changes (Carter, March 25, 2013). 
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May House Financial Services Committee approves a bill to repeal the 
requirement in Dodd-Frank for financial institutions to separate their 
swaps trading operations (Carter and Ackley, May 13, 2013). 
Jun The House passes several bills that individually would make relatively 
small changes in Dodd-Frank that governs financial swaps and derivative 
transactions; the bill faces criticism from Democrats and the Obama 
administration believes regulators should be given the time necessary to 
complete implementation (Carter, June 17, 2013).  
Jul CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler reasserts at a Senate hearing that CFTC has 
legal authority to pursue manipulation of commodity markets (Brush, 
2013). 
Aug CFTC Commissioner Bart Chilton (D) states he does not want banks 
trading commodities.   
Coalition Ltd reports commodity revenue of 10 largest banks falls 25% in 
first half of 2013 (Brush, 2013). 
Nov CFTC proposes new rule (modification to part 150 of the Commision’s 
regulations) setting position limits for 28 physical futures and option 
contracts (CFTC website).   
Commissioner Bart Chilton (D) expresses gratification and Scott O’Mailia 
(aide to Senate Republican) expresses disappointment (CFTC website).   
Rumors begin to circulate of China selling from is stockpile cotton reserve 
(McFerron, Javier, and Perez, 2013). 
 
2014 D R D 
Jan Gary Gensler (D) resigns as Chairman of the CFTC (CFTC website). 
The measures passed by the Republican House to undo parts of Dodd-
Frank unlikely to go further as Senate’s Democratic majority oppose them 
(Weyl, January 6, 2014). 
Jun President Obama (D) appoints Timothy Massad (D) as CFTC Chairman 
(CFTC website). 
 
2015 D R R 
Jan House Republicans try to tweak financial rules during first week of the 
new Republican controlled Congress, passes House, no action in Senate, 
and President threatens veto (Hopkins, 2015). 
Jun CFTC Chairman Massad (D) announces a proposal that would force US 
banks’ overseas operations to comply with one slice of American swaps 
rules – setting aside collateral when trading in a category of swaps 
(Levinson, 2015). 
Jul Dodd-Frank five years old.  Financial services industry has spent hundreds 
of millions of dollars lobbying against Dodd-Frank over the past five 
years, but it is unlikely to be repealed.  Out of the nearly 400 rules to come 
form the law, only about 60% have been finalized (Cahlink, July 20, 
2015). 
Sep CFTC proposes a revision to its proposed modification to the aggregation 
provisions of part 150 (of the Commission’s regulations, November 15, 
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2013) which addresses when aggregation is required on the basis of 
ownership of a greater than 50 percent interest in another entity (Federal 
Register, September 29, 2015). 
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Appendix 27: New Participants – Accounting for Swap Dealers and Index Funds 
Most of the increased participation in commodity futures and option markets over 
the past few years has been attributed to OTC swap dealers and managed money.  A swap 
dealer is an entity, such as a bank or investment bank, that markets swaps to end users, 
managed funds, or proprietary trades the instruments itself.  Swap dealers often manage 
the risk associated with their net swap positions by trading in the futures market.  A swap 
is a matched purchase and sale of a financial instrument for different delivery dates.  The 
two legs of a swap correspond to an unhedged forward transaction and are designed to 
match a previously contracted forward sale and purchase.  Swaps can be used to hedge or 
speculate in financial markets.  An OTC contract is a standardized or customized forward 
contract that is bought and sold outside of an organized exchange; the most common 
being swaps. 
Managed funds consist of (1) managed money funds that buy and sell financial 
instruments via trading and (2) index funds that buy and hold financial instruments via 
investing.  The two most common managed money funds are hedge funds and 
commodity funds.  A hedge fund is a private investment pool that employs sophisticated 
investment techniques in both asset and derivative markets.  Hedge fund is a misleading 
term because they do not necessarily hedge.  Hedge funds pool investors’ money and 
make extensive use of leverage (purchases assets or derivatives with borrowed money on 
margin).  Hedge funds under $100 mln in assets are not required to register under federal 
securities law with the SEC.  Previous freedom from regulation and not being open to the 
public has given hedge funds extensive latitude in investment strategies.  A commodity 
fund (pool) is a managed speculative futures fund, similar to a mutual fund, in a security 
or commodity market.  Commodity funds were very popular in the 1970’s and 1980’s 
prior to the advent of hedge funds and index funds. 
Index funds seek commodity exposure as another asset class.  The assets of an 
index fund are invested in financial instruments based on or linked to a (commodity) 
price index.  Index funds are usually an unleveraged strategy as they buy exposure and 
maintain the “long” position by  “rolling” from one quarter to the next.  They are 
considered a “passive investment” because they buy and hold on a long-term basis versus 
trade (buy and sell) on a short-term basis.   In June 2008, of the total net notional value of 
managed funds invested in commodity indexes, 24% was held by index funds, 42% by 
institutional investors, 9% by sovereign wealth funds, and 25% by other traders (Bennett, 
2010; CFTC industry survey 2007/2008). 
In June 2008, the total OTC and on-exchange index investment activity notional 
value as a percentage of the total notional value of all futures and options open contracts 
for the 33 U.S. ET markets that are included in major commodity indexes was as follows 
(Bennett, 2010; CFTC industry survey 2007/2008): 
 
Index Investment  US ET Markets 
(billion)  (billion) 
US Exchanges only  $161 (100%) 17% of $945 
NYMEX crude oil  $51 (32%)  13% of $405 
CBOT wheat futures  $9  (6%)  47% of $19 
CBOT corn futures  $13 (7%)  18% of $74 
ICE cotton futures  $3 (2%)  23% of $13 
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In June 2008, the percent of total long positions held by index traders was ICE 
cotton 27%, CBOT soybeans  28%, CBOT wheat 47%, and CBOT corn 22% (Bennett, 
2010; GAO analysis of CFTC data from CFTC industry survey 2007/2008). 
By July 2009, index funds as a percentage of the major U.S. current crops was 
broken down as follows: 196% of soft red crop (CBOT contract), 22% of soybean crop 
(CBOT contract), and 13% of corn crop (CBOT contract) (U.S. Senate Hearing, 111-155, 
2009).  For the CBOT wheat contract, index funds comprised 56% of total open interest.  
(There are three U.S. wheat futures markets: Kansas City, Minneapolis, and Chicago; 
Chicago is the global benchmark and thus attracts the most participants.) 
The vast majority of commodity index trading by principals is conducted off-
exchange using swap contracts.  As a result of the growth in the swap market and the 
dealers who support the market, there has been an associated growth in the open interest 
of the futures markets related to commodities for which swaps are offered, as these swap 
dealers attempt to lay off the residual risk of their swap book (Bennett, 2010, p. 67).  
Managed funds generally use swaps over futures; thus swap dealers are major 
participants in futures markets (on behalf of their clients). The International Swaps & 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) and Securities Industry & Financial Markets Association 
(SIFMA) represent the swaps industry.  Both organizations lobby for swap dealers and 
are funded by major Wall Street banks.  ISDA and SIFMA have led the fight against 
regulation of swaps industry and are each part of the successful appeal in 2012 against 
the CFTC’s proposed position limits for 28 physical commodities (Peterson, 2012). 
For particular commodity classes, such as agriculture and energy, large 
commercial companies that have the expertise to manage market price risks have set up 
affiliates to specialize as swap dealers for those commodities.  The swaps industry is a 
concentration of 10 to 20 major financial institutions (commonly referred to as Wall 
Street Banks).  Between 1991 and Dodd-Frank (2010), the CFTC granted exemptions to 
swap dealers to manage price risk on their books that results from serving as a market 
maker for OTC clients.  Swap dealers, using futures and option markets to offset risks 
they hold due to swap positions on their books, were classified as commercial traders 
(hedgers) by the CFTC. 
CFMA (2000) prompted growth in OTC derivatives by exempting swaps from 
regulation.  The commodity index investors have not been directly subject to futures 
margins because they primarily have used OTC swaps, not futures contracts.  The swap 
dealers that provide commodity index exposures to investors through swaps (1) are 
subject to futures margins if they use ET futures to hedge their risk exposure from swaps 
but (2) may not use futures to hedge their exposures in full as they may have entered into 
other OTC transactions that offset their index exposures.  Index investors have not been 
restricted by contract position limits as they have obtained their index exposures through 
OTC swaps that are not subject to futures speculative position limits.  Swaps dealers have 
received exemptions from the CFTC that allow them to hold index-related futures 
positions in excess of speculative position limits.  With an exemption, a swap dealer can 
enable an investor to use an OTC swap to take a position that is greater than the level the 
investor would be permitted to take if the position were held solely in the futures market.  
The swap dealer can then take a futures position in excess of a position limit to hedge its 
exposure from the OTC swap. 
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Under Section 4a of the CEA (1936), the concept of “excessive speculation” is 
based on trading that results in “sudden or unreasonable fluctuations unwarranted 
changes in the price” of commodities underlying futures transactions.  The CEA does not 
make excessive speculation a per se violation of the Act, but rather, requires the CFTC to 
enact regulations to address such trading (i.e. through speculative position limits).  The 
CFTC report utilized to monitor traders’ positions is the Commitment of Traders Report 
(COT). 
Prior to 2009, in the COT report (CFTC, 2015) participants were classified as 
commercial and non-commercial.  Large trader data was filtered by type of trading 
activity.  Non-commercial entities included hedge funds, commodity trading advisors, 
commodity pool operators (managed money traders), and floor brokers and traders.   
Commercial entities any trader involved in the production, processing, merchandising, or 
other commercial activity in the commodity it is trading.  Swap dealers were classified as 
commercial traders. 
The COT report is published every Friday for markets in which there are 20 or 
more traders that hold positions above CFTC-established reporting levels.  The report 
shows commercial and non-commercial holdings, changes from previous report, 
percentage of open interest by category, concentration of positions held by the largest 4 
and 9 traders, and the number of trades in each category.  In January 2007, the CFTC 
increased transparency in 12 agricultural markets by publishing data on positions held by 
index traders. 
In September 2008, in response to the growth in swap dealer participation in ET 
futures markets, the CFTC made eight preliminary recommendations following an 
industry-wide survey of ET and OTC participants: (1) remove swap dealer from the 
commercial category and create a swap dealer classification for reporting purposes, (2) 
develop and publish a new periodic supplemental report on OTC swap dealer activity, (3) 
create a new CFTC office of data collection with enhanced procedures and staffing, (4) 
develop “Long Form” reporting for certain larger traders to more accurately assess type 
of trading activity, (5) review whether to eliminate bona fide hedge exemptions for swap 
dealers and create new limited risk management exemptions, (6) additional staffing and 
resources (budget of $111 million in 2008), (7) encourage clearing of OTC transaction, 
and (9) review of swap dealer commodity research independence. 
In September 2009, the CFTC began publishing a Disaggregated COT report that 
separates traders into 4 categories: (1) Producer / Merchant / Processor / User, (2) Swap 
Dealers, (3) Managed Money, and (4) Other Reportables.  As a result of Dodd-Frank, the 
CFTC (2015) now defines swap dealer as an entity that deals primarily in swaps for a 
commodity and uses the futures markets to manage or hedge the risk associated with 
those swap transactions.  The swap dealer’s counterparties may be speculative traders, 
like hedge funds, or traditional commercial clients that are managing risk arising from 








Appendix 28: An Overview of CFMA (2000) 
 
Approved by Congress on December 15, 2000, the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act (CFMA, 2000) was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on 
December 21, 2000.  The Act contains provisions affecting the regulatory and 
supervisory roles of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over derivative markets.  The highlight of 
CFMA 2000 was that it officially ensured the deregulation of financial products known 
as the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives.   Specifically, the Act clarifies that certain 
OTC derivative transactions are outside the jurisdiction of the CFTC (a debated 
regulatory issue between the SEC and CFTC since the introduction of financial futures 
markets in 1975).  The Act stipulates shared oversight by the CFTC and SEC, under 
certain conditions, for the trading of futures contracts on single stocks and narrowly-




The Act consists of four titles; Titles I and II dominate the Act.  Title I, 
Commodity Futures Modernization, amends CEA (1936) and revises specific provisions: 
(1) OTC derivatives, (2) futures exchange regulation, (3) contracts, (4) prohibited 
transactions, and (5) boards of trade.  Title II, Coordinated Regulation of Security 
Futures Products has two subtitles.  Subtitle A, Securities Law Amendments, amends the 
Security Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934 respecting (1) regulatory relief for markets and 
intermediaries trading security futures products, and (2) interagency cooperation.  
Subtitle B, Amendments to the CEA, amends the CEA with respect to SEC jurisdiction.  
Title III, Legal Certainty for Swap Agreements, amends the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
(GLBA) Act (repealed Glass Steagall Act of 1934), the Securities Act (SA) of 1933 and 
the SEA of 1934 with respect to swap agreements.  Title 1V, Regulatory Responsibility 
for Bank Products, introduces the Legal Certainty for Bank Products Act of 2000 that 
excludes specified banking products and swap agreements from CFTC jurisdiction. 
 
Introduction of CFMA 
 
On December 14, 2000, CFMA (2000) was first referred to the House 
subcommittee on Finance and Hazardous materials but was denied.  The Bill was then 
referred to the House Judiciary, Commerce, Banking and Financial Services, and 
Agriculture committees.  In each case the Bill was considered for such provisions that fall 
within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.  The sponsors introduced remarks on 
measure and then the Act was introduced into the House.  The co-sponsors of the Bill 
included three republicans and one democrat: Larry Combest (R, Texas), James Leach 




The main focus of the CFMA (2000) is OTC derivative transactions.  Prior to the 
Act, the CEA required that futures contracts must be traded on a CFTC regulated 
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exchange unless there was a statutory exclusion or regulatory exemption (which the 
CFTC began to issue in 1991).  Thus, OTC futures contracts were deemed illegal and 
unenforceable.  However, there was legal uncertainty because of the blurred distinctions 
between exchange-traded and OTC derivatives (since many OTC derivatives were based 
on exchange-traded markets).  The Act also amends the Shad-Johnson Accord (SJA) and 
the trading ban on single stock futures.  The SJA of 1982 was entered into between the 
SCE and CFTC, and subsequently codified by Congress, to clarify jurisdictions of the 
SEC and CFTC over security-based options and futures.  The SJA granted the SEC sole 
authority to regulate options on securities, certificates of deposit and stock groups while 
the regulation of futures and options on futures on exempted securities and broad-based 




Kloner (2001) provides an overview of key provisions of CFMA (2000).  The Act 
itself is 262 pages complete with definitions and references to other Acts of Congress and 
other sections of CFMA.  The following are Kloner’s (2001) selected provisions that 
pertain specifically to commodity futures market regulation and some extracts taken from 
the Act itself. 
 
Specified commodities, excluded commodities, and exempt commodities 
 
In CFMA (2000) the term, eligible contract participants (ECP), expands the 
range of persons eligible to make use of the new exclusions and exemptions created by 
the Act.  ECP includes regulated financial institutions, insurance companies, investment 
companies; commodity pools with total assets over $5 million; a corporation, partnership, 
trust, or other business entity that has total assets over $10 million, or enters into 
transactions guaranteed by other ECP’s, or if the transaction relates to the entities 
business, or has net worth over $1 million; employee benefit plans that have assets over 
$5 million and use independent advisers; government entities that transact with other 
ECP, own and invest on a discretionary basis more than $25 million in assets, or 
regularly enter into transactions with respect to the underlying commodity; regulated 
broker-dealers and futures commission merchants; CEA (1936) regulated floor brokers or 
traders connected to transactions via CEA (1936) regulated or exempt boards of trade; 
individuals with assets over $10 million (or $5 million if the transaction relates to the 
hedging of an asset); certain broker or investment advisers acting on behalf of an ECP; 
and any other person the CFTC determines eligible. 
The Act provides for the exclusions for certain transactions in foreign currency, 
government securities, and specified commodities.  These exclusions are for transactions 
other than those conducted on an organized exchange and foreign currency transactions 
between unregulated entities that are not eligible ECP.  The CFTC has only jurisdiction 
over retail foreign currency futures and options transactions that are not regulated by 
another federal agency.  Under the Act, the CEA (1936) does not apply to any transaction 
in an excluded commodity if the transaction is OTC (which includes a broad range, from 
interest rate products to any economic commercial index on price).  Subject to certain 
conditions, the Act generally exempts transactions in exempt commodities from most of 
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the regulatory requirements of the CEA.  An exempt commodity is a commodity that is 
neither an excluded commodity nor an agricultural commodity, i.e. metals or energy.  To 
qualify for an exemption, a transaction in an exempt commodity must be entered into (1) 
between ECP and not traded on an exchange or (2) between eligible commercial entities 
(ECE) on a principal-to-principal basis through and electronic trading facility (EFT).  The 
CFTC has authority to impose certain obligations on ETF’s through which qualifying 




The Act provides that the CEA (1936) does not apply to a hybrid instrument that 
is predominantly a security or depository instrument.  A hybrid instrument is deemed to 
be predominantly a security or depository instrument if (1) the issuer receives payment in 
full at the time of delivery, (2) the purchaser is not required to make additional payments, 
(3) the issuer is not subject to mark-to-market margining requirements, and (4) the 
instrument is not marketed as a futures contract.  A hybrid instrument is defined as a 
security or depository instrument that has one or more payments indexed to a value, level, 
or rate of one or more commodities.   
The Act excludes from the CEA (1936) any swap transaction and directs the 
CFTC, Federal Reserve, Treasury Department, and the SEC to conduct a study of the 
issues relating to the offering of swaps on a retail basis and to report back to Congress.  
Swap agreements must be entered into by ECP and all material terms must be 
individually negotiated.  Excluded from SEC authority over swaps are options and 
forwards on securities or security indexes. 
The Act excludes identified banking products (IBP) from the CEA (1936) if the 
product was commonly offered by a bank on or before December 5, 2000 and was not 
prohibited by the CEA (1936) or regulated by the CFTC before December 5, 2000.  IBP 
include any deposit instrument issued by a bank, banker’s acceptance, a loan or credit 
issued by a bank, a debit account at a bank, or any loan participation that is sold to 
professional investors.   Bank hybrid instruments (BHI) are also subject to the CEA and 
CFTC jurisdiction.  If the CFTC believes a BHI is not predominantly a banking product, 
it may consult with the Federal Reserve Board.  The Act also excludes covered swap 
agreements (CSA) from the CEA (1936). 
 
Reform of Shad-Johnson Accord 
 
The Act grants the SEC and CFTC joint jurisdiction over futures on single stocks 
and narrow-based stock indexes.  Broad-based indices remain exclusively under the 
CFTC’s jurisdiction.  Under the Act, the CFTC continues to be the primary regulator of 
futures markets and futures commission merchants; the SEC remains the primary 
regulator of securities markets and broker-dealers.  To trade security futures, futures 
exchanges and futures commission merchants are required to file notice registrations with 
the SEC, and securities exchanges and broker-dealers are required to file notice with the 
CFTC.  The SEC and CFTC will regulate all exchanges and intermediaries that trade 
security futures.  To avoid duplicate and inconsistent regulation, the SEC is required to 
coordinate with the CFTC on examinations of SEC notice-registered exchanges and 
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broker dealers, and the CFTC is required to coordinate with the SEC on examinations of 
CFTC notice-registered markets and intermediaries. 
 
Contract markets, DTEF, and EBT 
 
The Act specifies the criteria to be met by a board of trade in order to be 
designated as a contract market (contract markets in existence as of the date of the 
enactment of the Act are grandfathered).  The criteria include; establishing and enforcing 
rules preventing market manipulation, ensuring fair and equitable trading, specifying how 
the trade execution facility operates, ensuring the financial integrity of transactions, 
disciplining members or market participants who violate the rules, enabling the board of 
trade to obtain information to enforce its rules, and the Act provides eighteen core 
principles to maintain designation as a contract market (inclusive of “position limitations 
or accountability for speculators”). 
The Act amends the CEA (1936) where a board of trade may elect to operate as a 
derivatives transaction execution facility (DTEF) rather than a contract maker if it meets 
the DTEF designation requirements.  A registered DTEF may trade futures and options 
on any commodity that has a nearly exhaustible supply, not susceptible to manipulation, 
or does not have a cash market in place.  The CFTC is to facilitate the linking or 
coordination of derivatives clearing organizations registered under the Act with other 
regulated clearance facilities for the coordinated settlement of cleared transactions, 
coordinating with the Federal Banking agencies and the SEC.  Eligible DTEF traders 
include ECP’s and persons trading through registered futures commission merchants with 
capital of at least $20 million that are members of a self-regulatory organization and a 
clearing organization.  Board of trade can also operate a DTEF if they provide a separate 
location for DTEF trading; a board of trade must comply with nine core principles to 
maintain registration as a DTEF.  A DTEF may also trade futures and options on futures 
on any non-agricultural commodity if it limits such trading to ECP’s. 
The Act amends the CEA (1936) to permit a board to operate as an exempt board 
of trade (EBT).  To qualify as an EBT, a board of trade must limit trading to contracts 
where the (1) the underlying commodity has an inexhaustible deliverable supply, is not 
subject to manipulation, or has no cash market, (2) participants are eligible ECP’s, and 
(3) the contracts do not involve securities.  If the CFTC finds that the EBT is a source of 
price discovery for the underlying commodity, the EBT will be required to publicly 




The Act provides that a transaction between ECP’s shall be unenforceable under 
federal or state law based solely on the failure of the transaction to comply with the terms 
of an exemption or exclusion provided for under the CEA (1936) or by the CFTC.  The 
Act provides that no BHI or CSA shall be unenforceable based solely on the failure to 
comply with the terms and conditions of an exclusion from the CEA (1936). 
The Act provides special procedures to encourage and facilitate bona fide hedging 
by agricultural producers.  The CFTC is to consider issuing rules or orders to prescribe 
procedures for delivery, increase ease of participation, provide flexibility, and encourage 
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contract markets to provide information to facilitate the participation of agricultural 
producers in contract markets.  The CFTC is to report within a year to the Committee on 
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate on the steps it has taken to implement 
the above. 
The Act excludes ETF’s from regulation under the CEA (1936) to the extent that 
they offer other facilities for the trading of qualifying transactions in excluded 
commodities and/or qualifying hybrid instruments and swap transactions.   
The Act amends CEA (1936) to preempt state bucket shop and gambling laws to 
(1) qualifying transactions in specified commodities and excluded commodities, (2) 
qualifying hybrid instruments, swap transactions, and BHI’s and CSA’s and (3) excluded 
ETF’s.   
The Act amends the CEA (1936) to exempt an investment adviser registered 
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 from the requirement to register as a 
commodity trading advisor under the CEA (1936) where (1) its business does not consist 
of acting as a commodity trading advisor and (2) it does not act as a commodity trading 
advisor (CTA) to any investment trust or fund that is engaged in trading futures contracts 
on contract markets or DTEF’s.  Simply, CTAs can dispense commodity trading advice 
without having to register as a CTA under the CEA (1936). 
The Act amends the Federal banking laws, the Bankruptcy Code, and the CEA 
(1936) to provide a clear statutory basis for the regulation of clearing systems that 
develop for OTC derivatives.   
 
The provisions of the Act take effect the date of the enactment.  Trading in 
securities is prohibited until one year after the date of enactment of the Act or the date on 
which a futures association has met the requirements to become a limited purpose 
national securities association.  In the case of ECP’s trading on a principal-to-principal 
basis, the one-year period is reduced to eight months. 
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Appendix 29:  An Overview of Dodd-Frank (2010) 
 
Dodd-Frank (2010) was introduced in the House of Representatives on December 
2, 2009 as “The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009” by Barney 
Frank (D-MA).  The Act passed the House on December 11, 2009 and, after being 
introduced by Chris Dodd (D-CN), passed the Senate with amendment on May 20, 2010.   
The joint conference committee reported the Act on June 29, 2010, agreed to by the 
House on June 30, 2010, and by the Senate on July 15, 2010.  Dodd-Frank was signed 
into law by President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010 and enacted by 111th United States 
Congress effective July 21, 2010. 
Dodd-Frank is an 848-page document with 16 titles (54 including short titles).  
There have been 6 versions, 199 actions, 24 amendments, and 6 related bills. Certain 
components of the Act are still being challenged and contested to this day.  There were 
no additional sponsors for the Bill.  The various House Committees (and Subcommittees) 
that reviewed the legislation included: Financial Services, Agricultural, Energy and 
Commerce (Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection), Judiciary, Rules, Budget, 
Oversight and Government Reform, and Ways and Means.  For the Senate, the only 
committee was the Banking, Housing, and Urban Affaires Committee. 
 
Key Provision for Derivatives: Title VII 
 
The Act requires that most derivatives contracts, formerly traded exclusively in 
the OTC market, be cleared and traded on exchanges.  Traders in these products are 
required to post margin and have contracts re-priced each day.  Dodd-Frank (2010) 
presumes that some derivatives contracts will still be traded in the OTC market but the 
Act grants regulators broader powers to obtain information about these derivatives and 
impose margin and capital requirements on them as well.  Title VII, Wall Street 
Transparency and Accountability consists of two subtitles: (A) Regulation of OTC Swaps 
Markets and (B) Regulation of Security-Based Swap (SBS) Markets. 
 
Clearing and Reporting Requirements 
 
Title VII of the Act creates mostly parallel clearing and exchange trading 
requirements for swaps and security-based swaps (SBSs) as those terms are defined by 
Title VII and further clarified by the CFTC and SEC in joint rulemaking.  The CFTC 
(2015) explains that instruments based on interest or other monetary rates would be 
swaps, whereas instruments based on the yield or value of a single security, loan or 
narrow-based security index would be security-based swaps.  Section 723, amends 
CFMA (2000) and CEA (1936) creates the clearing and exchange trading requirements 
for swaps over which the CFTC has jurisdiction and Section 763 (amends GLB 1999 and 
SEA 1933) creates largely parallel requirements for SBSs over which the SEC has 
authority.  Dodd-Frank (2010) makes it unlawful for parties to enter into swaps or SBSs 
unless the transaction has been submitted for clearing (if the swap or SBS is required to 
be cleared).  Two ways a swap or SBSs may become subject to clearing requirement are 
(1) agency of jurisdiction is required to engage in an ongoing review for determination or 
(2) submission of request to the CFTC or SEC and the respective agency has 90 days to 
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determine whether the swap or SBS is subject to the clearing requirement, given five 
considerations and public comment.   In either case, the relevant agency determines that a 
particular swap or SBS is required to be cleared or is not required to be cleared. 
Referred to as the “exchange-trading requirement” (ETR) with certain exceptions, 
swaps and SBSs that are required to be cleared must also be executed on a regulated 
exchange, a swaps execution facility (SEF), or a security-based swap execution facility 
(SBSEF).  The goal is to promote pre-trade and price transparency.  SEFs and SBSEFs 
must comply with a number of core principles and the new trading facilities have 
regulatory and administrative responsibilities far beyond what applied to OTC trading 
desks pre-Dodd-Frank (2010).  The Act provides exceptions to the exchange-trading 
mandate: (1) if no exchange or SEF or SFSEF makes a swap available for trading, the 
contract may be traded OTC and (2) a swap that meets the end-user clearing exemption is 
likewise exempt.  SEFs provide pre-trade transparency (participants see quoted prices 
before transacting) and price data will be made public (real-time).  The CFTC and SEC 
have made proposed rules on the ETR since Dodd-Frank (2010) was enacted.  
Sections 723 and 763 provide exceptions to the clearing requirement for swaps 
and SBSs when one of the counterparties to the transaction is not a financial entity; this is 
refereed to as the “end-user exemption.”  The non-financial entity must use the 
transaction to hedge or mitigate commercial risk, and notify the relevant agency as to 
how it meets financial obligations associated with swaps.  A financial entity is defined as 
a swap dealer, a security-based swap dealer, a major swap participant (MSP), a major 
security-based swap participant, a commodity pool, a private fund, an employee benefit 
plan, or a person engaged in banking or activities of a financial nature.  The swaps 
engaged in by the non-financial entity, such as an airline or commodity producer, must be 
for the purpose of hedging (or mitigating commercial risk).  The swap must not be used 
for either a purpose that is in the nature of speculation, investing, or trading or to hedge 
another swap or SBS position unless that other position itself is used to hedge. The 
exemption applies on a swap-by-swap basis. 
Dodd-Frank (2010) defines a swap dealer (section 721) as any person (entity) that 
holds out as a dealer in swaps, makes a market in swaps, regularly enters into swaps with 
counterparties as an ordinary course of business, or engages in activity causing to be 
known as a dealer or market maker in swaps.  The Act excludes certain swaps used to 
hedge or mitigate risk, if the risks arise from a potential change in the value of assets a 
person (entity) produces or services provided.  It excludes swaps entered into between 
majority-owned affiliates.  The rule includes a “de minimus” exception (gross notional 
amount of $8 bln), but the threshold is subject to CFTC discretion.  The CFTC and SEC 
issued a joint rule on May 23, 2013 defining SD (as above) and MSP.  A major swap 
participant has a “substantial position” in swaps determined under two-pronged test: (1) a 
current exposure is substantial when the current mark-to-market value of swap position 
minus collateral posted against the position if the net uncollateralized exposure exceeds 
$1 bln, or $3 bln for interest rate and currency swaps and (2) a future exposure is 
substantial when current mark-to-market value of swap position minus collateral posted 
against the position if the net uncollateralized exposure exceeds $2 bln or $6 bln for 
interest rate and currency swaps. 
Regarding the reporting of swaps and SBSs, (1) swaps must be reported to 
registered swap data repositories or CFTC, (2) SBSs must be reported to registered SBS 
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data repositories or SEC, and (3) Dodd-Frank (2010) requires all swaps to be reported but 
there are grandfather clauses with respect to the Act and the clearing requirement.  
Section 727 of the Act outlines the public availability of swap transaction data and that 
the CFTC is required to promulgate rules regarding the availability of such data.  There is 
no parallel requirement for SBSs because national securities exchanges provide 
comparable reporting.  Swaps entered into prior to the enactment of the Act are subject to 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements for un-cleared swaps and SBSs so that the 
CFTC and SEC have a complete picture of derivatives market.  The SEC proposed its 
rule on reporting requirements for SBSs on 12/2/2010 and the CFTC issued a final rule 
describing reporting, recordkeeping, and daily trading record obligations for swap dealers 
and MSPs on 4/3/2012. 
The CFTC and SEC have the authority under the Act to promulgate rules they 
determine to be necessary to “prevent evasions of the mandatory clearing requirements 
under this Act.”  There are two ways in which a swap or SBS may become subject to the 
clearing requirement: (1) the DCO submit the swap and SBS to the CFTC or SEC and the 
agency determines whether to apply the mandatory clearing requirement or (2) the CFTC 
and SEC engage in independent review of swaps and SBSs to determine if those 
transactions should be subject to the mandatory clearing requirement.  It is possible that 
the CFTC and the SEC identify swaps and SBSs that are subject to the clearing 
requirement but no DCO or clearing agency accepts them for clearing.  In the event no 
acceptance, the relevant agency is required to investigate, issue a public report, and take 
such actions as the commission determines, which may include requiring margin or 
capital by the parties to the swap (but not if the financial integrity of the derivatives 
organization is threatened). 
 
Enhanced CFTC Authority 
 
The Dodd-Frank (2010) legislation intended to (1) insulate commodity prices 
from the impact of excessive speculation and manipulation by enhancing the CFTC’s 
power to set margin and position limits and (2) to prohibit manipulation in markets for 
commodities and swaps.  With respect to margin requirements and position limits, 
Section 736 of the Act grants the CFTC the authority to set margin requirements (but not 
specific margin amounts) for futures exchanges as the CFTC finds to be necessary and 
appropriate.  Section 737 of the Act directs the CFTC to establish position limits for 
swaps and futures.  In January 2011, the CFTC proposed position limits on 28 
commodities; but Wall Street lobbyists challenged the proposal.  In September 2012, the 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that it could not give 
deference to the CFTC’s interpretation of the statute because the agency had erroneously 
found the statute to be unambiguous.  The agency has since proposed new position limits 
and they have gone unchallenged.  
Section 753 amends the CEA (1936) to broaden the CFTC’s anti-manipulation 
authority and add new prohibitions against false reporting and providing misleading 
information to the CFTC.  The CFTC issued regulations implementing this authority, 
following a case-by-case approach, rather than setting detailed rules (similar to the SEC’s 
approach to prosecuting securities fraud).  In October 2012, the CFTC revealed that it had 
imposed the largest fine for violations of the anti-manipulation provisions of the CEA in 
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CFTC history.  Barclays Bank, PLC admitted to both UK and US regulators that it had 
submitted false reports of its borrowing rates to the British Bankers Association for 
LIBOR.  Barclays admitted to submitting knowingly false rates at the request of some the 
bank’s derivatives traders.  Barclays admitted that during the financial crisis it suspected 
other member banks of submitting rates to the BBA understating the bank's borrowing 
costs.  However, Barclays did not admit violating Section 6(c)(1) of the CEA but agreed 
to a $200 mln fine and to comply with certain internal controls designed to prevent 
manipulation. 
 
Prohibition on Federal Assistance to Swap Entities 
 
Section 716 of the Act prohibits federal assistance, defined as the use of funds to 
loan money to, buy the securities or other assets of, or to enter into “any assistance 
arrangement with a “swaps entity” (did not to take effect until July 16, 2013).  Swap 
entities include swap dealers and major swap participants, not including a major swap or 
SBS participant that is an insured depository institution.  The prohibition on aid does not 
prevent a complying bank from creating an affiliate that is a swaps entity; the bank itself 
may continue to act as a swaps dealer for contracts involving rates or reference assets, i.e. 
banks can continue as dealers in swaps linked to interest rates, currencies, government 
securities, and precious metals but not other commodities or equities.  Credit default 
swaps are treated as a special category; banks may deal in them if they are cleared by a 
DCO regulated by the SEC or CFTC.  Dealing in un-cleared credit default swaps is not 
deemed to be permissible bank activity.  The intent is to ensure that taxpayer funds are 
not to be used to meet obligations by financial institutions engaged in risky derivative 
trading.  Section 716 mandates that no taxpayer funds may be used to prevent the 
liquidation of a swaps entity. 
 
In summary, through the enactment of Dodd-Frank (2010) regulatory legislation 
(Miller and Ruane, 2012), the following applies to OTC derivative markets.  (1) Swap 
dealers and major swap participants (firms with substantial derivative positions) are 
subject to margin and capital requirements above and beyond the clearinghouse mandate.  
(2) Swaps that are cleared are also be subject to trading on an exchange, or an exchange-
like “swap execution facility” regulated by either the CFTC (in the case of commodity or 
index-based swaps) or the SEC (in the case of security-based swaps).  (3) All trades are 
reported to data repositories, so that regulators have complete information about all 
derivative positions.  (4) Data on swap prices and trading volumes are made public.  (5) 
Exceptions to the clearing and trading requirements are made for commercial hedgers 
(bona-fide hedgers) and smaller institutions; but trades are still reported to data 
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